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2016 State of the Commonwealth Report
■   PRODUCED BY THE STROME COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AT OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
■  SPONSORED BY THE VIRGINIA CHAMBER FOUNDATION

November 2016
Dear Reader:
T
his is the second State of the Commonwealth Report produced by the 
Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University. 
It is jointly sponsored by ODU’s Strome College of Business and the 
Virginia Chamber of Commerce. While the report represents the work of 
many people connected in various ways to the university, it does not constitute 
an official viewpoint of Old Dominion, or its president, John R. Broderick. 
Similarly, it does not represent the views of the Virginia Chamber of 
Commerce or its president, Barry DuVal.    
The report maintains the goal of stimulating thought and discussion that 
ultimately will make Virginia an even better place to live, work and do 
business. We are proud of the Commonwealth’s many successes, but realize 
that it is possible to improve our performance. In order to do so, we must have 
accurate information about “where we are” and a sound understanding of the 
policy options open to us.  
The 2016 report is divided into eight parts:
The Virginia Economy in Transition: The Commonwealth is experiencing 
relatively slow economic growth as it gradually transitions from an economy 
highly dependent upon federal spending to one that still involves a substantial 
federal presence, but also more value-added private-sector activities, 
entrepreneurial ventures and participation in international trade.   
Northern Virginia: Turning the Corner? NOVA now accounts for 37 percent 
of all employment in Virginia, but approximately 45 percent of the value of 
the Commonwealth’s economic activity. Recent growth in professional and 
business services employment suggests that the region may have turned the 
corner toward a more diverse, private sector-oriented economy.   
The Hotel Industry in the Commonwealth: Over the past quarter-century, 
the hotel industry has become a relatively less important part of the Virginia 
economy. Occupancy rates have yet to recover to prerecession levels and price-
adjusted hotel revenue and revenue per available room in 2015 similarly were 
below their previous peaks. 
Will Robots Take Your Job? A Look at Virginia’s Opportunities and 
Vulnerabilities: A recent study found that 47 percent of all current jobs are 
susceptible to loss because of automation and the use of artificial intelligence. 
The key to a worker’s job vulnerability relates primarily to whether that 
worker is engaged in repetitive work that can be replicated by a machine or 
software using artificial intelligence. 
Broadband in Virginia: Vital for Economic Development: Up to 70 percent 
of the world’s internet traffic flows through Northern Virginia, but some 
areas of the Commonwealth still do not enjoy broadband internet connections. 
Robust broadband access now is as important as roads, bridges and airports in 
terms of economic development and population growth.
Stock Car Racing in Virginia: The Sport and the Business: In addition to 
its nationally prominent Bristol Motor Speedway and Richmond International 
Speedway, the Commonwealth hosts nine other racetracks, five dirt tracks and 
eight drag racing strips. While still a very important economic phenomenon, 
attendance and revenue data suggest that stock car racing has passed its peak 
of popularity.
The Rise of Single-Earner Households in Virginia: Why It Matters: 
Forty-seven percent of all households in Virginia now are headed by one or 
more single individuals and these households include all adult age groups. 
Nevertheless, our current legal and regulatory structure continues to focus on 
“Ozzie and Harriet” households.   
Liberty University: A Higher Education Phenomenon: Christian-centered 
Liberty University has a combined on-campus and online enrollment of more 
than 100,000 students and has accumulated an endowment of $1.4 billion. The 
university’s long-term aspiration is to be considered in the same breath as 
Notre Dame is for Roman Catholics and Brigham Young is for Mormons.
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ii 2016 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT■
November 2016
Dear Reader:
T
he Virginia Chamber Foundation is pleased to present you with 
the second State of the Commonwealth Report, to once again give 
a detailed economic profile of significant trends that will affect 
Virginia’s future growth. This independent report, produced by Old Dominion 
University’s Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, is a key part of the 
Virginia Chamber Foundation’s mission to strengthen Virginia’s long-term 
competitiveness through research that provides relevant metrics for our 
economy’s progress. 
The annual State of the Commonwealth Report is a key way in which we 
measure the success of our economic strategies. I would like to thank those 
who contributed their support to the Virginia Chamber Foundation, which 
allows us to invest in this statewide economic profile. Those foundation 
sponsors are recognized on the following page. 
This year’s report takes an in-depth look at economic trends at a regional and 
statewide level, and provides a perspective of how we’re faring compared with 
other states around the country. The data in this report will be of particular 
importance as we launch the effort to update the Virginia Chamber’s 
Blueprint Virginia. 
In 2013, we released the first Blueprint Virginia, with ambitious policy 
goals for advancing Virginia’s long-term economic growth. Since that first 
Blueprint, we have made significant progress implementing those policies, and 
at the same time, the Chamber has nearly doubled its membership to 25,000 
companies around the Commonwealth. Blueprint 2025 will engage a larger, 
more diverse cross-section of Virginia businesses to establish even more 
ambitious goals to improve Virginia’s business climate. 
While the conclusions of this independent report are the authors’ alone, and 
do not necessarily reflect those of the Virginia Chamber of Commerce or 
our members, the State of the Commonwealth Report presents a critically 
important benchmark for Virginia’s economy. I hope that it will continue to 
spark candid conversations about the best ways to overcome our challenges, 
and that those conversations result in action. 
The Virginia Chamber will continue to be a catalyst for ideas to improve 
Virginia’s long-term business climate and for implementing those policy ideas 
at the state and federal levels. This year, we had a 95 percent success rate in 
implementing Blueprint priorities in the General Assembly. There is much 
work left to be done. 
We hope that the content of this report will help policymakers make informed 
decisions that will put private-sector businesses on the path to creating more 
high-wage, high-growth jobs and bring greater prosperity to all Virginians.
 
Sincerely,
Barry DuVal 
President & CEO  
Virginia Chamber of Commerce
iii
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■THE VIRGINIA 
ECONOMY IN 
TRANSITION 
Times of transition are strenuous, but I love 
them. We can make our new normal any way 
we want.
– Kristin Armstrong
2
3The Virginia economy is in transition. It is moving slowly away from an economic base dominated by federal 
spending, especially defense spending, to one 
in which value-added private-sector activities, 
entrepreneurial instincts and international 
trade will play increasingly large roles. At 
the same time, it is learning to cope with 
rapid technological change that often features 
labor-saving devices that reduce the demand 
for some kinds of labor, even while they 
increase the demand for other occupations 
and specialties.     
The transition can be exhilarating. Witness the 
economic energy of Northern Virginia, which 
now accounts for approximately 45 percent 
of the value of the Commonwealth’s annual 
output, or the emergence of biotechnology cores 
in Richmond and Prince William County.  
Yet, transition also can be painful. Witness the 
gradual decline in importance of mining and 
textile production in Virginia, or the inability 
of Hampton Roads almost one decade later 
to recover all of the jobs the region lost in the 
Great Recession of 2008. 
The transition process has been confounded 
by economic data sending us contradictory 
signals about our progress. Virginia’s rate 
of unemployment has been falling (good), but 
simultaneously the absolute size of our labor 
force and our labor force participation rate 
have been falling (not so good).  
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Consider as well the somewhat discordant economic growth numbers the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce 
distributed in September 2016. The BEA informed us that its advance 
estimate of the real (after inflation) rate of growth of the Commonwealth’s 
economy in 2015 was a modest 1.4 percent, even while the rates were a 
hefty 3.7 percent in Hampton Roads and 3.9 percent in Richmond. Growth 
in the Washington/Alexandria/Arlington metropolitan area was a tepid 1.3 
percent and the rest of the state’s metro areas combined for a 1 percent 
contraction. 
These numbers are difficult to interpret. The strong growth in Richmond 
and Hampton Roads would seem to suggest statewide growth above 1.4 
percent, even with the D.C. metro area’s growth at only 1.3 percent. The 
issue is that Northern Virginia (NOVA) accounts for a major share of 
the Virginia economy, but the NOVA metro area definition includes the 
District of Columbia and a good part of the District’s suburbs in Maryland. 
However, the Virginia gross domestic product (GDP) estimates would only 
include the economic activity in Virginia counties and independent cities 
and not the D.C./Alexandria/Arlington region as a whole.1  
Looking at state compensation data, Northern Virginia accounts for 
42 percent, Richmond and Hampton Roads combine for another 35 
percent and the remainder of the metro areas in the Commonwealth 
account for the remaining 23 percent. Using these shares to weight the 
2015 metropolitan GDP growth rates suggests a rate of growth around 
1.9 percent for the state, close to the number released for 2015 GDP 
growth. So, as in recent years, Virginia’s rate of growth remained low in 
2015 largely because growth in Northern Virginia remained weak. 
GDP growth is a headline-grabbing calculation, but it is not without some 
issues. We need to sort out what has been happening across the entire 
economic landscape in the Commonwealth and its metropolitan areas.  
Let’s begin with Graph 1, which presents the annual growth rates for 
real (price-adjusted) GDP for the United States and Virginia since 2007. 
Whereas the prerecession period (2000-2007) was a time of prosperity for 
1  This calculation is nearly identical to the procedure used by the BEA to drill down to metro area GDP 
estimates. For example, Virginia saw a slowdown in finance, insurance and real estate growth in 2015. The 
D.C.-Alexandria-Arlington metro has the highest share of compensation in that industry and, therefore, will 
contract relatively more than Richmond or Hampton Roads. For a full discussion of how metro area GDP is 
estimated, please see: http://www.bea.gov/regional/pdf/GDPMetro2015.pdf.
the Commonwealth, GDP growth in Virginia since the Great Recession 
has trailed the national growth rate five years in a row.  
In both 2012 and 2014, the gap between the national economic growth 
rate and our state economic growth rate was enormous. 2014 represented 
an economic low point for the Commonwealth. Virginia GDP growth 
was effectively zero (0.02 percent), while the nation grew at 2.4 percent. 
Viewed in this context, the 2016 Q1 real GDP estimate of 1.9 percent for 
the Commonwealth represents a welcome upward trend. The estimate 
for Q2 will be released in early December and we are forecasting growth 
around 1.9 percent again. 
How do we explain Virginia’s lethargic economic growth after the Great 
Recession? A slowdown in federal government spending – which accounts 
for almost 30 percent2 of the Commonwealth’s GDP – is the major culprit. 
This spending comes to Virginia in two major forms: expenditures on 
personnel and contract awards to business firms for construction, supplies 
and services.  
Unfortunately, both the total wages earned by federal government 
personnel in Virginia and the dollar volume of government contracts 
awarded to Virginia firms trended downward between 2010 and 2015 
(see Table 1). So also did the number of active-duty military personnel in 
the Commonwealth; we have at least 25,000 fewer active-duty military 
personnel in Virginia today compared to the turn of the century, and of 
course we have lost their spending as well.    
Transition or not, federal spending continues to be the engine that 
drives the Virginia economy. Northern Virginia (especially Fairfax 
County and Arlington), Norfolk, Newport News and Virginia Beach 
host the lion’s share of the defense-related federal spending in the 
Commonwealth. Federal contracts (both defense and nondefense) 
were responsible for approximately 14 percent of the real gross 
state product in FY 2010, but by FY 2015, that share had receded to 
11 percent. In dollar terms, this represented a momentous $10 billion 
reduction in federal contract activity in Virginia. Federal government 
contract awards and defense contract awards to firms headquartered in 
Virginia peaked in FY 2011 and have been declining ever since.3  
2   So reports the Pew Charitable Trust, “Federal Spending in the States, 2005 to 2014,” March 3, 2016, 
www.pewtrusts.org.
3   The trend is adverse as well. Between FY 2014 and FY 2015, total federal contracts nationally contracted by 
1.4 percent, but in Virginia contracted by 6.3 percent.  
5GRAPH 1
UNITED STATES AND VIRGINIA ACTUAL AND FORECASTED REAL GDP, 2007-2016-Q2
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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TABLE 1
TOTAL CONTRACT AWARDS FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO FIRMS IN VIRGINIA, 
FY 2010 TO FY 2015 (BILLIONS OF $)
Military 
Compensation
Total Contract 
Awards
Defense 
Contract Awards
FY 2010 $13.619 $58.890 $41.017
FY 2011 $13.408 $60,217 $42.873
FY 2012 $13.260 $55.227 $37.865
FY 2013 $12.845 $51.117 $33.454
FY 2014 $12.693 $51.929 $33.673
FY 2015 $12.664 $48.663 $29.612
Source: usaspending.gov and calculations by the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at 
Old Dominion University
Sequestration: A Primer
Sequestration is a previously obscure legal term that first leaped into the 
public consciousness in 2011. It refers to someone taking legal possession 
of assets until specific debts have been paid. Since the Budget Control Act 
(BCA) of 2011, however, the word sequestration most often is used with 
reference to federal government budget spending caps that are part of 
the BCA. The original BCA reduced estimated baseline federal spending 
by a cumulative $1 trillion between FY 2012 and FY 2021. The reductions 
were equally split between national defense and nondefense discretionary 
expenditures. 
The BCA also established a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction 
(JSCDR) with the express intent that it would achieve agreement on 
an additional deficit reduction package of at least $1.2 trillion. As an 
incentive, if agreement was not reached, the BCA mandated further 
across-the-board reductions in total discretionary spending of $1.2 
trillion, once again split evenly between national defense and nondefense 
discretionary expenditures. The BCA also required the president to 
withhold expenditures to achieve the “sequester level” spending caps in 
the event spending exceeded these caps. When the JSCDR failed to reach 
agreement on a deficit reduction package, the president implemented the 
sequester mechanism as required by the BCA in FY 2013.  
The red line in Graph 2 illustrates the sequester level of federal defense 
expenditures. The blue line estimates what expenditures would have been 
without any of the give-and-take just described. The three trapezoids 
above the red line represent sequestration relief – deals, if you will – that 
Congress made with the president since 2011 to alter the terms of the 
BCA. Each of these agreements added some defense spending, but as the 
graph indicates, each also was accompanied by an expiration date. Thus, 
the trapezoids did not constitute permanent spending increases.
The BCA caps, even with revisions, have significantly dampened prospects 
for future increases in defense spending. Even so, Congress has a long-
established appetite for increased spending, with Republicans tending 
to prefer increased defense spending, and Democrats tending to opt 
for increased spending on nondefense-related social and infrastructure 
programs. The two parties may hammer out yet another compromise, 
but this is hardly guaranteed. Further, any deal that might be made will 
result in only marginal changes in the BCA, rather than a wholesale 
abandonment of it.  
When all is said and done, absent the nation entering a war or major 
conflict, the overall outlook for defense spending is hardly sanguine. It is 
defense spending, or lack thereof, that will call much of the economic tune 
in Virginia over the next few years.     
7GRAPH 2
FEDERAL DEFENSE BUDGETS WITH AND WITHOUT SEQUESTRATION, FY 2012 TO FY 2021
Source: Congressional Research Service, “Defense: FY 2017 Budget Request, Authorization and Appropriations,” April 12, 2016
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Sectoral Sources of Economic 
Growth in Virginia
Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis suggest that a slowdown 
in the economic activity in the government sector (federal, state and 
local) was responsible for shaving 0.6 percent from the 2015 real 
growth rate of Virginia. Graph 3 provides these GDP contribution 
data for the government sector as well as for the other major sectors of 
the economy. Note that manufacturing exercised a negative 2.5 percent 
influence on the state’s growth rate, even while it continues to account for 
9 percent of Virginia’s GDP.  
Somewhat surprising in Graph 3 is the strongly positive contribution of 
agriculture to the Commonwealth’s economic growth in 2015. Relatively 
speaking, agriculture has been declining in importance in Virginia, but 
its impact on the state’s economy in 2015 was considerable. On the other 
hand, mining continued its long-term decline in importance.
Graph 4 takes a longer-range view (2007-2015) and provides a look at 
the change in sector contribution to economic growth across the various 
sectors in the Commonwealth. The information sector and finance 
and insurance have experienced strong recoveries. Agriculture has 
experienced a remarkable turnaround during the recovery period. Mining, 
transportation and warehousing, manufacturing and government all 
remain negative or slightly positive contributors to growth in 2015. So, it 
is possible that structural changes have occurred in these industries. These 
sectors may never recover sufficiently to provide meaningful contributions 
to growth.
9GRAPH 3
INDUSTRY SECTOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO 2015 REAL GDP GROWTH
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 4
CHANGE IN INDUSTRY SECTOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO POSTRECESSION REAL GDP GROWTH, 2007-2015
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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Virginia’s Economy Has Been 
Diversifying, But…
For years, conversations in the Commonwealth have focused on the need 
to diversify the state’s economy away from such strong reliance upon 
government activity and toward the private sector. The truth is that 
the state actually has been doing exactly this for nearly 20 years, albeit 
not as rapidly as some would prefer. Graph 5 illustrates the share of 
the Virginia economy that can be attributed to private industry. Private 
industry’s share of real GDP was only 78 percent in 1997, implying that 
the government was responsible for 22 percent. In 2015, the private-sector 
share had risen to 82 percent. This increase may not seem large, but it 
corresponds to $17 billion in output.  
Still, before we congratulate ourselves for our diversification successes, 
we must recognize that most of the change during this decade can be 
attributed to congressional spending sequestration. Simply put, it was 
imposed on us. The federal government has not been spending as much 
in several areas important to the Virginia economy and it is this decline, 
rather than exuberant private-sector growth, that is primarily responsible 
for the increasing relative importance of our private sector. 
Virginia now has recorded four straight years in which its real rate of 
economic growth has been less than 2 percent. Declining federal spending 
is the primary cause. This leads naturally to a question: Why have the 
federal government spending cuts been so painful for Virginia, but less so 
for most of our neighboring states?  
The story starts with the Great Recession. Graph 5 illustrates how 
the recession disrupted what had been a slow, steady increase in 
private industry’s share of GDP. Between 2006 and 2009, government 
expenditures became a larger share of the Commonwealth’s GDP, as was 
the case during the 2001 recession. Counter-cyclical federal government 
spending in many cases took the place of private-sector expenditures. 
Declining federal spending changed this pattern and put a chill on 
government spending and contracting in Virginia. This quickly translated 
to lower economic growth rates for the Commonwealth. Further, if 
sequestration continues in a meaningful way, then Virginia is quite likely 
to continue in the economic doldrums and experience lower than average 
economic growth rates.
Other states have not felt comparable pain from their contractions 
in federal spending. The major reason is that their private sectors, 
relatively speaking, are stronger than those of Virginia. Graph 6 
reports the private-sector share of gross state product for South Carolina, 
North Carolina, Maryland and Florida from 2012 through 2015. In 
2015, Florida, at 88 percent, had the largest private-sector share. North 
Carolina was a close second at 87 percent, followed by South Carolina at 
85 percent.  
Not only are Florida, North Carolina and South Carolina less dependent 
upon federal spending than Virginia and Maryland, but also their 
economies are growing faster. Virginia and Maryland have tended to be 
“feast or famine” states that boom when federal government spending is 
rising (witness 2000-2006) and suffer when federal government spending 
declines (which describes most of this decade). Table 2 summarizes these 
relationships for the 2012-2015 time period.
TABLE 2
REAL GDP GROWTH 2012-2015 - SELECTED STATES 
(2015 STATE RANKING GIVEN IN PARENTHESIS)
Virginia Maryland Florida
North 
Carolina
South 
Carolina
2012 0.7% 0.4% 1.8% -0.3% 0.2%
2013 0.2 -0.1 2.3 1.3 1.1
2014 0 1.6 2.6 2.1 2.5
2015 1.4 (33) 1.5 (29) 3.1 (7) 2.7 (10) 1.9 (18)
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
2016 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
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GRAPH 5
PRIVATE-SECTOR SHARE OF GDP IN VIRGINIA, 1997-2015
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and calculations by the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 6
PRIVATE SHARE OF GDP FOR SELECTED STATES, 2012-2015
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and calculations by the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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Labor Market Conditions
Labor market conditions in Virginia continued to improve during 2015. 
Total nonfarm payroll employment expanded by 285,600 jobs, or 1.8 
percent above the 2014 level (see Graph 7). This marked the highest 
number of jobs added annually since 2012. The Commonwealth did add 
jobs in both 2013 and 2014, but at levels that significantly lagged the 
performance of other states and the United States as a whole. Hence, the 
Commonwealth’s 2015 performance was a clear departure from mediocrity 
and a positive sign. 
Graph 8 presents employment growth for the first seven months of 2016 
compared to the same month in 2015. January, February and March were 
characterized by strong job creation in Virginia. However, since March, 
job growth in Virginia has decelerated noticeably. July had one of the 
smallest increases in employment growth in recent history. The data for 
August were better, but taken as a whole, 2016 job growth has been slower 
than expected. This was a contributing reason why Gov. Terry McAuliffe 
reported that the state’s tax collections were trailing forecasts and state 
budgets had to adjust accordingly.      
15
GRAPH 7
NONFARM PAYROLL EMPLOYMENT (TOTAL AND ANNUAL GROWTH), 2007-2015 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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GRAPH 8
TOTAL NONFARM PAYROLL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH – 2016 COMPARED TO SAME MONTH 2015
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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THE JOB GROWTH REQUIRED TO REDUCE 
VIRGINIA’S RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
We can agree that the more jobs, the better.  However, what constitutes 
strong job growth versus weak job growth? One way to evaluate job growth 
in Virginia would be to ask how much job growth would be needed to 
reduce our unemployment rate by a specific amount. Our July 2016 rate of 
unemployment was 3.7 percent. What magnitude of job growth is required 
to reduce this rate to 3 percent by July 2017? The answer: We would need 
to add a net of 4,858 new jobs each month for another 12 months.  
Graph 9 tells us we were falling well short of generating the new jobs 
required to reduce our state’s unemployment rate to 3 percent. March, 
April and May were well below the 4,858 net jobs goal. However, June, 
July and August were much improved.     
Graph 10 confirms that for many years the rate of unemployment in 
Virginia was lower than that of the entire country. In July 2016, it was 1.2 
percent below the national rate. In general, this has reflected the strength 
of the Virginia economy over time. Even so, one can expect this gap to 
narrow and even disappear if the Virginia economy continues to grow at a 
slower rate than the national economy.  
THE AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES OF 
VIRGINIA WORKERS
Another important measure of labor market health is the level of wages 
earned by a typical worker. The good news is that average weekly wages 
per employee in the Commonwealth have been increasing. The average 
weekly wage paid a Virginia worker in 2015 was $918, a 4 percent 
increase over 2014. This easily exceeded the 0.8 percent growth in the 
Consumer Price Index between December 2014 and December 2015, 
so the real incomes and spending power of workers grew. Indeed, since 
the end of the Great Recession, the average weekly wage of a Virginia 
worker has risen 18 percent (from $779.88 to $918.41). It appears as 
if 2016 will continue this trend; wage data through 2016-Q2 show a 
2 percent growth over 2015-Q2.
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
Measured unemployment rates are heavily influenced by labor force 
participation. This is because unemployment is measured as a percentage 
of the existing labor force. One is considered to be in the labor force either 
if one already has a job, or does not have a job but is actively seeking one. 
Therefore, individuals who have dropped out of the labor market and are 
no longer seeking employment (for whatever reason) are not counted 
as members of the labor force. This reduces the size of the denominator 
when the rate of unemployment is computed and reduces the measured 
unemployment rate. Paradoxically, this may occur even though the reason 
the individuals dropped out of the labor force was that they could not find 
work.  
Let’s examine recent evidence concerning labor force participation. 
Graph 11 shows the increase in the percentage of adults ages 16-64 
who were not working in selected locations in Virginia. Virginians 
have been dropping out of the labor force at alarming rates, so much 
so that the absolute size of our state’s labor force has been declining 
(see Graph 12).   
What has been driving these adverse labor force participation 
developments? There are five prominent hypotheses that purport to 
explain why labor force participation has been falling in Virginia as well as 
nationally. They are complementary explanations because each may have 
some validity. We will consider each in turn.
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 GRAPH 9
2016 MONTHLY NET EMPLOYMENT CHANGE – TOTAL NONFARM EMPLOYMENT
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Jobs Calculator
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2016 Monthly Net Employment Change – Total Nonfarm Employment 
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GRAPH 10
NATIONAL AND VIRGINIA RATES OF UNEMPLOYMENT (U3), 2012-2016
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 10	
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GRAPH 11
PERCENT INCREASE IN ADULTS AGES 16-64 NOT WORKING, 2009-2014
Source: Headwaters Economics, Economic Profile System, www.headwaterseconomic.org 11	
	
	
Graph 11 
Percent Increase in Adults Ages 16-64 Not Working, 2009-2014 
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Graph 1  
Percent Increase in Adults Ages 1 -64 Not Working, 20 9-2014 
 
.20%
3.20%
3.90%
4. %
6.70%
5.20%
4.20%
4. %
. %
1. %
2. %
3. %
4. %
5. %
6. %
7. %
8. %
Fairfax County Fredericksburg 
City
Roanoke City Lynchburg City Bristol City Richmond City Virginia Beach 
City
United States
	
	
	
raph 11 
erce t I crease i  lts ges 1 -64 ot or i g, 2009-2014 
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Fairfax ounty Fr dericksburg 
ity
oanoke ity Lynchburg ity ristol ity ich ond ity irginia each 
ity
nited ates
21
GRAPH 12
SIZE OF THE VIRGINIA LABOR FORCE
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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DISCOURAGED WORKERS
This explanation asserts that some people attempt to find a job, but 
cannot, and get frustrated and drop out of the labor force. The Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) calculates a variety of unemployment rates 
for the United States and individual states that attempt to capture this 
phenomenon. In addition to the conventional “U3” rate of unemployment 
that the media publicize, the BLS also computes a “U6” rate that 
is a broader measure of labor market weakness than the usual U3 
unemployment rate. The U6 rate includes employees who are working 
part time, but would rather work full time, plus discouraged workers who 
have stopped looking for jobs. Because it is much more inclusive, the U6 
rate always exceeds the more common U3 unemployment rate and the gap 
between the two grows rapidly during times of economic recession, when 
discouraged workers multiply in number.  
Graph 13 reports the U6 unemployment rates for the United States 
and Virginia between 2003 and 2016. There is little doubt that the 
discouraged worker effect is real. It is accentuated by what is often 
labeled “structural unemployment” – jobs are available, but those who 
are unemployed either are not qualified to fill them, or they are not in 
the right geographic location to do so. Prospective employees who are 
not qualified to fill available jobs undoubtedly do get discouraged and 
some stop looking.
CHANGING DEMOGRAPHY
Our population is aging and as it ages, one might expect an increasing 
proportion of people to drop out of the labor force because they have ended 
their useful work lives. Until recently, few argued with this supposition. 
However, as Graph 14 demonstrates, the labor force participation rates 
(LFPRs) of more mature individuals have been increasing in recent years. 
Perhaps more mature people find they cannot afford to retire as quickly. 
Whatever the reason, a demographic explanation for falling labor force 
participation rates no longer is persuasive.
GENEROUS SOCIAL SAFETY NET
Some worry that the social safety net has become sufficiently 
generous that it enables people to avoid having to earn income. This 
narrative involves an individual cobbling together some combination of 
unemployment compensation, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF), food stamps and the like to eke out an existence.  
This explanation reflects a variant of what is termed “moral hazard” – 
negative behavior that can arise when people know they are insured or 
otherwise will be supported in a specific situation. Moral hazard is the 
bane of insurance companies because individuals covered by insurance 
subsequently often take greater risks.  
Is this true for the social safety net? This is not clear. However, we can 
make two social safety net statements with confidence. First, real per 
capita safety net expenditures have been increasing in the United States. 
Second, large differences exist among the states in terms of the social 
safety net benefits they provide their residents.  
With respect to increasing real safety net expenditures, the most rapidly 
growing social benefit is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). However, 
it is paid as a supplement only to individuals who already are working, so 
it does not qualify as a program that discourages work. The second most 
rapidly growing social safety net expenditure is TANF, and here real per 
capita expenditures have approximately tripled between 2000 and 2014.4 It 
could be a factor in declining labor force participation rates.
Differences in state social safety net expenditures might cause people in 
some states to move to more generous states, and some people in those 
states not to seek work. In 2013, in the most generous state, the average 
unemployment insurance benefit was $6,894, whereas it was less than half 
of this ($3,335) in the least generous state. Further, with respect to TANF, 
the proportion of poor families with children who received TANF in 2013 
varied from a low of 3 percent to a high of 61 percent among the states.5 
Clearly, if TANF makes a difference, much would depend upon where one 
resides.
Nevertheless, empirical work suggests that the social safety net hypothesis 
cannot explain more than 10 to 20 percent of the variations in labor force 
participation. It is a political hot button explanation that has only limited 
empirical validity.
4   Catherine Rampell, “The Changing Social Safety Net, in Charts,” The Washington Post (April 8, 2014), 
www.washingtonpost.com.
5   Sarah Bruch, “Inequalities in Safety Net Programs Across the U.S. States,” Scholars Strategy Network 
(October 2015), www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/node/28104.
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GRAPH 13
THE U6 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: VIRGINIA AND UNITED STATES, 2003-2016
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Graph 13 
The U6 Unemployment Rate:Virginia and United States, 2003-2016 
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GRAPH 14
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF MORE MATURE INDIVIDUALS
Source: Doug Short, “Demographic Trends for the 50-and-older Work Force,” www.dshort.com (Sept. 7, 2016)
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RISING DISABILITY CLAIMS
National Public Radio reported in 2013 that nearly one in every four 
adults in Hale County, Ala., was receiving a federal disability payment.6 In 
general, an increasing number of adults are successfully claiming disability 
(see Graph 15). This is true for the United States and also for Virginia. 
There is little doubt that this has reduced labor force participation, but 
by itself can explain no more than one-fifth of the recent declines in labor 
force participation that we have observed.
INCREASED RATES OF COLLEGE ATTENDANCE
Until recently, some of the decline in the labor force participation of 
younger adults could be attributed to greater proportions of them 
attending college. This has come to an end, as Graph 16 illustrates. 
Headcount enrollments have been falling in most segments of higher 
education, including, especially, public two-year colleges, though by no 
means at all institutions. 
6   www.npr.org/2013/03/25/175293860/in-one-alabama-county-nearly-1-in-4-working-age-adults-is-on-
disability.
SUMMING UP THE LABOR FORCE 
PARTICIPATION RATE EVIDENCE
There is no single explanation capable of elucidating the phenomenon 
of declining labor force participation in the United States or Virginia. 
Quantitatively, the discouraged worker hypothesis (and related structural 
unemployment) appears to be the single most important explanation of 
falling labor force participation, but even after accounting for discouraged 
workers, one can only explain less than half of the changes we have 
observed in recent years. For the Commonwealth, there is also some 
evidence that disability claims are playing an increasing role, but these, 
too, explain just a portion of the labor force contraction.
Plausibly, we must look for additional explanations that extend beyond the 
economic realm where declining labor force participation is concerned. 
Could it be that gradual changes in societal attitudes have occurred such 
that it now is socially more acceptable for many people not to be in the 
labor force, or to work only part time? And further, that laborsaving 
technological change will make such behavior commonplace? We do not 
have room to explore these possibilities here, but they are intriguing topics 
worthy of the attention of government at both the state and federal level.
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GRAPH 15
RISING DISABILITY CLAIMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND VIRGINIA (IN THOUSANDS)
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2015 American Community Survey
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GRAPH 16
DECLINING COLLEGE HEADCOUNT ENROLLMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011-2014
  
Source: National Center for Educational Statistics, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_303.25.asp?current=yes
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Graph	16	
Declining	College	Headcount	Enrollments	in	the	United	States,	2011-2014	
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A Side Point: Where Do Net 
New Jobs Come From?
The employment numbers examined in this chapter all have been “net” 
levels. At the same time, some firms are shedding jobs, while other firms 
are adding jobs either through expansion of existing facilities or by the 
creation of a new firm. The final nonfarm payroll employment numbers 
that we report in this chapter are net jobs after all of such pluses and 
minuses have been taken into consideration.  
As is true in most states, new job creation in Virginia is largely caused 
by the expansion of existing firms. About 75 percent of job creation in 
Virginia comes from the expansion of existing firms.7 
The Commonwealth’s 
Tax Revenue Shortfall
Gov. McAuliffe announced in August that the Commonwealth was not 
collecting the volume of tax revenues forecast for the 2016 fiscal year. To 
the extent that tax revenues are a leading economic indicator, the shortfall 
tells us that Virginia’s economic growth is decelerating. The rather modest 
Bureau of Economic Analysis gross domestic product growth estimates for 
Virginia in September 2016 (only 1.9 percent) support this notion.  
It might also be true, however, that even though the Commonwealth has 
been gaining jobs overall, simultaneously it has been shedding high-wage 
7   Michael Mazerov and Michael Leachman, “State Job Creation Strategies Often Off Base,” Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities, 2016.
jobs and replacing them with low-wage jobs. There is some evidence of this 
in Northern Virginia (see the next chapter). If those who exit the labor 
force are more mature, then when they leave the labor force they take 
their higher wages with them, and less-experienced, lower-wage workers 
are hired in their place.  
Of course, one also could easily argue that the forecasts of 2016 tax 
revenues made sometime in 2015 simply were too high and not properly 
connected to core economic numbers. Hence, the shortfall is the product 
of a forecast that was overly optimistic (which is not an uncommon 
governmental phenomenon).
Drawing upon the governor’s Executive Budget Document, which is 
submitted in December of each year, we can examine the average forecast 
errors made by those who forecast revenues and tax collections. One can 
see in Table 3 that there are several years where U.S. GDP forecasts 
by Virginia staff exceed the actual growth in GDP. This is especially 
true in and around the Great Recession. This did not lead to egregious 
errors, however, in the Commonwealth’s revenue forecasts. During 
the eight-year comparative time span, actual tax revenue collections 
exceeded those forecast by a fraction of a percent.  
Hence, over the past decade there has been no consistent pattern 
of overestimation of state tax revenues. That said, the forecasters 
nonetheless were wide of the mark for FY 2016 and there will be pain 
inflicted as state agencies are forced to reduce their spending.
While the state created 67,000 jobs in 2015, only 
20,000 of those were jobs announced by the 
Virginia Economic Development Partnership.
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TABLE 3
VIRGINIA TAX REVENUE AND U.S. REAL GDP FORECASTS VERSUS ACTUAL, 2006-2015
Year Revenue Forecast Actual Revenues
U.S. Real GDP Growth 
Forecast
U.S. Real GDP Growth
2016 $18,308.9 -- 2.4% --
2015 $16,927.4 $17,735.6 2.5% 2.6%
2014 $16,970.9 $16,411.4 2.1% 2.4%
2013 $16,416.5 $16,684.6 1.7% 1.5%
2012 $15,726.6 $15,846.7 1.7% 2.2%
2011 $14,717.4 $15,040.2 2.2% 1.6%
2010 $13,921.8 $14,219.5 0.4% 2.5%
2009 $15,015.3 $14,315.1 -0.4% -2.8%
2008 $16,087.3 $15,767.0 2.1% -0.3%
Sources: Virginia Department of Planning and Budget and Bureau of Economic Analysis
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A Look at Virginia’s Largest 
Metropolitan Areas
Uneven economic conditions exist across Virginia’s metropolitan regions, 
continuing a postrecession pattern. Some metropolitan areas are doing 
well, while others are struggling. In last year’s report, the only real 
metropolitan bright spots in the Commonwealth were the Richmond and 
Washington, D.C., regions. There are bright spots again this year, but the 
players are different – Richmond and Hampton Roads.  
Table 4 presents real GDP growth rates for eight Virginia metropolitan 
areas between 2008 and 2015. The 2015 GDP economic growth rate 
estimates merit additional discussion. They are “advance estimates” that 
have been generated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The BEA 
is the same agency that is responsible for the national GDP estimates. 
Though we are nearly through 2016, the advance estimates released in 
September 2016 were for 2015, not 2016.  
According to the BEA, Richmond and Hampton Roads performed quite 
well in 2015, growing 3.9 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively. The 
Washington, D.C., metro area saw positive, but slow economic growth (1.3 
percent). Growth in the remainder of the metro areas was flat or down.
The BEA revises the estimates for each year and sometimes their revisions 
are startlingly large. In 2014, for example, the eventual revisions averaged 
1.4 percent in absolute terms – a huge difference when the numbers 
themselves are so small. As a consequence, it usually is better to assess 
metropolitan growth by focusing on longer time periods. The final column 
in Table 4 does this by computing average real economic growth rates for 
the time period 2008-2015. This is more informative than a single year’s 
growth rate.  
The long-term average growth rate numbers in Table 4 are disheartening. 
While the United States has averaged about 2 percent real economic 
growth during this period, only Charlottesville approached 2 percent 
among Virginia’s metro regions. Richmond and Hampton Roads averaged 
1.1 percent and 0.7 percent, respectively. This is despite the BEA’s 
estimates that they grew 3.71 percent and 3.89 percent, respectively, in 
2015.  
We fully expect the BEA to revise downward both the Hampton Roads 
and Richmond growth estimates – perhaps even cutting them in half. At 
the same time, it also seems possible that economic growth in Northern 
Virginia may have been underestimated.     
Nonetheless, the overall tenor of the numbers for the eight metropolitan 
regions is discouraging. Between 2008 and 2015, four of the eight 
regions recorded many years of negative economic growth, epitomized 
by Lynchburg and Roanoke, both of which recorded negative economic 
growth rates in six of the eight years covered. Clearly, economic 
progress has not been evenly distributed across the Commonwealth.  
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TABLE 4
REAL GDP GROWTH, SELECTED VIRGINIA METRO AREAS, 2008-2015
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
2009-2015 
Average
Blacksburg -7.20% -3.11% 1.46% 2.97% 7.47% -3.78% 1.61% -0.98% 1.20%
Charlottesville 1.24% -0.19% 3.79% 3.22% 2.69% 0.59% 2.94% -0.26% 1.90%
Harrisonburg -4.64% 9.12% 3.34% -0.91% -0.53% -1.38% 0.21% -2.61% -0.30%
Lynchburg -1.06% -0.45% 1.86% -1.72% -1.49% -0.73% 0.79% -0.64% -0.30%
Richmond 0.00% -0.98% 1.41% -0.06% 0.91% 0.78% 0.62% 3.89% 1.10%
Roanoke -0.52% -1.79% -1.59% -1.01% -0.58% -0.14% 0.36% 0.80% -0.30%
Hampton 
Roads
-0.29% 0.65% -0.16% 0.66% 0.83% 0.28% -0.73% 3.71% 0.70%
Wash DC/
NOVA
2.11% 0.02% 3.29% 1.56% 0.25% -0.55% 0.96% 1.27% 1.00%
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and calculations by the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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Concluding Remarks
If one were to view the Virginia economy as a patient undergoing a 
physical examination because she hasn’t been feeling quite as good as 
she thinks she should, then as economic doctors we would be forced to 
conclude that her maladies have proven difficult to diagnose. This is 
because we are receiving conflicting signals about the Virginia economy. 
Several indicators suggest economic expansion. Unemployment rates have 
been steadily falling and are approaching levels not seen since early 2007. 
Wages have been rising at an average rate of about 2 percent a year during 
the recovery and 2015 saw exceptional wage growth in excess of 4 percent. 
Year-to-date numbers for 2016 (through June) show continued growth of 
2 percent over year-to-date 2015.
Unfortunately, other indicators of the state’s economy are less rosy. 
Virginia’s labor force has been declining in size and its labor force 
participation rates have been declining as well. The state’s labor force 
in July 2016 was essentially the same size as it was in March 2011 and is 
in the midst of a downward trend. The reasons for declining labor force 
participation are not well understood, but one way or another, society ends 
up having to support prime-working-age individuals who drop out of the 
labor force.  
What does the future hold? It appears that Virginia’s economy is 
decelerating – not a fortuitous development, given that it was not 
growing very fast when the current slowdown began. This coincides 
with torpid international economic growth and immediate external 
economic stimulus does not appear to be on the horizon.  
Three of the most important sectors of the economy of the Commonwealth 
relate to defense spending, tourism and the Port of Virginia. All three have 
cooled, albeit for different reasons. One of the few economic bright spots is 
the growth of professional and business services employment in Northern 
Virginia, which we discuss in the next chapter.   
In last year’s report, we forecast that 2015 GDP growth would be 1.33 
percent, and the Commonwealth recorded an actual growth rate of 1.4 
percent. Hence, our model was right on target. At this time last year, 
we also were forecasting 1.98 percent real economic growth for 2016. 
The state’s 2016-Q1 real growth rate of 1.9 percent (though for only one 
quarter) is right in line with this forecast.  
However, since the beginning of 2016, our model has been suggesting 
slower growth in each of the remaining quarters of 2016 and through 
2017. As a consequence, we have revised our 2016 economic growth 
forecast for Virginia downward from 1.98 percent to 1.85 percent 
(Graph 1). We are forecasting national economic growth to pick up in 
the second part of 2016 and outpace the Commonwealth’s growth rate 
through mid-2017.  
Reality in the Commonwealth is that most of the monthly economic data 
reported in the first half of 2016 have been underwhelming. There is little 
reason to believe that real GDP growth in 2016 will differ significantly 
from GDP growth in 2015.
Virginia’s economy will grow in 2016, but less than 2 percent. It will not 
be a memorable year in terms of economic performance. We do forecast 
modest growth continuing into 2017 in employment, housing prices and 
average wages, plus continued improvement in the unemployment rate. 
The problem is that the moderate pace of growth of these indicators will 
not be sufficient to push the Commonwealth’s real GDP growth above 
2 percent.  
A cause for concern is Virginia’s relatively slow growth compared to other 
states. Our 2015 growth rate of 1.4 percent was a major improvement over 
2013 and 2014. Even so, this still placed us only 33rd from the top among 
the 50 states. Seventeen states recorded GDP growth rates of 2 percent or 
higher, with California and Oregon posting growth rates in excess of 
4 percent.  
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Our ability to change our future depends substantially on the actions of 
those we cannot control – the federal government, the Federal Reserve 
System, the People’s Republic of China, the European Union, etc. Even so, 
there are positive steps we can take that over time can move us forward at 
a more rapid rate. These include:
•  making patient strategic investments in research and development, 
particularly in sectors with strong private-sector market demand;
•  improving our educational system K through doctorate;
•  developing new export-oriented markets for Virginia’s products; 
•  diversifying our economic structure; 
•  improving our transportation system; 
•  making competitive economic development efforts to attract new 
businesses or assist those that wish to expand; and 
•  improving our business regulatory climate. 
We are not, after all, helpless actors in a play solely directed by others.
■NORTHERN VIRGINIA:
TURNING THE 
CORNER?
34
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T
he Capital Region’s economic health 
greatly influences the Commonwealth 
of Virginia’s economic trajectory. 
Northern Virginia is a vital element of both 
the regional and the state economies. In 
June 2016, Northern Virginia represented 
37 percent of Virginia’s employment and 44 
percent of the employment in the Washington-
Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 
metropolitan statistical area (henceforth, 
simply the Washington, D.C., metro area).1  
The region has grown tremendously and now 
is the nation’s sixth-largest metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA).  
Even with this growth, the region remains a 
government town, economically speaking.  As 
noted in last year’s State of the Commonwealth 
Report, the Capital Region and Northern 
Virginia remain highly dependent on 
federal employment and spending. This 
dependence creates both opportunities and 
challenges. Increased federal employment and 
procurement spending mitigated some of the 
worst impacts of the Great Recession of 2008, 
but reversals in those trends sank economic 
growth from 2011 through most of 2014.    
Job growth, however, returned strongly in 
2015 and 2016, occurring at a pace not seen 
since 2005. Since government spending has 
1   The region includes Washington, D.C.; Calvert, Charles, Frederick, 
Montgomery and Prince George’s County in Maryland; Alexandria, 
Arlington County, Clarke County, Culpeper County, Fairfax, Fairfax 
County, Falls Church, Fauquier County, Loudoun County, Manassas, 
Manassas Park, Prince William County, Rappahannock County, 
Spotsylvania County, Stafford County, Fredericksburg and Warren 
County in Virginia; and Jefferson County in West Virginia. When we 
refer to Northern Virginia, we include the Virginia counties listed 
above.
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been relatively stagnant, this means that nongovernmental sectors of the 
regional economy have been expanding. This provokes a very important 
question: Has Northern Virginia turned the corner in its economic 
evolution and is it becoming a diversified economic center similar to other 
large metropolitan regions?
In the following pages, we will examine recent trends influencing the 
Washington, D.C., metro area, with a particular focus on Northern 
Virginia’s economic performance. There are indications that a 
transformation is underway in both the Washington metro area and 
Northern Virginia, more specifically. The region’s economy is, and will 
continue to be, highly influenced by the federal government. However, 
there are signals that the region’s crucial professional and business 
services sector is growing even as federal spending remains flat. This 
implies economic diversification, a long sought-after, but elusive, regional 
goal. 
The Washington, D.C., 
Metro Area
In 2015, the Washington, D.C., metro area boasted a $442 billion economy. 
Graph 1 shows that since 2001, the region’s economy grew relatively 
faster than the nation during the years prior to the Great Recession and 
subsequently did not decline as sharply during this recession. However, 
regional economic growth faltered after the recession and particularly 
since 2011. Whereas the rest of the country recovered during 2009-2014, 
economic growth in the Washington metropolitan region was relatively 
flat. Things changed in late 2014. 
Graph 2 illustrates changes in monthly employment compared to the 
previous year for the entire Washington, D.C., metro area. As was true 
for many other metropolitan regions, Washington, D.C., lost employment 
between late 2008 and early 2010. Since then, the rest of the country 
has experienced a modest but steady recovery, but the Washington, 
D.C., metro area encountered a second rough stretch in 2013 as the 
consequences of the Budget Control Act and sequestration manifested 
themselves. The region’s major economic engine – federal employment and 
procurement activities – was sputtering. 
One can track changes in monthly employment compared to the previous 
year for the entire Washington, D.C., metro area’s federal employment in 
Graph 3. Between mid-2011 and 2014, federal employment each month 
was consistently lower than the comparable month in the previous 
year. This had, and still has, significant consequences for the region 
because annual average wages per federal employee approximate 
$100,000. Reduced employment generated fewer dollars to spend 
and retailers across the region felt this in sales of items ranging from 
automobiles to pizzas. Even basic health care expenditures were impacted. 
Similarly, cutbacks in federal procurement removed additional spending 
from the Washington, D.C., metro area. One can see in Graph 4 that the 
region received approximately $71 billion in federal procurement spending 
in 2015. Much of this spending went to the region’s professional and 
business services sector, which constitutes much of the region’s economic 
base. However, federal procurement spending is down significantly from 
its peak of $82.5 billion in 2010.  
Even so, the region’s continued population growth has continued to fuel 
growth of more locally focused jobs, albeit not jobs that ordinarily pay 
high wages. As a result, the Washington, D.C., metro area’s postrecession 
economy can be characterized as one in which high-wage jobs often have 
been traded for jobs that involve more modest earnings. 
While the region’s job market lagged in 2013 and 2014, its performance 
was much stronger in 2015 and through the first half of 2016. By June 
2016, Washington, D.C., metro area employment had grown to roughly 
3.28 million jobs – 81,000 net additional jobs more than the previous year 
(June 2015 to June 2016). This represents an increase of 2.5 percent. As 
demonstrated in Graph 5, this growth places the Washington, D.C., metro 
area in the middle of the pack among large metropolitan regions in the 
United States. Only Sunbelt cities such as Phoenix, Dallas and Atlanta 
and West Coast cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle 
experienced larger growth in employment. Northeastern and Midwestern 
metropolitan regions such as New York, Boston, Chicago and Minneapolis 
grew more slowly than the Washington, D.C., metro area.
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GRAPH 1
GDP GROWTH IN THE U.S. AND WASHINGTON METRO AREA, 2001-2015
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (*2009 Chained Dollars)
1	
	
Graph 1 
GDP growth in the US and Washington Metro Area, 2001-2015 
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GRAPH 2
CHANGES IN MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR FOR THE 
WASHINGTON, D.C., METRO AREA, JANUARY 2001 TO JUNE 2016
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
2	
	
Graph 2 
Changes in Monthly Employment Compared to the Previous Year  
for the Washington, D.C., Metro Area, January 2001 to June 2016 
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GRAPH 3
 CHANGES IN MONTHLY FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE WASHINGTON, D.C., METRO AREA COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR, 
JANUARY 2010 TO JUNE 2016
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics
3	
	
 
Graph 3 
 Changes in Monthly Federal Employment in the Washington, D.C., Metro rea 
Compared to the Previous ear, January 2010 to June 2016 
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GRAPH 4
ANNUAL FEDERAL PROCUREMENT IN THE WASHINGTON, D.C., METRO AREA, 1980-2015
Sources: U.S. Census, Consolidated Federal Funds Report and usaspending.gov
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Graph 4 
Annual Federal Procurement in the Washington, D.C., Metro Area, 1980-2015 
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GRAPH 5
PERCENT JOB GROWTH IN THE LARGEST U.S. METROPOLITAN REGIONS, JUNE 2015 TO JUNE 2016
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics
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Graph 5 
Percent Job Growth in the Largest U.S. Metropolitan Regions, June 2015 to June 2016 
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Northern Virginia
Northern Virginia’s economy tends to mirror that of the Washington 
metro area because it is also driven by federal government employment 
and procurement. As shown in Graph 6, between late 2013 and early 2014, 
Northern Virginia lost employment relative to the previous year. Much of 
this was driven by the reduction of federal employment and procurement 
mandated by the Budget Control Act and sequestration. Graph 7 shows 
that Northern Virginia’s total level of federal employment has slowly 
declined over the course of the present decade. Many of these jobs losses 
occurred between 2013 and 2014.  
Federal employment in Northern Virginia stabilized at the end of 2014 
and, in June 2016, the region was home to 86,400 federal jobs. The 
Department of Defense (DOD) employs many of these workers at large 
installations such as the Pentagon and Fort Belvoir. DOD employment 
in Northern Virginia represents approximately 23.3 percent of the 
Washington, D.C., metro area’s federal workforce and almost half (48 
percent) of Virginia’s federal workforce. 
However, direct federal employment only tells part of the story, as federal 
contracting also has declined. Many of the firms that contract with the 
federal government are located in Northern Virginia, particularly in 
inner suburban locations such as Crystal City and Roslyn, as well as outer 
suburban locations such as Tysons Corner, Springfield and along the 
Dulles Corridor.   
Nevertheless, Graph 8 reveals that, much like the broader Washington, 
D.C., metro area, federal procurement spending in Northern Virginia has 
declined since the beginning of the decade and remained largely flat over 
the past several years. These reductions in federal spending2 became quite 
noticeable in FY 2013, when firms in Northern Virginia received almost 
$4.5 billion less than they had in FY 2012. Federal procurement levels 
have remained largely flat since that time.
Many of Northern Virginia’s government contractors can be found in the 
professional and business services sector. It is clear that many companies 
2   By place of performance for the prime recipient transactions.
in this sector depend heavily upon government spending and procurement. 
This sector – which includes key activities such as legal, accounting, 
consulting and scientific research services, among others – has become a 
key element of Northern Virginia’s economic base. Industries focused upon 
retail trade and many health care-related industries tend to recycle money 
within the regional economy and as a result population growth influences 
their growth patterns. By contrast, many professional and business 
services bring new money into the economy and therefore drive regional 
growth.
Even while procurement spending remained relatively flat in FY 
2015, employers in some sectors nevertheless continued to create jobs 
in Northern Virginia. Graph 9 contrasts employment trends in the 
professional and business services sector and the federal government 
in Northern Virginia. As the consequences of the Budget Control 
Act and sequestration took hold in late 2013 and into 2014, both the 
federal government and professional and business services sectors lost 
employment relative to the previous year in Northern Virginia. Since the 
middle of 2014, however, a new pattern has emerged. The professional 
and business services sector has begun to grow, even though federal 
employment and procurement remain relatively flat. While it is a bit 
early to declare that this signals the emergence of a new economic model 
for Northern Virginia, clearly this is a potentially significant change. It 
appears that professional and business services companies in Northern 
Virginia may be diversifying their markets and becoming less reliant on 
federal spending. If so, it bodes well for the region. While the federal 
government will always be important to Northern Virginia’s regional 
economy, achieving greater economic diversity will stimulate economic 
growth and perhaps provide greater economic stability as well.  
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GRAPH 6
CHANGES IN MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR, JANUARY 2010 TO JUNE 2016
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics
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Graph 6 
Changes in Monthly Employment in Northern Virginia Compared to the Previous Year, 
January 2010 to June 2016 
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GRAPH 7
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, JUNE 2010 TO JUNE 2016
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics
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Graph 7 
Federal Government Employment in Northern Virginia, June 2010 to June 2016 
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GRAPH 8
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, FY 2010 TO FY 2015 
Source: usaspending.gov
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Graph 8 
Federal Procurement in Northern Virginia,FY 2010 to FY 2015  
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GRAPH 9
MONTHLY CHANGES IN PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESS SERVICES EMPLOYMENT AND FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA 
COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR, JUNE 2011 TO JUNE 2016 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics
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Graph 9 
Monthly Changes in Professional and Business Services Employment and Federal Employment in Northern Virginia 
Compared to the Previous Year, June 2011 to June 2016  
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In spite of the economic challenges of the past half-decade, labor 
markets in Northern Virginia have remained strong relative to the 
Washington, D.C., metro area and the nation at large. Graph 10 shows 
that Northern Virginia’s unemployment rate has been below 5 percent 
for almost five years and has been below the unemployment rate for the 
Washington metro area and the United State every year since 2008. To the 
extent that the region’s private-sector economy can disconnect itself from 
its reliance on federal spending, the more likely it is that the region’s labor 
markets will remain strong.
Though 2013 and 2014 were difficult years for the region’s professional 
and business services sector, its recent growth is a reminder that it is one 
of the region’s most important economic drivers. By itself, professional 
and business services contributed roughly one-third of the 35,400 net 
new jobs created in Northern Virginia between June 2015 and June 
2016. However, several other sectors also have been instrumental in 
growing the regional economy. Graph 11 depicts changes in employment by 
major sector between June 2015 and June 2016. The leisure and hospitality 
sector (which includes accommodation and food services, as well as the 
arts, entertainment and recreation-related industries) added 6,800 net 
new jobs during this period, or roughly one of the region’s every five net 
new jobs. Other sectors adding substantial employment during this period 
included education and health services (4,200 net new jobs) and retail 
trade (5,000 net new jobs). 
Several other key sectors saw employment levels remain relatively flat. 
The information sector and the transportation and utilities sector posted 
only modest gains, and the financial activities and manufacturing sectors 
lost employment. The overall government sector remained relatively 
unchanged between June 2015 and June 2016, as modest net increases 
in federal employment were offset by similar declines in state and local 
government employment.
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GRAPH 10
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES: U.S., D.C. METROPOLITAN REGION AND NORTHERN VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2008 TO JUNE 2016
Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics 
10	
	
 
Graph 10 
Unemployment Rates: U.S., D.C. Metropolitan Region and Northern Virginia, January 2008 to June 2016 
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GRAPH 11
GAINS AND LOSSES IN JOBS BY MAJOR SECTOR IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, JUNE 2015 TO JUNE 2016
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of Economic Analysis
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Graph 11 
Gains and Losses in Jobs by Major Sector in Northern Virginia, June 2015 to June 2016 
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GRAPH 12
POPULATION GROWTH VERSUS EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 2000-2015
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics, and U.S. Census Bureau
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Graph 12 
Population Growth Versus Employment Growth in Northern Virginia, 2000-2015 
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Demographics
Northern Virginia’s employment base continues to grow, but not as rapidly 
as its population. Graph 12 indexes population and employment growth 
in Northern Virginia since 2000 (2000 = 100). As the region recovered 
from the early 2000s recession, its pace of employment growth converged 
with the pace of population growth. The recession, though, set these 
two variables on different trajectories. Northern Virginia’s population 
now is almost 35 percent greater than it was in 2000, but its nonfarm 
employment is only 21 percent greater than it was in 2000.   
Slow growth in the region’s economic base sectors (professional and 
business services, federal government) over the first part of this decade 
held consequences for the region’s population. Graph 13 illustrates the 
three primary components of population growth in Northern Virginia 
between 2010 and 2015 – natural increase (births minus deaths), 
international migration and domestic migration.  
Northern Virginia gained almost 33,000 net new residents over the time 
period, which turned out to be about half of the Washington, D.C. metro 
area’s total. However, one can see in Graph 13 that actually there was net 
domestic out-migration from Northern Virginia to other metropolitan 
areas and states during the 2013-2015 time period. Setting aside births 
minus deaths and international migration into the region, more people 
were leaving Northern Virginia for other regions (often in other states) 
than were coming into the region. Several economic studies has shown 
that similar flows of people among regions and states are highly sensitive 
to job creation and job availability. Since Northern Virginia’s job creation 
has trailed its population growth, some residents have departed the region 
in search of improved job prospects elsewhere. The same studies reveal 
that the cost of living, especially housing costs, also exercises an influence 
over domestic migration. “Real,” price-adjusted magnitudes count. Not 
surprisingly, elevated housing costs stimulate out-migration and tend to 
discourage in-migration. We will have more to say about this shortly.  
Counteracting the region’s domestic outflow of individuals, however, 
has been a robust and valuable inflow of international immigrants. 
International migration has become an increasingly important source of 
economic stimulus for Northern Virginia, not the least because these new 
residents tend to be better educated than the region’s existing population 
and many have become entrepreneurs. Of all Northern Virginians who 
hold an advanced or professional degree, 24 percent are foreign born.
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GRAPH 13
ELEMENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 2010-2015
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program, 2015
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Graph 13 
Elements of Population Change in Northern Virginia, 2010-2015 
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Housing
The high cost of living – particularly in the form of relatively high housing 
costs – influences migratory patterns and can pose real challenges for 
working families. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) produces 
an index known as Regional Price Parities (RPP), which is an overall 
measurement of cost of living differentials. The RPP tells us that in 
2014, housing in the Washington, D.C., metro area was almost 20 
percent more expensive than the nation as a whole. Housing costs 
played a major role here – the RPP for rent, for example, revealed a 
discouraging 70 percent cost differential for the Washington, D.C., metro 
area relative to the rest of the country.   
The region’s economic trends directly influence these housing-related 
issues. During the first half of the decade, job losses in the federal 
government and the professional and business services sector, plus the 
uncertainty created by the government shutdown and sequestration, put 
a damper on the region’s housing industry. Similarly, tighter lending 
requirements, higher rents and accumulating student loan debts inhibited 
and delayed the ability of millennials to enter the housing market. 
A commonly used standard concerning housing affordability is that 
households experience housing-based financial stress when their housing 
costs exceed 30 percent of their income. The U.S. Census Bureau’s 
American Community Survey (ACS) provides interesting information in 
this regard. The ACS reports that during the 2010-2014 period, roughly 
two-thirds of Northern Virginia households were owners and a third 
were renters. Table 1 shows that approximately 44 percent of those who 
were renting and 27 percent of those who were homeowners were cost-
burdened because they were paying more than 30 percent of their incomes 
to meet their housing costs. Almost 20 percent of all renters and 9 percent 
of homeowners were severely cost-burdened, as they were paying more 
than 50 percent of their household incomes on housing.  
Affordability concerns notwithstanding, the broad trends for housing 
markets in Northern Virginia are generally positive. One of the most 
visible and frequently cited measures of the health of residential housing 
markets is the median price paid for existing, single-family homes. Graph 
14 reveals that the median price of existing, single-family homes in 
Northern Virginia has rebounded after a momentous 44 percent decline 
between 2006 and 2009. The median sales price of an existing, single-
family home was almost $442,000 in 2015, a figure 3 percent below its 
previous 2006 peak.
The healing of the market for single-family homes in Northern Virginia 
has been slow and is by no means complete. The number of active listings 
in Northern Virginia in 2015 still was only 42 percent of the feverish 
maximum it hit in 2006.  
TABLE 1
PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME SPENT ON HOUSING IN 
NORTHERN VIRGINIA
Percent of Household 
Income Spent on Housing
Renters Owners
Less than 10.0 percent 2.6% 13.8%
10.0 to 14.9 percent 8.0% 14.6%
15.0 to 19.9 percent 13.7% 17.3%
20.0 to 24.9 percent 14.7% 15.4%
25.0 to 29.9 percent 12.9% 11.5%
30.0 to 34.9 percent 9.5% 7.6%
35.0 to 39.9 percent 6.6% 4.9%
40.0 to 49.9 percent 8.5% 5.3%
50.0 percent or more 19.5% 9.2%
Not computed 4.0% 0.3%
Housing Cost Burdened 
(>30% AMI)
44.1% 27.1%
Severe Housing Cost 
Burdened (>50% AMI)
19.5% 9.2%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010-2014 American Community Survey where AMI = area median income
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GRAPH 14
MEDIAN SALES PRICES OF EXISTING HOMES IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2000 TO JUNE 2016
Source: Metropolitan Regional Information Systems (MRIS)
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Graph 14 
Median Sales Prices of Existing Homes in Northern Virginia, January 2000 to June 2016 
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GRAPH 15
ACTIVE LISTINGS OF HOMES FOR SALE IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2000 TO JUNE 2016
Source: Metropolitan Regional Information Systems (MRIS)
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Graph 15 
Active Listings of Homes for Sale in Northern Virginia, January 2000 to June 2016 
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Turning the Corner?
The Washington, D.C., metropolitan area’s regional economy rebounded 
relatively quickly from the Great Recession, in part due to increased 
federal spending associated with the American Recovery Act, plus other 
increases in governmental spending. As noted earlier, however, Budget 
Control Act spending caps and resulting sequestration took billions in 
annual federal spending out of the Northern Virginia economy. 
These cutbacks were most visible in declining employment in the high-
value professional and business services sector of the economy. Regional 
job growth continued modestly through the downturn in federal spending, 
but was dominated by relatively low-wage jobs in the retail and hospitality 
sectors. There were some bright signs, however. Even though federal 
spending in the region in 2015 dropped by almost $1.5 billion from the 
previous year, and Northern Virginia experienced its best overall job 
growth since before the Great Recession, professional and business 
services job growth rebounded strongly. 
Job growth numbers for Northern Virginia are not consistent with the 
recently released estimates of growth in gross regional product, which at 
less than 1.3 percent would suggest very tepid job growth. It is possible 
that 2015 productivity in Northern Virginia took a dive, but we are 
inclined to focus more of our economic assessment of the region’s job 
growth.  
Northern Virginia – and the Washington, D.C., metro area more generally 
– always will be the beneficiary of government spending, especially 
expenditures related to national defense. Government spending doubtless 
will grow over time, ensuring that both the overall Washington, D.C., 
metro area and Northern Virginia also are going to grow at least at a 
middling pace. The salient question, however, is whether the region 
can evolve and become more than a “company town,” in which the 
quintessential dominant company is the federal government. In 
last year’s report we presented the choices to be made as a fork in the 
economic road – continue to rely mostly on government employment and 
federal spending, or pivot the regional economy to a more diversified 
market structure. Given the impressive job growth in 2015 that continued 
through the first half of 2016, this year we must ask: Has Northern 
Virginia, and the Washington, D.C. region more broadly, turned an 
economic corner and now sees a different future?  
Recent jobs data, especially in professional and business services, 
suggest that change is afoot. For this to continue, firms in the region 
must continue their move beyond their heretofore-dominant business-
to-government (B2G) model and instead place greater emphasis on 
expanding business-to-business (B2B) opportunities. This will not be easy. 
The low-hanging private-sector fruit in this effort will likely come from 
cybersecurity, as businesses catch up with historic underspending for these 
services. Biotechnology that leverages the huge research and development 
complex of the National Institutes of Health and Johns Hopkins University 
on the Maryland side of the Potomac also has promise. However, other 
industries will need to emerge for solid economic diversification to take 
hold. Exports also offer a significant opportunity, given the relative dearth 
of export-based industries in Northern Virginia.  
In order to transition to a new model, Northern Virginia must be an 
attractive place for talented workers to live and work. In a knowledge-
based economy, human capital, in the form of smart, motivated people, is 
the ultimate resource. For the past half century, Northern Virginia has 
played this game well and in the process has attracted large numbers of 
talented individuals, many of whom are highly educated. Nevertheless, the 
high cost of living and traffic congestion offer challenges to current and 
potential residents.
Housing costs present a well-recognized challenge in Northern Virginia, 
with more than 44 percent of renters and 27 percent of homeowners 
spending more than 30 percent of their incomes on housing. Regional 
mobility is an increasing challenge, especially considering the well-
publicized challenges facing the Metrorail system. The 2015 Urban 
Mobility Scorecard, published by the Transportation Institute at Texas 
A&M, ranks the Washington, D.C., metro area first (worst) among the 
15 largest metropolitan areas in the United States in terms of congestion 
costs per auto commuter, as well as first in terms of yearly delay per auto 
commuter.3  
3   Data in this paragraph come from the 2015 Urban Mobility Scorecard, Texas A&M Transportation Institute, 
http://d2dtl5nnlpfr0r.cloudfront.net/tti.tamu.edu/documents/mobility-scorecard-2015-wappx.pdf.
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Working families face difficult trade-offs between affordability and 
workplace proximity. The ability of Northern Virginia organizations to 
retain their workforces will have a direct bearing on future economic 
competitiveness. But finding the right balance of infrastructure 
investment, policy choices, including tax policies, and the provision of key 
public services remains elusive for most jurisdictions. Witness the recent 
struggles of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.  
Recent migration data for Northern Virginia deserve attention. For 
the two most recent years ending in July 2015, the region experienced 
negative net domestic migration, meaning that more households 
moved out of Northern Virginia than into Northern Virginia from 
domestic sources. The losses, which likely reflect some retirement-driven 
moves, were more than offset by natural population increase and net 
international migration, but primarily reflect tepid job generation. 
Net domestic out-migration may represent the temporary effects of the 
BCA-driven economic downturn, but bears watching to see if recent job 
growth reverses this trend. Just as important is the region’s continued 
ability to attract new international migrants. Perhaps different from 
other areas of the country, the proportion of international immigrants 
living in the Washington, D.C., metro area that possesses a college degree 
is almost exactly the same as for the native population. These individuals 
provide valuable economic thrust to the region. Having a continuing flow 
of workers with a wide range of skills is an important asset for Northern 
Virginia employers, especially as regional businesses adapt to global 
market opportunities. 
At the end of the day, it is fair to observe that Northern Virginia is 
superbly located and is home to some remarkable human capital. The test 
now is whether the region can deal effectively with the growth that this 
superb location and remarkable human capital have energized. Northern 
Virginia has the assets to turn the corner and become a more business-
oriented, globally competitive region, but will it happen? Stay tuned.
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THE HOTEL 
INDUSTRY IN THE 
COMMONWEALTH
Do not forget to show hospitality to strangers.
–  Hebrews 12:2
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T
his chapter presents a long-term, 25-
year look at the economic performance 
of the hotel industry in Virginia.1 How 
important is the hotel industry to us? The 
candid answer: not as important as it used to 
be. Table 1 reports hotel room revenue as a 
percentage of total personal income in the 
United States and Virginia in selected years. 
It is evident that hotel room revenue as a 
share of personal income generally declined 
in these geographic areas between 1991 
and 2015. However, the share of hotel room 
revenue to personal income bottomed out in 
the United States in 2009, but continued to fall 
in Virginia until 2013, when modest recovery 
began.      
Is Airbnb responsible for some of this 
deterioration? Almost certainly (though data 
to demonstrate this are scarce). A July 2, 
2016, examination of Airbnb’s offerings in 
Virginia Beach revealed that more than 300 
properties were available for rent.2 However, 
Table 1 also reveals that the relative decline 
in importance of the hotel industry began 
well before Airbnb was founded in 2008. 
Therefore, current hotel and motel owners 
are off target when they blame all of their 
ills on Airbnb.   
1   Not included in our analysis are travelers staying in nonhotel 
accommodations such as campgrounds, time-shares and private 
vacation rentals, or those who stay with friends and relatives. Also 
not included are expenditures that travelers make at businesses, 
restaurants and places of entertainment. 
2  www.airbnb.com/s/Virginia-Beach--VA?s_tag=ZcIJyHG2.
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Why has the hotel industry fared so poorly in Virginia? The short answer 
is that the Great Recession of 2008 reduced the financial ability of 
people to travel and stay in hotels. This was compounded several years 
later by the federal government spending limits that were imposed by 
the Congressional sequestration agreement (versions of which are still 
in effect). Both Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads are notably 
dependent upon federal spending, especially defense spending, and this has 
had a visibly negative influence on the hotel industry.  
TABLE 1
HOTEL REVENUE AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL PERSONAL INCOME 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND VIRGINIA, 1991 TO 2015
U.S. Virginia
1991 0.887 0.918
2001 0.871 0.881
2007 0.896 0.902
2009 0.765 0.819
2010 0.795 0.820
2013 0.867 0.762
2014 0.904 0.784
2015 0.930 0.807
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 2, 2016; Bureau of Economic Analysis; and the Center for 
Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
How Has The Hotel Industry 
Been Performing Nationally?
We will measure performance using three metrics: (1) total hotel revenue; 
(2) revenue per available room (REVPAR); and (3) occupancy rates.
(1) Total Hotel Room Revenues in the United States
•  Hotel room revenues, unadjusted for inflation, more than tripled from 
$44.9 billion in 1991 to $142.5 billion in 2015, or 217 percent (see Graph 
1). However, in real terms, adjusting for inflation, hotel revenues 
increased by only 82.5 percent during the 25 years.
•  Nominal room revenue increased by an average of 4.7 percent per year 
during this time period, but real room revenue increased by only 2.4 
percent per year; prices during this time period increased by an average 
of 2.2 percent per year. 
•  The hotel industry in the United States was severely affected by 
the Great Recession. Real hotel revenue declined from a peak of 
$51.85 billion in 2007 to $43.09 billion in 2009. It took the industry 
another four years to recover these revenue losses. Since then, things 
have improved noticeably: real, inflation-adjusted hotel room revenues 
increased from $52.34 billion in 2013 to $60.15 billion in 2015, a 14.9 
percent increase between 2013 and 2015. 
(2)  Revenue Per Available Room (REVPAR) in the United States
•  Profitability is the best measure of the prosperity of a particular hotel or 
the hotel industry, but profitability data are not available for the market 
segments in which we are interested. Next best is the revenue earned 
by hotels per available room (REVPAR) because it is a measure that 
incorporates both supply and demand influences. 
•  REVPAR nationally increased from $36.10 in 1991 to $78.62 in 2015 
– 117.8 percent. How much of this increase was due to general price 
inflation? All but 25.1 percent, which is what remains after deflating 
REVPAR by the Consumer Price Index. This translates to a rather 
small increase of only 0.9 percent annually. During the Great Recession, 
Where did we obtain our data? We have three primary sources. Smith 
Travel Research (STR) data are used for hotel lodging revenue, demand 
and supply of hotel rooms, as well as associated measures of hotel 
industry performance. Data on personal income come from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Consumer 
price index (CPI) data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the 
U.S. Department of Labor. When we convert nominal dollars to “real” 
dollars, we use 1982-84 as our base.
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real, inflation-adjusted REVPAR declined from $31.61 in 2007 to a low 
of $24.96 in 2009. It was not until 2015 that real REVPAR had risen to 
$33.17 and surpassed its previous 2007 peak (see Graph 2).  
(3) Hotel Occupancy Rates in the United States
•  The average occupancy rate for hotels in the United States approximated 
62 percent between 1991 and 2015. However, occupancy rates declined 
substantially during the Great Recession – the occupancy rate fell from 
63.2 percent in 2006 to only 54.6 percent in 2009. It was not until 2014 
that occupancy rates exceeded their 2006 level. The good news for the 
hotel industry is that the 2015 occupancy rate reached an all-time high – 
65.5 percent (see Graph 3).
NATIONAL HOTEL INDUSTRY DYNAMICS  
•  The Great Recession is the major reason why the industry’s performance 
declined between 2007 and 2009. The demand for hotel rooms began to 
recover in 2010 and has continued to increase steadily since then. 
•  The slackening of demand during the Great Recession was compounded 
by a substantial increase in the supply of hotel rooms. Between 2006 and 
2010, the supply of hotel rooms nationally increased by 8.4 percent. Since 
then, the supply has been fairly stable, increasing by less than 1 percent 
each year between 2010 and 2014 and by only 1.1 percent in 2015 (see 
Graph 4).
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GRAPH 1
HOTEL REVENUE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1991-2015 (BILLIONS OF $)
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 2, 2016; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 2
REVENUE PER AVAILABLE ROOM (REVPAR): UNITED STATES, 1991-2015
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 2, 2016; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 3
HOTEL OCCUPANCY RATES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1991-2015
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 2, 2016, and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 4
AVAILABLE HOTEL ROOMS AND ROOMS OCCUPIED IN THE UNITED STATES, 1991-2015
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 2, 2016, and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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How Has The Hotel Industry 
Been Performing In Virginia?
(1) Total Hotel Room Revenues in Virginia
 •  If total hotel room revenue is the criterion, then over the past 25 
years, the performance of the hotel industry in the Commonwealth 
has been poor compared to the nation as a whole. Total hotel room 
revenue in Virginia increased by 185 percent between 1991 and 2015, 
but this easily trailed the national increase of 217 percent. When 
adjusted for inflation, hotel room revenues statewide increased by 
only 63.7 percent during the same time period, once again trailing the 
national average of 82.5 percent.  
•  Even though real hotel room revenues increased from $1.32 billion in 
2013 to $1.49 billion in 2015 (a 12.87 percent gain), they remain slightly 
lower than the $1.50 billion peak in 2007 (see Graph 5). 
(2) Revenue Per Available Room (REVPAR) in Virginia
•  Over the last 25 years, nominal REVPAR in the Commonwealth 
increased from $32.18 in 1991 to $63.99 in 2015, or 98.9 percent. 
However, real, inflation-adjusted REVPAR increased by only 14.3 
percent during the same time period, or only 0.5 percent annually. 
Further, real REVPAR began to decline in 2007 and continued to fall 
through 2013. Real REVPAR did increase in 2014 and 2015, but remains 
well below its 2007 peak of $29.86 (see Graph 6).  
(3) Occupancy Rates in Virginia
•  The occupancy rate of hotels in Virginia averaged approximately 61 
percent between 1991 and 2015 – slightly below that of the nation. 
The Great Recession hammered Virginia hotels and by 2009 their 
average occupancy rate had fallen to only 54.5 percent. Since then, 
occupancy rates generally have trended upward. The 2015 rate was 
61.6 percent – still below the highs of 62.61 percent in 2005 and 
63.51 percent in 1994 (see Graph 7).  
VIRGINIA HOTEL INDUSTRY DYNAMICS 
•  There is little mystery attached to the causes of the 
underperformance of the hotel industry in Virginia in recent years. 
The combination of the Great Recession plus federal government 
budget sequestration constituted powerful blows from which the 
industry has yet to recover. 
•  Further, as was true for the United States, a substantial increase in the 
supply of hotel rooms in Virginia put an additional damper on industry 
performance. Even while the demand for hotel rooms was declining 
between 2006 and 2010, the supply of hotel rooms was increasing by 11.4 
percent in Virginia. Since then, that supply has held fairly constant. By 
the end of 2015, the total supply of hotel rooms in Virginia actually was 
0.05 percent below its 2010 level.   
•  The good news going forward for the Virginia hotel industry is that the 
hotel room supply/demand imbalance appears to be diminishing (see 
Graph 8). Nonetheless, happy days are not likely to return until federal 
spending in the Commonwealth, especially for defense, revives. 
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GRAPH 5
HOTEL REVENUE IN VIRGINIA, 1991-2015 (BILLIONS OF $)
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 2, 2016; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 6
REVENUE PER AVAILABLE ROOM (REVPAR) IN VIRGINIA, 1991-2015
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 2, 2016; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 7
HOTEL OCCUPANCY RATES IN VIRGINIA, 1991-2015
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 2, 2016, and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 8
AVAILABLE HOTEL ROOMS AND ROOMS OCCUPIED IN VIRGINIA (000S), 1991-2015
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, May 2, 2016, and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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How Has The Hotel Industry 
Been Performing In Selected 
Virginia Metropolitan Areas?
(1)  Total Hotel Room Revenue in Virginia Beach and the Virginia 
Portion of the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Region
•  If we once again use total hotel room revenue as our criterion, then 
the performance of the hotel industry in Virginia Beach has roughly 
matched the performance of the entire state over the past 25 years (see 
Graph 9). True, nominal total hotel revenue increased from $120.17 
million in 1991 to $293.43 million in 2015 (144.2 percent). Nevertheless, 
in real terms, total hotel room revenue declined by a little less than 
1 percent during the 25 years. Compare this to the nation’s 82.5 percent 
increase and Virginia’s 63.7 percent increase.  
•  Meanwhile, in the Virginia portion of the Washington, D.C., 
metropolitan region, nominal hotel revenue rose 235.9 percent to $1.63 
billion in 2015 and real hotel revenues rose 93 percent to $687.8 million 
(see Graph 10).
(2) Revenue Per Available Room (REVPAR) in Roanoke and Bristol
•  Where REVPAR is concerned, the Roanoke and Bristol/Kingsport 
metropolitan areas performed better than Virginia Beach, but not 
as well as Northern Virginia. Graph 11 reveals that real REVPAR in 
Roanoke increased by 6.1 percent between 1991 and 2015, while Graph 12 
tells us that real REVPAR in the Bristol/Kingsport region increased by 
2.3 percent during the intervening 24 years.  
•  Since REVPAR may be the single best measure of the health of a hotel 
or motel, the very modest increases in REVPAR that were spread over 
almost a quarter-century in these two regions underline the reality that, 
in general, these have not been boom times for hotels in Virginia. 
(3) Occupancy Rates in Richmond/Petersburg and Williamsburg
•  The occupancy rate for hotels in the Richmond/Petersburg area peaked 
in 1996 at 63.64 percent, reached a low of 48.23 percent in 2009 and 
then recovered nicely to 61.94 percent in 2015 (see Graph 13). This 
occupancy rate roughly matches Virginia’s 61.6 percent, but trails the 
national rate of 65.5 percent. This is further evidence that all is not well 
in the hotel industry in the Commonwealth.  
•  The story is even less attractive in the case of Williamsburg where, 
despite recent recovery, occupancy rates still are about 9 percent below 
what they were in the mid-1990s. The Historic Triangle (Williamsburg, 
Jamestown, Yorktown) currently is in the process of repositioning itself 
and the messages it sends to prospective visitors (see Graph 14).  
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GRAPH 9
HOTEL REVENUE IN VIRGINIA BEACH, 1991-2015 (MILLIONS OF $)
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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Graph 9 
Hotel Revenue in Virginia Beach: 1991-2015 (millions of $) 
 
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Strome College of 
Business, Old Dominion University 
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GRAPH 10
HOTEL REVENUE IN THE VIRGINIA PORTION OF THE WASHINGTON, D.C., METROPOLITAN REGION, 1991-2015 (MILLIONS OF $)
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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Graph 10 
Hotel Revenue in the Virginia Portion of the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Region, 1991-2005 
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GRAPH 11
NOMINAL AND REAL REVPAR IN ROANOKE, 1991-2015 (MILLIONS OF $)
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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Graph 11 
Nominal and Real REVPAR in Roanoke, 1991-2015 
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GRAPH 12
NOMINAL AND REAL REVPAR IN BRISTOL/KINGSPORT, 1991-2015 (MILLIONS OF $)
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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Graph 12 
Nominal and Real REVPAR in Bristol/Kingsport, 1991-2015 
 
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Strome College 
of Business, Old Dominion University 
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GRAPH 13
HOTEL OCCUPANCY RATES IN RICHMOND/PETERSBURG, 1991-2015
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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Graph 13 
Hotel Occupancy Rates in Richmond/Petersburg, 1991-2015 
 
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Strome College 
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GRAPH 14
HOTEL OCCUPANCY RATES IN WILLIAMSBURG, 1991-2015
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University
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Graph 14 
Hotel Occupancy Rates in Williamsburg, 1991-2015 
 
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report; Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Strome College of 
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HOTEL INDUSTRY DYNAMICS IN THE 
METROPOLITAN REGIONS
•  Each metropolitan area in many ways is a microcosm of the 
Commonwealth in terms of the causes of its hotel industry distress. 
The Great Recession and torpid defense spending are the major 
culprits. Alas, recent economic growth numbers for Virginia have 
not been encouraging, and Congressional spending sequestration is 
likely to continue. This does not bode well for Virginia. However, the 
Commonwealth does appear to be working its way out of the supply/
demand imbalance for hotel rooms that reached its peak in the state 
in 2009 and 2010. If this trend continues, then it will improve both 
REVPAR and occupancy rates for hotel rooms throughout the state.  
•  The overall prosperity of Virginia’s hotel industry is demonstrably 
sensitive to federal spending levels. Sequestration has had a significant 
negative impact upon the number of rooms demanded by federal 
employees and active-duty military personnel. The average daily 
rate charged by hotels in the Washington, D.C., hotel market in 2015 
($149.61) was below the comparable 2007 level ($153.13), and the real 
average daily rate in 2015 in the Capitol Region remained 14.3 percent 
below its 2007 level.
•  Further, stagnant or contracting travel budgets have caused many 
federal agencies to substitute remote meetings powered by software 
such as Skype, Jitsi and Goober instead of face-to-face meetings that 
require out-of-town travel. In military-intensive Hampton Roads, every 
single submarket in that region experienced negative real REVPAR 
between 2007 and 2015. As a general rule, the greater the distance 
a metropolitan hotel market is from Washington, D.C., the greater 
the probability that market did not experience a decline in REVPAR 
over the 2007-2015 time period. Bristol, Lynchburg, Roanoke and 
Staunton all experienced increases in real REVPAR during the same 
years.   
•  An interesting trend in some of Virginia’s hotel markets involves a 
gradual upscale movement in the quality of rooms being supplied and 
occupied. In brief, more upscale hotel rooms that typically operate under 
the aegis of national franchises and are able to command higher prices3 
gradually are replacing older, less impressive hotels and motels that have 
no national connections. In Virginia Beach, total hotel room revenue 
increased nicely (9.7 percent between 2013 and 2015) even though the 
city actually supplied fewer hotel rooms. A recent study performed for 
the city of Virginia Beach, based upon Smith Travel Research data, 
found that franchised, upscale hotels in the resort city not only charged 
higher rates, but also had higher occupancy rates than economy hotels. 
Table 2 presents some of those study results. 
TABLE 2
HOTEL PERFORMANCE BY HOTEL CATEGORY: 
VIRGINIA BEACH, 2006 AND 2014
2006 2014
Percentage 
Change
Supply of 
Upscale Rooms
2,365 3,019 +27.7%
Supply of 
Economy Rooms
2,698 2,661    -1.4%
Demand for 
Upscale Rooms
1,590 1,942 +22.1%
Demand for 
Economy Rooms
1,601 1,531   -4.4%
REVPAR at 
Upscale Hotels
 $83.5 $93.0 +11.4%
Source: 2014 Virginia Beach Hotel Supply & Demand Analysis, February 2016, and the Center for Economic 
Analysis and Policy at Old Dominion University  
3   Smith Travel Research data show that the supply of hotel rooms designated as “upscale” (measured by 
high average daily rates) increased 27.7 percent between 2006 and 2014, while “economy” hotel rooms 
decreased in number by 1.4 percent.  Further, the average occupancy rate at the upscale hotels was 65.1 
percent, compared to only 57.2 percent at economy hotels.
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Final Thoughts
Can the hotel industry and the overall tourism sector recover their mojo 
and reverse their decline in relative economic importance in Virginia? This 
does not seem likely to occur as long as federal financial sequestration 
restricts federal expenditures overall and defense expenditures in 
particular.  
Once again, it is apparent that the Commonwealth’s economic dependence 
on federal spending is a two-edged sword. Ideally, the Virginia economy 
of the future will be more diversified and current federal contractors 
increasingly will find private-sector and international customers for 
their goods and services. There are encouraging signs that some of this 
evolution is occurring now in Northern Virginia.  
It is easy to editorialize that Virginia’s economic base should be more 
diversified than it is currently. Accomplishing this, however, is hardly an 
easy task and it is fair to say that no consensus exists among either elected 
officials or academics as to how to go about this. In the context of this 
chapter dealing with the hotel industry, it is an issue in need of further 
study.    
■WILL ROBOTS TAKE 
YOUR JOB? A LOOK AT 
VIRGINIA’S
OPPORTUNITIES AND 
VULNERABILITIES
It’s not about the skill level or how much 
education you have. Really, the primary 
question is, is the job on some level routine, 
repetitive and predictable? 
–  Martin Ford, “Rise of the Robots” 
(Basic Books, 2015)
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t’s not often that a study generated by two 
Oxford academics creates as much hubbub 
as did a 2013 examination that focused on 
which U.S. occupations are at “high risk” of 
being automated within the next 20 years. Carl 
Benedikt Frey, an economist, and Michael A. 
Osborne, an engineer, led the Oxford automation 
study,1 which concluded that 47 percent of 
total employment in 702 occupations in the 
United States should be considered to be in the 
“high risk” category relative to the potential of 
automation to destroy these jobs. “Automation” 
here refers broadly to the substitution by 
employers of machines, software-guided 
processes and artificial intelligence (AI) for 
workers.
Virtually everyone knows about mechanical 
dishwashers replacing human dishwashers and 
one can easily visualize a single giant combine 
harvester replacing dozens of farmworkers 
wielding scythes. Less obvious perhaps has been 
the accelerating automation of the financial 
services industry, where giants such as Goldman 
Sachs are using software programs instead 
of highly paid associates to conduct and write 
research, make stock trades, summarize relevant 
news and even communicate with customers. 
Contemplate also the use of sensors rather than 
people to pick out microcircuits or even heads of 
lettuce that are of inferior quality and therefore 
should be discarded. Or, consider that a computer 
now can defeat the best human chess player and 
an AI program developed by Google “learned” on 
1   Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, “The Future of Employment: 
How Susceptible Are Jobs to Automation?” Oxford Martin School, Sept. 
17, 2013. www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_
Employment.pdf.
Data presented in this chapter relate either to the U.S. or Virginia. 
What about Virginia metropolitan regions such as Richmond and 
Roanoke? Bureau of Labor Statistics occupational data that focus 
on mid-sized regions are much more variable than statewide data 
and, in some cases, simply not available. Presentation of these data 
might lead to unjustified conclusions. Hence, we do not offer any 
regional data, though some are available.
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its own how to beat the reigning world champion at Go, the exceedingly 
complex 2,500-year-old strategy game.
An increasing number of McDonald’s restaurants now have computer 
screens that take your order – rendering unnecessary some of the 
workers formerly behind the counter. No minimum-wage law applies 
to the computer screens. In the realm of higher education, the advent 
of new distance-learning tools and the rise of “MOOCs” (massive open 
online courses) are disrupting the centuries-old “sage on the stage” model 
that emphasizes professors lecturing to groups of more or less interested 
students arrayed in front of them.
Highest on the risk list are occupations that include telemarketers, 
tax preparers, library technicians, etchers and engravers, and bank 
tellers. Frey and Osborne argue that up to 87 percent of jobs in the 
accommodation and food services sector are at risk, as are up to 54 
percent of jobs in finance and insurance. Lowest on their risk list are 
occupations such as elementary school teachers, doctors and dentists, 
nurses, many health care workers, plumbers, theatrical makeup artists 
and foresters.
The Common Denominator
What determines whether the jobs of workers in some occupations (say, 
secretaries and legal researchers) are at high risk, while the jobs of 
workers in other occupations (nurses and plumbers) are not? The key is 
not necessarily the level of education required for each job, though this 
may play a role. Instead, the overriding deciding factor is the extent 
to which jobs require creative and social intelligence, perception, 
interpretation and the ability to manipulate as opposed to being 
dominated by repetitive, routine tasks capable of being learned by 
machines fueled by artificial intelligence.  
Some analysts believe that Frey and Osborne’s estimates are 
substantially too high. A 2016 Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) study takes issue with their methodology 
and argues that it isn’t all workers in an occupation that are at risk, but 
rather specific jobs within occupations. Thus, some workers at financial 
firms can readily be supplanted by trading algorithms incorporated 
into software, while others cannot be replaced because of their 
personal relationships with specific firms and customers. The OECD 
study concludes that only 9 percent of all jobs are at risk because of 
automation (Melanie Arntz, Terry Gregory and Ulrich Zierahn, “The Risk 
of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries,” www.oecd-ilibrary.org, May 
2016). A July 2016 study produced by McKinsey analysts Michael Chui, 
James Manyika and Mehdi Miremadi (“Where Machines Could Replace 
Humans — and Where They Can’t (Yet),” www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/business-technology/our-insights/where-machines-could-
replace-humans-and-where-they-cant-yet?cid=other-eml-alt-mkq-mck-
oth-1607), concluded that 60 percent of all occupations in the United 
States could see 30 percent or more of their work activities being 
automated.
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Note that job recovery in the United States (and Virginia) from the 
Great Recession of 2008 has been built upon relatively low-skill service 
jobs that pay relatively low wages. It is often these jobs that Frey and 
Osborne argue are most at risk because of automation. The reason is 
that they involve repetitive tasks that can be programmed into a machine 
or computer. Further, the machine frequently can complete those tasks 
with a higher level of quality and do so at a lower per-unit cost than their 
human counterpart. Think about the computer screen that is taking the 
place of behind-the-counter personnel at Panera Bread.  
The reality is that computerization of jobs no longer is confined to 
traditional assembly-line, mass-production industries. However, it 
also is true that some manual labor tasks require physical adaptability 
and flexibility in approach. Hence, workers doing these tasks are more 
resistant to automation than those in other jobs that often require more 
education, but nevertheless can be imitated by “smart” machines.
It is the exercise of reasoning, judgment and creative abilities plus the 
application of social interaction skills that most frequently cause a job to 
fall into the low automation risk category rather than high risk. One does 
not need a bachelor’s degree to become an electrician or a plumber (both 
low-risk occupations). Nevertheless, electricians, automobile mechanics 
and plumbers must be able to assess, interpret, adjust, reason and create 
when inserted into unpredictable situations. “You never know what kinds 
of wiring and connections you’re going to find in an old house,” a veteran 
electrician told us. Some variant of this observation, however, might be 
applied to nurses, engineers and multimedia artists. On-the-job experience 
often assumes great value in such positions because it provides workers 
with a set of proficiencies that enables them to exercise sound judgment in 
situations that seldom are repetitive.  
On the other hand, the tasks confronting a telephone operator, shipping 
clerk or Las Vegas gaming employee tend to be repetitive and frequently 
can be replaced by a smart machine. True, these jobs usually require less 
formal education than those in low-risk occupations. However, it is not 
education per se that makes the difference here, but rather the presence 
or absence of repetitive tasks, reasoning and creativity.  
The principle is straightforward: Repetitive, predictable tasks are 
susceptible to machine learning and the application of artificial 
intelligence. Thus, college professors, despite their Ph.Ds., may indeed 
find some of their number being replaced by learner-driven technology 
that is capable of doing what they do, but at a reduced cost. Ironically, 
the learner-driven technologies with access to abundant data and feedback 
may actually be more sensitive than the typical college professor is to 
the peculiar geographic locations, job and family situations, and learning 
preferences of individual students.  
Contrast college professors to elementary school teachers, very few of 
whom hold a doctorate. These teachers cannot be replaced by a machine 
because of their need to exercise judgment, interpret what is going 
on in their sometimes unpredictable classrooms, develop individually 
focused plans of action on the fly, and use their social skills to deal with 
impressionable and sometimes delicate young people. Elementary school 
teachers are among the least at-risk workers in society today.  
What The Studies Say 
(And Do Not Say)
Neither Frey and Osborne, nor the OECD or McKinsey Global 
Institute, are rigid determinists. They speak in terms of probabilities 
(“susceptibilities”) rather than certainties. The future they paint is a 
plausible one, yet not one that is inevitable. Why?  Because technological 
change and changing prices may alter the world they have addressed. 
Consider the following situations.  
•  Think of a new machine that is capable of performing many of the tasks 
of a software engineer; however, this machine is prohibitively expensive 
and hence what is feasible is not economic.  
•  Further, even when a machine is capable of performing a task 
inexpensively, there may be a visible gap between the machine doing that 
task inexpensively and doing it well. Consider automated checkout lines 
at supermarkets and automated check-in lines at airports. Intelligent 
2016 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
84 WILL ROBOTS TAKE YOUR JOB? A LOOK AT VIRGINIA’S OPPORTUNITIES AND VULNERABILITIES ■
machine innovations such as these reduce supplier costs, but clearly can 
be the source of customer frustration and delays.    
•  The use of “big data” has the potential to diminish the need for human 
judgment and interpretation that currently cause some jobs to be 
resistant to automation. A range of cognitive tasks could be susceptible 
to machine learning and recognition if their development is based upon 
large data sets that are capable of recognizing patterns and therefore 
can capture the key aspects of human choice and behavior. Just as big 
data enable Amazon to suggest books that customers might like based 
on their internet behavior, these data sets also might inform activities 
ranging from selling automobiles, houses and tickets to serving legal 
clients and responding to calls for law enforcement.   
•  None of the studies directly addresses the distinction that some 
economists currently make between “tradable” versus “non-tradable” 
goods. Tradable goods are those that are sold internationally in 
competitive markets, for example, cellphones. In tradable markets, 
automobile workers in one country (say, the U.S.) can lose their jobs 
to automobile workers in another country (say, China) because of 
international competition. By contrast, goods and services in non-
tradable markets are not subject to international competition. A 
hairstylist in Harrisonburg isn’t in competition with a hairstylist in 
Beijing. Even so, things can change. Consider that tax preparation used 
to be a predominantly local industry – relatively few customers went 
outside of their hometowns to get their tax returns completed. However, 
because of automation, a tax preparer in Danville now can lose her job 
to tax preparers in New York City or Beijing who are using software 
and internet connections that enable them to prepare tax returns 
for residents in Southwest Virginia. The point is easily understood: 
Automation converts some goods and services from tradable to non-
tradable and this can result in the loss or shuffling of jobs. This trend is 
likely to continue as software driven by artificial intelligence makes it 
possible for items such as tax forms to be completed anywhere.   
•  Frey and Osborne point out that many of the people who will lose their 
jobs as a result of automation are among those in society least able to 
cope with such disruptions due to background, education and lack of 
mobility. It seems likely, therefore, that the impact of automation will be 
felt unevenly across income classes.  
•  The analysts do not directly discuss current proposals, such as a $15 
per hour minimum wage, but economic analysis predicts that such a 
law would provide an additional incentive for employers to accelerate 
the adoption of laborsaving automation. The salient questions are 
whether the nature of their production processes, their specific collective 
bargaining agreements and the law actually give them the flexibility 
to do so. The answers clearly differ across industries and even inside 
industries.     
None of the analysts should be regarded as champions of the world they 
foresee. They are impartial reporters of the facts as they view them. Still, 
they note that the demise of high-risk jobs will increase unemployment 
at least in the short run and likely increase economic inequality as well 
unless society provides financial incentives and invests in job retraining 
programs designed to ease the flow of people from the high-risk 
occupations where jobs are being lost, to low-risk occupations where 
the number of jobs is increasing. Of course, this may be easier said than 
done. How does one teach creative and social skills, how to interpret and 
make judgments, and how to adjust to the unexpected to people who may 
have lower than average intellectual abilities and who for decades have 
been performing repetitive tasks? How does one convince an unemployed 
steelworker with a family and a mortgage that he or she should move 
from West Virginia to Texas? Frey and Osborne are straightforward: “For 
workers to win the race, however, they will have to acquire creative and 
social skills.” This is important advice, given that McKinsey suggested in 
2013 that sophisticated algorithms could substitute for approximately 140 
million full-time knowledge workers worldwide.2  
2   McKinsey Global Institute, “Disruptive Technologies: Advances That Will Transform Life, Business and the 
Global Economy.” 
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The National Picture
For the United States as a whole, Frey and Osborne estimate that 47 
percent of all nonfarm jobs fall into their “high risk” category in terms 
of being eliminated because of automation. In April 2016, this would have 
translated to 67.64 million nonfarm jobs – a staggering number.3 However, 
even if Frey and Osborne’s estimates are precisely on the mark, it does 
not follow that these losses will occur immediately. Multiple decades 
sometimes are required for industries to adjust to new realities. Witness 
the slow deterioration of output levels and jobs in the coal, textile and 
tobacco industries in Virginia.  
Graph 1 reports the five broad occupational categories that Frey and 
Osborne estimated have the greatest vulnerability to job losses because 
of technological change, plus the five broad occupations with the least 
susceptibility.  
The McKinsey study approaches the job vulnerability question through a 
somewhat different lens by focusing on 2,000 different work activities in 
more than 800 occupations. Similar to the OECD, McKinsey argues that 
individual occupations are distinctive in requiring a variety of different 
work activities, which might include physical movement, processing 
data, interacting with customers and the like. These work activities have 
varying potential for automation. The McKinsey study provides estimates 
of the portion of time during each workweek that a typical worker spends 
on each specific work activity. Graph 2 reports the estimates of the 
percentage of time during a typical workweek that workers in the United 
States spend on various work activities. From left to right, these range 
from the work activities least susceptible to automation (such as managing 
others) to those most susceptible to automation (predictable physical 
work).  
3  This is a seasonally adjusted number and includes government employees.
Where physical work is concerned, it is the predictability of the motions 
involved with that work that is the key to the susceptibility of a particular 
occupation to automation. McKinsey concluded that 78 percent of jobs 
involving predictable physical work (welding, food preparation and 
packaging of products) are prone to be automated, whereas only 25 
percent of jobs involving less predictable physical work (construction, 
forestry and raising outdoor animals) are vulnerable. Using the same 
analysis, McKinsey concluded that 47 percent of a retail salesperson’s 
activities have the technical potential to be automated, but fully 86 percent 
of the jobs of the retail sector’s bookkeepers, accountants and auditing 
clerks are in jeopardy. McKinsey reported these estimates in detail in a 
2015 study.4 The consulting group concluded that 45 percent of all work 
activities could be automated using already available technologies, but only 
5 percent of all occupations (the Frey and Osborne focus indicator).  
The McKinsey analysts also estimated that more than 20 percent of a 
typical CEO’s working time could be automated using currently available 
technologies. The analysts concluded that several lower-paid occupations, 
such as health aides, landscapers and maintenance workers, faced fewer 
risks associated with automation because the work of the individuals in 
these occupations could not easily be replaced by a machine or replicated 
by means of AI.  
The consulting group found that the amount of workers’ average hourly 
wages explained only 19 percent of the variability in their automation 
susceptibility. That is, it was the characteristics of specific work tasks 
rather than the monetary value of that work that was the most important 
determinant of whether or not those work tasks were vulnerable to 
automation. High salaries did not guarantee reduced susceptibility to 
automation. Indeed, the opposite may be true – high salaries increase the 
incentive for employers to seek ways to automate.  
4   Michael Chui, James Manyika and Mehdi Miremadi, “Four Fundamentals of Workplace Automation,” 
www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/business-technology/our-insights/four-fundamentals-of-workplace-
automation (November 2015).
Miles Brundage of Slate asks an interesting question: In the future, 
will “made by humans” become a phrase equivalent to “organic” or 
“fair trade”? www.slate.com (Sept. 27, 2013)
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GRAPH 1
THE BROAD OCCUPATIONS MOST (LEAST) SUSCEPTIBLE TO AUTOMATION: 
PERCENT OF JOBS IN FREY AND OSBORNE’S “HIGH RISK” CATEGORY
Source: Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?” Oxford University Martin School, Sept. 17, 2013
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GRAPH 2
PERCENT OF TIME SPENT IN VARIOUS WORK ACTIVITIES IN ALL U.S. OCCUPATIONS, 2014
Source: Michael Chui, James Manyika and Mehdi Miremadi (“Where Machines Could Replace Humans – and Where They Can’t (Yet),” www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/business-technology/our-insights/where-machines-could-
replace-humans-and-where-they-cant-yet?cid=other-eml-alt-mkq-mck-oth-1607), July 2016
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The Virginia Picture
Frey and Osborne examined 702 specific occupations as defined by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and ultimately assigned a probability to each 
occupation that is their estimate of the susceptibility of the jobs in that 
occupation to disappearing because of automation. Let’s begin our analysis 
by applying their technique to 22 broad occupational labor force segments 
in Virginia. Table 1 supplies these data, which apply to 3,682,470 Virginia 
nonfarm workers in 2015 in the Commonwealth.  
It is evident in Table 1 that Frey and Osborne’s methodology suggests 
that 1,877,540 jobs in Virginia are susceptible to automation whereby 
a machine, software or artificial intelligence replaces the worker. This 
is 51 percent of all Virginia jobs (compared to the national average of 
47 percent) and these jobs account for $70.56 billion in annual wages. 
Note that Virginia’s total employment roster is slightly more vulnerable 
to technological change than is true for the United States. This implies 
that Virginia’s workforce has a lower percentage of workers performing 
nonrepetitive tasks that require judgment and on-the-job flexibility.  
That one’s job is susceptible to being lost to technological change does not 
mean that this actually will occur. Not all employers choose to automate, 
or to do it in the same ways. Further, some work tasks that appear to 
be highly repetitive sometimes turn out not to be so at crucial decision 
points in the work process and therefore resist “pattern recognition” – the 
application of artificial intelligence in a manner that adequately imitates 
what a human being would do in a specific situation. A manufacturing 
robot, for example, might be superb at detecting minute differences in 
the size and weight of items being produced, but nevertheless be unable 
to detect emerging differences in smell or color. Human participation and 
intervention still are required in some situations.  
Frey and Osborne are not inerrant savants who can see around 
corners and neither are we. They note that “making predictions about 
technological progress is notoriously difficult” and acknowledge that some 
occupations will experience future tumult from automation that they 
currently do not predict. For example, one should not read the numbers in 
Table 1 to mean that it is a certainty that more than 278,000 jobs relating 
to food preparation absolutely are going to be lost in Virginia. Additionally, 
as noted previously, even if these job losses do occur, decades may be 
required for this to happen.       
In general, we can see in Table 1 that there is a tendency for the 
negative job impacts of technological change to land most heavily on 
the least-educated members of the labor force – but only if their jobs 
involve the repetitive, absence of judgment characteristics mentioned 
previously. The key to surviving automation is not worker education, 
per se, but instead job characteristics involving varied tasks that 
require workers to make judgment calls, on occasion to use their 
intuition and in some cases to work together as a team.     
Note that if the OECD study referenced earlier is correct, then the 
number of Virginia jobs at risk is not 1,877,540, but rather only 327,822 – 
still a large number, but one that would be much more manageable. The 
OECD critique of Frey and Osborne’s work focuses on the variability in 
the occupational circumstances and conditions the OECD believes exist 
inside the 702 occupations that Frey and Osborne analyze. This variability, 
the OECD argues, means that it often is inappropriate to include all jobs 
in an occupation in a category labeled “at risk.”
No doubt some variability in job activities and requirements does 
exist inside conventionally labeled occupations; however, 702 distinct 
occupations is a large number and separate analysis of each occupation 
at this level of detail likely picks up considerable heterogeneity in worker 
tasks. Nonetheless, the OECD analysis underlines that the most expansive 
estimates of the impact of automation on jobs should be inspected carefully 
and probably deflated. Further, even if 47 percent of all jobs in the United 
States are at risk because of automation, it does not follow that the loss of 
these jobs would occur immediately. Decades might be required for such 
an adjustment to occur. The slow, downward employment evolution of the 
automobile, coal and steel industries in the United States illustrates the 
often-gradual nature of occupational and industrial change.       
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TABLE 1
FREY AND OSBORNE’S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO AUTOMATION TECHNIQUE APPLIED TO 22 BROAD JOB CLASSIFICATIONS: VIRGINIA, 2015
BROAD OCCUPATIONAL GROUP
VIRGINIA 
TOTAL 
EMPLOYMENT 
AVERAGE HOURLY 
WAGE
AVERAGE 
ANNUAL INCOME
TOTAL VIRGINIA 
ANNUAL WAGES
PERCENT JOBS 
AT RISK
TOTAL JOBS 
AT RISK
TOTAL ANNUAL WAGES 
AT RISK
Management Occupations      166,610  $  61.79  $    128,530  $    21,414,383,300 13.10% 21,826  $    2,606,680,168 
Business and Financial Operations 
Occupations
     251,780  $  39.24  $      81,620  $    20,550,283,600 43.37% 109,197  $    8,561,241,991 
Computer and Mathematical 
Occupations
     195,140  $  46.52  $      96,750  $    18,879,795,000 13.31% 25,973  $    2,020,223,511 
Architecture and Engineering 
Occupations
       73,790  $  41.31  $      85,930  $      6,340,774,700 21.15% 15,607  $       985,125,516 
Life, Physical and Social Science 
Occupations
       31,160  $  39.76  $      82,700  $      2,576,932,000 19.38% 6,039  $       414,754,154 
Community and Social Service 
Occupations
       50,870  $  22.91  $      47,660  $      2,424,464,200 4.16% 2,116  $          86,907,634 
Legal Occupations        36,050  $  49.75  $    103,480  $      3,730,454,000 27.53% 9,925  $       565,249,295 
Education, Training and Library 
Occupations
     237,250  $  25.93  $      53,930  $    12,794,892,500 11.74% 27,853  $    1,051,500,158 
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports 
and Media Occupations
       48,510  $  27.51  $      57,220  $      2,775,742,200 17.85% 8,659  $       531,050,098 
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical 
Occupations
     198,840  $  36.24  $      75,390  $    14,990,547,600 14.30% 28,434  $    1,366,670,286 
Healthcare Support Occupations        85,840  $  14.00  $      29,120  $      2,499,660,800 23.70% 20,344  $       625,569,235 
Protective Service Occupations        99,650  $  21.41  $      44,530  $      4,437,414,500 44.31% 44,155  $    1,604,686,868 
Food Preparation and Serving Related 
Occupations
     318,730  $  11.00  $      22,870  $      7,289,355,100 87.47% 278,793  $    6,239,845,855 
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TABLE 1
FREY AND OSBORNE’S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO AUTOMATION TECHNIQUE APPLIED TO 22 BROAD JOB CLASSIFICATIONS: VIRGINIA, 2015
BROAD OCCUPATIONAL GROUP
VIRGINIA 
TOTAL 
EMPLOYMENT 
AVERAGE HOURLY 
WAGE
AVERAGE 
ANNUAL INCOME
TOTAL VIRGINIA 
ANNUAL WAGES
PERCENT JOBS 
AT RISK
TOTAL JOBS 
AT RISK
TOTAL ANNUAL WAGES 
AT RISK
Building and Grounds Cleaning and 
Maintenance Occupations
     124,970  $  12.21  $      25,400  $      3,174,238,000 74.02% 92,503  $    2,369,839,041 
Personal Care and Service Occupations      119,900  $  12.47  $      25,930  $      3,109,007,000 41.06% 49,231  $    1,057,000,959 
Sales and Related Occupations      392,330  $  18.61  $      38,710  $    15,187,094,300 76.13% 298,681  $    9,298,746,336 
Office and Administrative Support 
Occupations
     549,560  $  17.58  $      36,570  $    20,097,409,200 76.83% 422,227  $  14,749,877,695 
Farming, Fishing and Forestry 
Occupations
         6,380  $  15.77  $      32,800  $         209,264,000 41.54% 2,650  $       100,689,765 
Construction and Extraction 
Occupations
     156,160  $  20.36  $      42,360  $      6,614,937,600 61.58% 96,163  $    3,743,489,693 
Installation, Maintenance and Repair 
Occupations
     144,650  $  22.65  $      47,110  $      6,814,461,500 56.94% 82,364  $    3,649,015,736 
Production Occupations      171,550  $  17.51  $      36,420  $      6,247,851,000 73.82% 126,638  $    4,328,941,847 
Transportation and Material Moving 
Occupations
     222,750  $  17.41  $      36,220  $      8,068,005,000 63.05% 108,162  $    4,606,862,311 
Totals  3,682,470  $  190,226,967,100 50.99% 1,877,540  $  70,563,968,152
Source: May 2015 Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) data are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm. The May 2015 area level estimates are the first OES estimates to use the 2010 
metropolitan statistical area definitions.
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Is Technological Change 
(And Job Churning) 
Speeding Up?
Is the job-churning process identified by Frey and Osborne going to 
accelerate? That is the trillion-dollar question. It’s true that nearly 
everywhere we look, there is evidence of technological change: self-
driving automobiles and intelligent tractors, smartphones with amazing 
capabilities, potent new drugs, cloud computing, disease-resistant crops, 
medical therapies tailored to a specific individual’s genetic makeup. The 
list of technological changes is impressively long and some argue that 
this lends credence to futurist Ray Kurzweil’s 2001 prediction: “We won’t 
experience 100 years of progress in the 21st century – it will be more 
like 20,000 years of progress (at today’s rate).”5 The implication is that 
technological change is going to cut a wide swath through global labor 
forces in the coming decades. 
Perhaps, but there are others who point out that for all of the marvelous 
technological innovations that have occurred in recent years, actual 
productivity increases have been disappointingly small. As George Mason 
University economist Tyler Cowen put it, “Silicon Valley has not saved us 
from a productivity slowdown” (The New York Times, March 4, 2016). The 
fundamental economics is simple: If technological innovations do not lead 
to significant increases in productivity, then this seriously diminishes their 
lure. Why invest in equipment, software enhancements or AI unless such 
investments are really going to make a difference?
Graph 3 reports the average annual growth in labor productivity (literally, 
output per worker hour) in the United States over the past 20 years. One 
can see that since 2009, labor productivity growth has stalled and now 
is clearly on a lower trend line than it was in the previous decade. This 
5   http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns. Kurzweil and others speak of “singularity,” a 
situation in which technological change has become so rapid and so profound that it disrupts, perhaps 
even destroys, human life as we know it. In this view, technological change is a double-edged sword that 
simultaneously generates benefits, such as longer life spans and reduced physical drudgery, even while 
it introduces significant new dangers that range from the obvious (nuclear bombs) to less-obvious AI 
innovations and nanobots that are controlled by unscrupulous forces, perhaps even other, nonhuman AI 
software. 
reduces the incentive for decision makers to invest in new technologies 
that hold little promise of improving the firm’s bottom line.    
Economic data leave little doubt that there has been a slowdown in 
productivity growth that actually dates back to about 1970. Some label 
this “secular stagnation,” but whatever its label, it has afflicted nearly 
all mature Western economies that have not been sitting on substantial 
oil deposits. Some highly reputable analysts, such as Northwestern 
University’s Robert Gordon, argue that recent decades have been 
characterized by a dearth of truly consequential, cost-reducing, 
production-increasing innovations (“The Rise and Fall of American 
Growth,” Princeton University Press, 2015).  
Nevertheless, even if productivity were not declining, reality is that 
a significant proportion of recent innovations have been labor-saving 
in nature – apparent advances that cause firms and organizations to 
substitute machines and AI for people. Consider that in 2015, the United 
States produced 21.3 percent more manufactured output, but accomplished 
this with 16 percent fewer workers than in 2001.6 Further, this and similar 
episodes of automation often generate ripples of change throughout the 
economy. As self-driving cars and trucks move into the mainstream, the 
jobs of mechanics, insurance agents, car salespersons and repair shop 
workers will be disrupted, and some of them no doubt will lose their jobs.     
In the long run, society as a whole emerges better off and enjoys a 
higher standard of living when such developments occur because these 
innovations free up workers who subsequently can be employed doing 
other things. Remember that in 1800, approximately 90 percent of the 
labor force in the United States was involved in agriculture. Today, 
less than 2 percent of our labor force is so occupied, but that 2 percent 
is marvelously productive. The remaining 98 percent of the labor force 
is employed doing other things that have resulted in dramatic growth 
in our standard of living.7
The short-run story, however, can be painfully different. Workers 
displaced by technological innovations lose their jobs and subsequently 
6   Old Dominion University calculations based upon U.S. Department of Commerce data and the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
7   In the jargon of economics, such innovations push out society’s production possibilities curve and make it 
possible for society to improve its standard of living.
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may find it difficult to obtain new employment. In some cases, this is 
because they are not qualified for the jobs that are available – they are the 
proverbial square pegs attempting to fit into round holes. Jobs exist for 
welders, but steelworkers who have lost their jobs are not trained to weld.
It is these “susceptible” individuals/workers whose circumstances are 
highlighted by Frey and Osborne. Not only may some of them lose 
their jobs, but also their spell of unemployment could turn out to be 
disappointingly long because they are not qualified to fill available 
job openings. They also could be both emotionally and geographically 
immobile. Or, the economy could be in the midst of recession and 
employers simply don’t need additional workers. Whatever the reason, 
they are the “at risk” employees in today’s economy.
While we sometimes hear alarmist rhetoric about job-destroying new 
technologies, the available data do not really support this interpretation. 
Graph 4 reports the absolute number of job layoffs and discharges by 
month in the United States between 2000 and 2016. Immediately visible 
is the upward spike in layoffs and discharges produced by the Great 
Recession. Other than this, since 2011, monthly levels of layoffs and 
discharges in the United States now are lower than they were at the 
turn of the century. It’s not clear that changes in technology, whether 
accelerating or not, have resulted in huge numbers of displaced workers 
who have lost their jobs to machines, software or AI.  
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GRAPH 3
ANNUAL PERCENT GROWTH IN LABOR PRODUCTIVITY (OUTPUT PER HOUR) IN THE UNITED STATES, 1996-2015
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Series ID PRS85006092 3 
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Annual Percent Growth in Labor Productivity (Output per Hour) in the United States, 1 -2015    
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GRAPH 4
NUMBER OF JOB LAYOFFS AND DISCHARGES BY MONTH: UNITED STATES, 2000-2016
Source: FRED database, https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/JTSLDL. Data are seasonally adjusted.
Graph 4 
Number of Job Layoffs 
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Implications
When technological change occurs, it often results in some workers 
losing their jobs and increased levels of economic inequality. Predictably, 
labor unions and worker advocates (some political) often resist such 
adjustments and demand that generous benefits be paid to those affected 
and that extensive job retraining programs and educational alternatives 
be offered at very low personal cost to each displaced worker. Similar 
arguments are made when freely flowing international trade causes 
workers to lose their jobs. One can make a credible equity case for 
supplying such benefits and programs to displaced workers even though 
the available economic evidence discourages the notion that there are 
conspicuous skill shortages (even in STEM-related occupations)8 in 
American labor markets and the rates of return realized by governments 
that finance job retraining programs often are mediocre.      
A dynamic, growing economy requires willingness on the part of firms 
and organizations (including governments) to accept and implement 
cost-effective new methods of production and service. In response, wise 
public policies in this arena should focus on “riding the wave” of 
technological change rather than encouraging resistance movements 
that are destined to prove futile. Astutely constructed public-private 
partnerships between governments and firms have the potential to 
develop programs designed to compensate and redirect job losers, who 
in many cases are relatively innocent victims of dynamic economic 
forces well beyond their control.    
Three classes of programs commend themselves. These involve 
increasing the skills, flexibility and mobility of the workforce. With 
respect to skills, policy focus should be upon proficiencies that count in 
modern labor markets. This is not the same thing as generating massive 
numbers of additional bachelor’s degree holders, or STEM-degree holders, 
though many elected officials make this a high priority. To the surprise 
of many casual observers, there is relatively little rigorous economic 
evidence available that a significant shortage of job candidates exists 
in STEM-related occupations. Examples of skills currently in demand 
8   See Peter H. Cappelli, “Skills Gaps, Skill Shortages, and Skill Mismatches: Evidence and Arguments for the 
United States,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 68 (March 2015), 251-90.
include computer coding, welding and a wide variety of tasks associated 
with health care. The recent emphasis on “credentialing” may provide a 
means for individuals to upgrade their qualifications and abilities without 
committing themselves to entire academic degree programs.
With respect to flexibility, wherever possible, education and training 
should emphasize suppleness in thinking and approach, rather than 
rote memory. As Fareed Zakaria of The Washington Post (March 26, 
2015) put it so succinctly, “Critical thinking is, in the end, the only way 
to protect American jobs.” Occupational shortages come and go, often 
in unpredictable sequences. Workers now stay with the same employer 
for a median of only 4.6 years.9 The days of virtually guaranteed, steady 
employment with the same firm are all but gone. Like it or not, flexibility 
on the part of both employers and employees is the key to success.
With respect to mobility, wise public policy will reduce barriers that 
discourage people from moving geographically and/or telecommuting to 
jobs that may be located thousands of miles away.    
Relatively little in this domain will occur either easily or without 
controversy; witness recent discussions surrounding disrupters Uber 
and Lyft. What the available empirical evidence does tell us, however, 
is that the current range of public policies is insufficient to deal with 
the occupational ferment that Frey and Osborne have identified. We are 
forewarned.
9  Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/tenure.pdf.
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BROADBAND IN 
VIRGINIA: VITAL 
FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT
Broadband service connects businesses and 
individuals to the global marketplace. It has 
flattened the world by allowing businesses to 
communicate and collaborate in ways never 
before possible. 
–  Matt McQuade, “The Importance of 
Broadband to Economic Development,” Site 
Selection magazine, 2011
97
U
p to 70 percent of the world’s internet 
traffic flows through Northern 
Virginia. Tysons Corner became the 
home to MAE-East, one of the earliest internet 
exchanges and one of the building blocks 
of what would become the backbone of the 
internet. Firms such as Amazon Web Services, 
whose customers reputedly handle one-third of 
all daily internet messages, are located there. 
Northern Virginia and especially Loudoun 
County are dotted with internet data centers 
that underpin cloud computing.1 Movers and 
shakers such as CACI and VeriSign inhabit this 
internet hothouse.  
The internet by itself now generates an 
estimated 5 percent of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) of the United States and has 
been responsible for 21 percent of recent 
economic growth in mature world economies.2 
Broadband access and speeds – two keys to 
accessing the power of the internet – have 
become essential foundation stones for local 
and state economic development.
There is abundant empirical evidence 
available to support these conclusions. A 2006 
econometric study of U.S. regions done at 
MIT found that the presence of broadband 
internet connections added 1.0 percent to 1.4 
percent to the rate of growth of employment 
and 0.5 percent to 1.2 percent to the rate 
of establishment of new businesses. A 2007 
1   For a fascinating history of how the internet developed in Northern 
Virginia, see Paul Ceruzzi, Internet Alley: High Technology in Tysons 
Corner, 1945-2005 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008).
2   James Manyika and Charles Roxburgh, “The Great Transformer: 
The Impact of the internet on Economic Growth and Prosperity,” 
McKinsey Global Institute, 2011.  
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Brookings Institution study found that every 1 percent increase in 
broadband penetration in a state increased that state’s employment by 
0.2 percent to 0.3 percent annually.3 A study published in 
Telecommunications Policy (December 2014), authored by Brian Whitacre 
et al., examined economic growth in rural areas of the United States 
between 2001 and 2010. The conclusion: “high levels of broadband 
adoption in rural areas positively (and potentially casually) impacted 
income growth between 2001 and 2010, and negatively influenced 
unemployment growth.”  
The potential of broadband internet connections to increase 
productivity and/or reduce costs is astonishingly great – up to $2.5 
trillion in a single decade in health care and $11.6 trillion in global 
manufacturing if the “internet of things” is exploited. Industries with 
less dynamic reputations are not exempt: municipal energy and service 
provision entities could lower their costs by $757 billion in a decade.4 
(All of these estimates are viewed from 2015.)
Broadband currently is defined by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) as representing internet speeds equal to 25 megabits 
per second (Mbps) for downloads and 3 Mbps for uploads. The definition 
of broadband, however, is much less important than the reality that 
high-speed internet access has become a critical element of economic 
development and has reshaped how we live our lives.   
For Virginia, the good news is that broadband access and speed have 
increased dramatically over the last decade. Nevertheless, access is not 
evenly distributed across the Commonwealth, with urban households being 
more likely to have access to broadband and broadband-related services 
than rural households. Another divide exists along income lines, which in 
turn implies the existence of racial and ethnic differentials. It will suffice 
for us to note that the urban/rural, rich/poor and racial/ethnic dichotomies 
present challenges to policymakers. Should high-speed broadband access 
be viewed in the same fashion as telephone service – something that 
3   Robert Crandall, William Lehr and Robert Litan, “The Effects of Broadband on Output and Employment: A 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of U.S. Data,” Issues in Economic Policy (July 2007), www.brookings.edu.
4   Adam Thierer and Andrea O’Sullivan, “Projecting the Growth and Economic Impact of the Internet of Things,” 
Mercatus Center, George Mason University, 2015.  
should be made available to virtually every household, even if cross-
subsidies are required to achieve this?  
The FCC and the Virginia Office of Telework Promotion and Broadband 
Assistance both classify broadband access as “critical infrastructure.” 
Understanding what broadband is, how it is delivered and how it can 
be utilized is essential to any policymaking and hence we will shift our 
attention to some internet and broadband basics. 
What Is Broadband?
Simply put, “broadband” refers to methods of transmitting data on the 
internet at higher than usual speeds. To be sure, it always has meant 
internet speeds that are faster than traditional dial-up access via a 
telephone landline.  
Internet speed, however, is a relative concept that is constantly evolving. 
internet download and upload speeds are measured in terms of megabits 
per second, or Mbps in shorthand.5 In 1988, broadband meant speeds 
greater than 1.5 to 2 Mbps downstream – rather pokey when compared 
to the 2010 FCC definition of 4 Mbps downstream and 1 Mbps upstream, 
or the FCC’s 2015 benchmark of 25 Mbps/3 Mbps. Even this latest 
benchmark is a subject of contention, with some members of the FCC 
arguing for a definition of 100 Mbps downstream. We’ll stick with the 
25 Mbps/3 Mbps definition until it is revised.6
In Virginia, as throughout the country, broadband delivery can occur by 
utilizing a range of technologies, including cable, fiber optic wire, digital 
subscriber lines, satellites and wireless. One can see in Table 1 that fiber 
optic use in Virginia exceeds the U.S. average. Other forms of transmission 
are close to this average, suggesting that broadband providers continue to 
leverage multiple means of broadband delivery.
5   Mbps is not, however, the same as MBps, which refers to megabytes per second and is used when one is 
measuring the size of files.  
6   Those interested in greater detail on these or related issues are advised to read “The Role of State and 
Local Governments in Broadband Deployment,” Southern Legislative Conference of the Council of State 
Governments, April 2016.
99
TABLE 1
BROADBAND DELIVERY METHODS: 
VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES
PERCENT OF POPULATION
Technology Virginia Nationwide
DSL 83.9% 90.0%
Fiber 47.8% 25.4%
Cable 79.5% 88.8%
Wireless 99.2% 99.4%
Other 0.0% 0.0%
Source: Federal Communications Commission, National Broadband Map, June 2014
Broadband Connection 
Speeds And Penetration: 
International Comparisons
The United States has made significant advances in the deployment 
of broadband in the last two decades and typically leads the Americas 
in terms of connection speeds. Nevertheless, in fourth quarter 2015, 
the United States did not even rank among the top 10 countries in the 
world in terms of its average peak connection speed, which was 61.5 
Mbps (see Table 2). Singapore’s average peak connection speed of 135.7 
Mbps dwarfs that of the United States.
The internet may have been founded in the United States, but the 
U.S. now lags several other developed countries in terms of broadband 
penetration. Broadband penetration averages 111 broadband subscriptions 
per 100 inhabitants in the United States. This may seem to be a large 
number, but the U.S. nevertheless clearly trailed Finland’s 138 and Japan’s 
130 in the United Nations/Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2015 rankings.7  
TABLE 2
TOP GLOBAL AVERAGE PEAK CONNECTION SPEEDS
1 Singapore     135.70
2 Hong Kong  105.20
3 South Korea 95.30
4 Macao          83.10
5 Japan             82.90
6 Indonesia    79.80
7 Mongolia      78.90
8 Taiwan 78.81
9 Qatar           77.80
10 Romania   73.60
Global Average 32.50 
Source: Akamai, “Q4 2015 State of the Internet Report”
7  www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband
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Broadband In Virginia
With 53 percent of households having adopted at least 25 Mbps/3 
Mbps internet speeds, Virginia boasts the fifth-highest rate of 
broadband adoption among the states (see Table 3). Virginia’s adoption 
rate is well above the U.S. average of 37 percent and almost 3.5 times that 
of North Carolina.  
The Commonwealth ranks among the top 10 states in terms of its average 
peak internet connectivity speed, which is 77.5 Mbps (see Table 4). If it 
were a nation, Virginia would rank 10th in the world in terms of internet 
speed and well above the global average peak connectivity of 32.5 Mbps.
 
TABLE 3
ADOPTION RATES OF BROADBAND BY HOUSEHOLDS: 
COMPARING VIRGINIA TO OTHER STATES, 2015 
Rank State
Percent at Least 
25 Mbps/3 Mbps
1 Massachusetts 68%
2 Maryland 59%
3 New Jersey 58%
4 New Hampshire 56%
5 Virginia 53%
6 Colorado 52%
7 Washington 52%
8 Vermont 51%
9 Oregon 49%
10 Pennsylvania 46%
Source: 2016 Broadcast Progress Report, Federal Communications Commission, www.fcc.gov
TABLE 4
AVERAGE PEAK CONNECTION SPEED FOR VIRGINIA
Quarter and Year
Average Peak 
Connection Speed 
Mbps
National Rank
Q4, 2012 37.0 9
Q4, 2013 59.2 2
Q4, 2014 73.5 2
Q4, 2015 77.5 6
Source: Akamai, “State of the Internet Reports,” 2012-2015
THE URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE
Virginia mirrors the United States with regard to having an urban-rural 
divide in internet access and speeds. The gap between urban and rural 
areas in Virginia represents a public policy challenge because reality is 
that it reflects economic circumstances. Urban areas can better afford 
to deploy high-speed internet connections, not only because of greater 
wealth, but also because providers there usually can realize cost economies 
of scale when their customer base is concentrated together and easy to 
reach. It is much more expensive per customer to provide broadband 
access in rural areas than in urban areas.  
As Table 5 discloses, in 2015, 11 percent of Virginians lacked access to 
“fixed advanced telecommunications capability,” a federal statutory term 
that is slightly more inclusive than broadband.8 However, the 11 percent 
number disguised the fact that only 3 percent of Virginians residing in 
urban areas lacked broadband access, while it was 38 percent in rural 
areas. The bottom line is that approximately 900,000 residents of the 
Commonwealth currently lack high-speed access to the internet.
Virginia’s Center for Innovative Technology (CIT) recently provided 
a more up-to-date analysis. Graph 1 discloses that the CIT found 
29 percent of those Virginians living in rural areas lacked access to 
8   Note, however, that BroadbandNow (www.broadbandnow.com/Virginia) says that 16 percent of Virginians 
lack broadband coverage that provides them with at least 25 Mbps speeds downloading and 3 Mbps speeds 
uploading.  
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broadband services at any speed, while 47 percent did not have access 
at the 25 Mbps/3 Mbps threshold. On the other hand, 96 percent of 
those living in urban areas had access to broadband at the 25 Mbps/ 
3 Mbps threshold or faster. Separately, www.broadbandnow.com/
Virginia reports that 11 of Virginia’s largest 54 cities and towns now 
have 100 percent broadband coverage of their households. All of these 
11 cities and towns are located in Northern Virginia.   
Figure 1 provides a geographic view of broadband access in the 
Commonwealth. The Urban Crescent of Hampton Roads, Richmond and 
Northern Virginia benefits from 95-plus percent household broadband 
access, while a few other larger cities and college towns exhibit 80-plus 
percent household broadband access possibilities. Still, if one ignores 
population and considers only geographic areas, a majority of the surface 
area of the Commonwealth has fewer than 70 percent of households that 
have the ability to access the internet via high-speed connections.  
Having broadband access, however, does not necessarily mean that this 
access is truly high speed. Figure 2 shows the percentages of households in 
each county that have access to the internet at various download speeds. 
As one might expect, higher-speed broadband penetration follows major 
urban corridors and interstates, but even then the pattern is surprisingly 
spotty. Literally, neighbors can find themselves dealing with different 
internet providers and therefore experience very different download 
speeds. One can see that circumstances frequently differ from one county 
or city to the next.
In May 2016, Gov. Terry McAuliffe announced a statewide initiative 
(RUOnline VA?) to identify and reduce the urban/rural broadband divide 
in Virginia. It is coupled with 2016 legislation that will make it easier to 
place broadband and telecommunications infrastructure in the rights-of-
way of state-maintained roads throughout the Commonwealth. This will 
reduce the expense involved in serving rural customers.
TABLE 5
VIRGINIANS WITHOUT ACCESS TO FIXED ADVANCED 
TELECOMMUNICATION CAPABILITY, 2015
Population 
Without 
Access
Percent of 
Population
Urban 
Population 
Without 
Access
Percent of 
Population
Rural 
Population 
Without 
Access
Percent of 
Population
United 
States
31,353,263 10% 9,001,161 3% 22,352,102 38%
Virginia 925,477 11% 186,349 3% 739,128 38%
Source: Federal Communications Commission 2016 Broadband Progress Report
THE INCOME AND EDUCATIONAL DIVIDE
The Brookings Institution issued a report in December 2015 that 
focused on broadband adoption rates in the United States as a whole.9 
Brookings concluded: “Multiple factors – including higher levels 
of income, educational attainment and telecommuting – all have a 
positive and significant effect on broadband adoption rates.” Graph 
2, which is derived from Brookings data, drives home these points. There 
were observable links between income, age, education and employment and 
broadband adoption in 2014.  
Table 6, also derived from Brookings data, reveals that the same general 
relationships held within the five largest Virginia metropolitan areas in 
2014. One cannot help but be struck by the very low broadband adoption 
rates of non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics. This has profoundly negative 
social and economic consequences and renders these individuals not only 
less employable, but also less informed, less able to communicate and less 
able to access many forms of entertainment. We will have more to say 
about this in a following section.
9   www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/12/07-broadband-adoption-rates-metropolitan-areas-tomer-
kane.
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GRAPH 1
HOUSEHOLD PERCENT ACCESS TO BROADBAND IN VIRGINIA: URBAN VS. RURAL AREAS, 2015
Sources: Center for Innovative Technology, Virginia Tech and Virginia Geographic Information Network: “Broadband Activities in the Commonwealth: An Annual Status Report,” October 2015
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FIGURE 1
PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH BROADBAND ACCESS IN VIRGINIA COUNTIES, 2015
Source: Virginia’s Center for Innovative Technology
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FIGURE 2
INTERNET DOWNLOAD SPEEDS BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF VIRGINIA, 2015
Source: Virginia’s Center for Innovative Technology
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Figure 2 
Internet Download Speeds by Geographic Area of Virginia, 2015 
 
 
Source: Virginia’s Center for Innovative Technology 
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GRAPH 2
INTERNET ADOPTION CHARACTERISTICS: UNITED STATES, 2014
Source: www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/12/07-broadband-adoption-rates-metropolitan-areas-tomer-kane
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TABLE 6
INTERNET ADOPTION CHARACTERISTICS: VIRGINIA, 2014
Metro Area
Percent HHs 
Broadband
 Percent 
HHs $50K+
Percent 
Work at 
Home
Percent 25 
Yrs+ with 
HS+
Percent 65+ 
Years
Percent 
Tech/Ed 
Workers
Average 
Mbps 
Download 
Speed 
Percent 
Urban
Percent 
Non-
Hispanic 
Black
Percent 
Hispanic
Lynchburg 64.3% 47.8% 3.4% 87.3% 15.4% 20.3% 18.6%  48.4% 17.2% 2.3%
Richmond 77.4% 59.3% 4.2% 88.4% 11.9% 25.1% 32.5% 80.7% 29.8% 5.4% 
Roanoke 68.3% 52.1% 3.2% 88.5% 15.7% 19.1% 25.9% 68.1% 12.5% 3.4%
Wash DC 84.7% 74.1% 5.1% 90.2% 10.0% 39.9% 33.6% 92.4% 25.0% 14.4%
Va. Beach 78.9% 57.6% 3.1% 90.2% 11.3% 23.9% 32.4% 90.3% 30.2% 5.8%
Source: www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/12/07-broadband-adoption-rates-metropolitan-areas-tomer-kane
Virginia’s Center For 
Innovative Technology 
Leads The Way
In 2006, Gov. Tim Kaine established an Office of Telework Promotion and 
Broadband Assistance within the Office of the Secretary of Technology. 
This guaranteed that high-speed broadband internet access would become 
and remain a high priority for the Commonwealth. The secretariat actively 
promotes high-speed internet access via advocacy, administering funded 
programs such as those involving big data, promoting cybersecurity 
awareness and solutions, sponsoring workshops, and supporting eight 
regional technology councils and a broadband advisory council, etc. Among 
the councils, the Northern Virginia Technology Council is particularly 
active and sponsors 150 or more networking and educational events 
annually.   
The Commonwealth’s Center for Innovative Technology, a part of the 
technology secretariat, is specially tasked with promoting the spread and 
use of broadband in Virginia. It undertakes a wide variety of activities 
to pursue its portfolio, including producing useful maps that readily 
show the areas of the Commonwealth that have broadband coverage and 
the speeds associated with that coverage; promoting and assessing the 
use of information technology in health provision; assisting localities 
in mobilizing their resources to expand the reach of broadband in their 
regions; and assessing the economic impact of its broadband initiatives. 
Shortly, we will examine several of those initiatives.    
The costly nature of broadband developments in rural areas and the 
relatively modest expected financial returns from such developments have 
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deterred many private firms from investing in broadband developments 
outside of urban areas. “Too many regulations and too expensive” was the 
concise evaluation of a senior executive of a large telecommunications firm 
when asked why that firm did not undertake more projects in rural areas.  
Firms such as Comcast, Cox, DIRECTV, Time Warner, Verizon, 
Virginia Broadband, Windstream and XFINITY typically have focused 
on serving urban areas and have not been the recipients of National 
Telecommunications Information Agency (NTIA) funding.  
CITIES AND REGIONS MOBILIZE
Virginia’s Center for Innovative Technology has been the driving 
organizational element in the deployment of broadband in rural Virginia. 
The CIT utilizes its expertise to orchestrate projects that nearly always 
have multiple sources of funding and involve a variety of governmental 
units and organizations. In general, the extension of broadband to rural 
areas of the Commonwealth has involved extensive federal funding from 
multiple agencies, but most often via the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
or the NTIA’s Broadband USA program, which has awarded more than 
$200 million in 13 grants to Virginia entities in the past several years. 
The recipients have included the CIT itself, the Mid-Atlantic Broadband 
Communities Corp. and the Bristol Virginia Utilities Authority. We will 
look at the latter two in greater detail.  
The Mid-Atlantic Broadband Communities Corp. (MBC) has been 
operating an open-access, fiber optic network in Southside Virginia 
since 2004. MBC’s creation was in partial response to the demise of the 
furniture, textiles and tobacco industries in Southside Virginia. This was 
one of the reasons the venture was able to receive more than $36 million 
in funding from the Virginia Tobacco Commission to enable it to get off 
the ground. 
Already by 2006, MBC had laid 600 route miles of new fiber, connecting 
20 counties and four cities in a network that included all major business, 
industrial and technology concentrations in the region. In 2012, MBC 
ended its cooperative governance structure and became a 501(c)(4) not-
for-profit corporation. The MBC network now spans 1,800 route miles. 
MBC asserts that it is responsible for 1,100 incremental jobs and $2.1 
billion of private-sector investment in Southside Virginia (www.mbc-va.
com/history). Private-sector investments have included data centers, 
call centers/operations centers, advanced manufacturing, research 
and development, and biotech industries. Most recently, MBC played a 
critical role in securing the expansion of a Microsoft data center project 
for Southside Virginia that will involve $346.7 million in private-sector 
investment and 90 attractive additional jobs. MBC participates in the Mid-
Atlantic Research Infrastructure Alliance (MARIA), a membership that 
enables it to offer internet connections up to four terabits per second in 
selected instances.
The Bristol Virginia Utilities Authority (BVU) operates within a 
narrowly crafted segment of Virginia law that classifies broadband 
services as private business ventures, and this is why providers such as 
Comcast, Cox and Verizon inhabit this business space. No municipality 
classified as a “city” in Virginia currently has fewer than 12 alternate 
internet providers, according to www.broadbandnow.com/Virginia, and 
overall there are 133 different broadband providers in Virginia.  
Even so, Code of Virginia sections §56-265.4:4 and §56-484.7:1 allow 
municipal electric utilities to become certified municipal local exchange 
carriers and to offer communications services that their systems are 
capable of supporting (cable television services are an exception), provided 
that they do not charge rates lower than incumbents, they do not subsidize 
services, and they impute private-sector costs into their rates. These 
restrictions clearly are attractive to private-sector broadband vendors 
because they effectively insulate them from price competition and price-
cutting.
Because the Code of Virginia requirements and other Commonwealth 
regulations are so limiting, this has effectively discouraged local 
governments from entering the broadband business. There are some 
exceptions. A particularly interesting one involves the city of Bristol, 
which years ago used its municipal utility system as an umbrella to offer 
broadband services. Subsequently, Bristol was grandfathered when more 
restrictive regulations went into effect in 2002. 
2016 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
108 BROADBAND IN VIRGINIA: VITAL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT■
BVU provides electricity, water, wastewater and fiber-optic 
telecommunications and information services to the city of Bristol, 
Washington County and the town of Abingdon. BVU OptiNet is a nonprofit 
division of BVU that began in 2001 to provide telecommunications services 
to approximately 12,500 customers in Southwest Virginia.10 BVU generally 
is acknowledged to be the first municipal utility in the United States to 
deploy an all-fiber network offering video, voice and data services.11
The utility received a federal award of $22.7 million that it combined 
with money from the Tobacco Indemnification Commission, the Virginia 
Department of Transportation and the Cumberland Peak Co. This enabled 
BVU to field 339 miles of fiber optic access to 5,600 residences, 220 
businesses and 95 percent of all K-12 schools in an eight-county region of 
Southwest Virginia.12
BVU recently became newsworthy for less attractive reasons because it is 
alleged to have developed what the Roanoke Times labeled a “culture of 
corruption, entitlement and greed.”13 According to the Times, “the utility 
was rife with self-dealing, extortion, tax evasion and fraud” and this 
resulted in nine convictions and/or guilty pleas. While shattering, these 
conspicuous malfeasances did not alter the fact that BVU was the first of 
its kind in terms of a utility providing broadband access.  
10   The Bristol Herald Courier reported on Feb. 5, 2016, that OptiNet, which generated $23 million in revenues 
in 2014-15, was up for sale. The reasons for this are not yet clear. 
11   Bristol’s program was challenged in the courts. In City of Bristol, VA v. Earley (145 F.Supp.2d 741, 745 W.D. 
Va. 2001), the court held that the City had authority to provide telecommunications services. However, in 
Marcus Cable Associates, LLC v. City of Bristol (237 F.Supp.2d 675, 678-79, W.D. Va. 2002), the same court 
held that the City did not have authority to provide cable television service. According to the court, the 
critical difference was that Virginia’s statute authorizing localities to establish “public utilities” applies to 
telecommunications services, but not to cable television.
12   Approximately 40 percent of eligible residences later subscribed to broadband. This underlines a persistent 
reality – the fact that broadband is available does not mean that it will be used.
13   Dan Casey, “Bristol Virginia Utilities Shows Culture of Corruption, Entitlement and Greed,” Roanoke Times 
(May 6, 2016), www.roanoke.com.
EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVES
Virginia’s research universities have enjoyed higher internet speeds 
for some time via Internet2. They are members of the nonprofit Mid-
Atlantic Research Infrastructure Alliance (MARIA), which provides 
campus connections up to 100 gigabits per second (Gbps), an almost 
unheard of speed only a few years ago. Translating this capability into 
research productivity and increased research funding, however, remains a 
challenge. 
At the K-12 level, the Commonwealth’s Department of Education not only 
is interested in connectivity – 94 percent of school divisions have a fiber 
optic connection – and connection speeds – 46 percent of school divisions 
have 100 kilobits per second (Kbps) speeds or better – but also in the 
prices school divisions pay for their internet access. Action seems merited 
in this area because only 5 percent of Virginia school divisions meet the 
NTIA’s national goal of paying no more than $3 per Mbps for internet 
access (http://stateofthestates.educationsuperhighway.org).  
Some public broadband ventures compete with private-sector broadband 
providers and this provokes understandable tension.  An example in point 
involves the Roanoke Valley Broadband Authority, which operates a fiber 
optic network in Roanoke, Salem, and surrounding Roanoke and Botetourt 
counties. The authority asked the Roanoke County Board of Supervisors 
to provide $3.4 million in public funding for an expansion of the project 
– a notion that the Virginia Cable Telecommunications Association found 
wanting. The project previously had received $6.2 million in bonding 
authority from the Virginia Resources Authority. As of this writing, the 
issue is not yet settled. (See Carmen Forman in the Roanoke Times, May 
12, 2016.)
A BVU residential customer is able to purchase 250 Mbps download 
speed and 30 Mbps upload speed plus four email accounts and an IP 
address for $99.95 per month.  These internet speeds are not blazing, but 
exceed those of most of rural and Southwest Virginia. 
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Final Thoughts
Much of the modern development and maturation of the internet has 
taken place in Northern Virginia. Even so, more than half of our state’s 
geographic area currently does not meet the 25 Mbps download speed/ 
3 Mbps upload speed standard that is commonly used today to delineate 
what constitutes a genuine broadband connection.
Many in Virginia do not yet seem to understand that broadband internet 
connections have assumed an importance that rivals that of roads, bridges 
and highways. In a nutshell, broadband internet connections have become 
an essential part of our economic infrastructure. Economic success or 
failure in an increasingly wide range of ventures now depends upon one’s 
ability to utilize the internet effectively and to harness the potential of 
broadband connections.  
Is it now time to consider broadband internet connections in the 
same fashion we do telephone connectivity? Since 1985, the Federal 
Communications Commission’s Lifeline Program has subsidized telephone 
carriers so that they can provide telephone connectivity in geographic 
areas where otherwise it would be entirely uneconomic to do so. The FCC 
did so because it concluded that telephone connectivity was fundamental 
not only for economic development, but also for citizenship and meaningful 
interpersonal relationships. On March 31, 2016, the FCC formally 
extended this policy to include discounted broadband internet coverage. It 
will take time and funds to implement this change, but it seems likely to 
reduce the rich/poor broadband gap that is apparent in Graph 2 for the 
United States and Table 6 for Virginia.
It is in the best interests of Virginia to diminish the urban/rural, rich/
poor and white/black differentials that currently exist in broadband 
coverage in the Commonwealth. An important economic reason is that 
such gaps reduce the quality of the labor force to which employers 
have access even while it diminishes their ability to access information, 
utilize modern technologies and sell to customers. It is not a good 
thing, for example, for only 29.8 percent of African-Americans in 
Richmond to have broadband access, while 77.4 percent of the overall 
Richmond population enjoys that status. The already large income and 
educational gaps that exist between the races will only become larger 
if the two groups have dramatically different levels of access to the 
internet tools that have become essential to economic prosperity.   
Much the same conclusion would be reached if we were to focus on the 
urban/rural divide in broadband coverage that continues to persist in 
Virginia. Such disparities are a recipe for rising economic inequality and 
future distress.  
Is state government the best available vehicle to address these challenges? 
Probably so – because there are many economic and social “spillover” 
effects generated by broadband internet deployment that no single 
individual or firm can take into account. These span the economic activity 
of schools, health care institutions, law enforcement, entertainment, 
the provision of governmental services, etc. Further, broadband access 
has stealthily become a vital part of our societal infrastructure and now 
occupies a role similar to that of roads, highways and bridges, for which 
the Commonwealth provides major funding.  
Mark well that this does not mean Virginia itself should get into the 
business of supplying broadband infrastructure, or that it should become 
a broadband supplier that competes with private firms. Nevertheless, 
it is appropriate for state government to provide its organizational 
talents and to supply partial funding for broadband activity even while 
it ensures coverage, seeks to minimize disparities and monitors quality 
levels. These are proper roles for government to assume because 
broadband benefits and costs spill over to virtually every citizen, 
whether or not they are aware that it is happening.   
■STOCK CAR RACING IN 
VIRGINIA: 
THE SPORT AND THE 
BUSINESS
110
111
V
irtually every popular sport that 
captures the public imagination boasts 
multiple levels of competition. In 
baseball, for example, competition ranges from 
sandlots and Little League on up to the minor 
leagues and Major League Baseball. Car racing 
is much the same. From the dirt tracks and 
drag strips to the short tracks and NASCAR, it 
is a sport enjoyed by many people as spectators 
and participants, in many different settings. It 
has evolved into a very big business.   
For some, car racing is recreational. For 
others, it is a spectator sport. For still others, it 
is a money-making business. Some people golf 
regularly or join a bowling league, while others 
enjoy tuning their cars and racing them. For 
many, this is an experience that simply is fun, 
yet for others it leads to a career or a business. 
People make significant investments in horses 
for racing or dogs for showing, while others 
make truly significant financial investments in 
race cars.
NASCAR, the National Association 
for Stock Car Auto Racing, is the most 
prominent organizer of stock car racing. 
It sanctions 1,500 races annually at 100 
tracks in almost 40 states. NASCAR exceeds 
both golf and tennis in terms of the number 
of its fans and television viewers, and live 
audiences can exceed 200,000. Although 
in recent years attendance has trended 
downward, NASCAR still asserts that it 
sponsors a majority of the most-attended 
single-day sporting events in the world.1  
1  “NASCAR,” Wikipedia (accessed May 19, 2016).  
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Professional race car drivers such as Jimmie Johnson, Kevin Harvick 
and Kyle Busch earn substantial amounts of money and are recognized 
by their fans on television and the national scene. Hendrick Motorsports, 
a NASCAR racing team, was worth $375 million in 2015, according to 
Forbes magazine (Feb. 16, 2016).  
For every famous team and driver, however, there are dozens who 
work semi-anonymously on their own cars, drive them in races and are 
racing heroes only to their families and the people in their communities. 
Car racing is a way of life for some people – a part of their culture, an 
opportunity for fun and relaxation.  
These are among the reasons why car racing has become a big business 
that involves thousands of Virginians, highly attended sports events, 
hundreds of millions of dollars of economic impact, expensive high-
technology vehicles, franchises, sponsorships, prize money and elaborate 
facilities. All of this is in addition to the teenager who “soups up” his 
car and enjoys drag racing and the demolition derbies that occur on dirt 
tracks around the Commonwealth. 
Car Racing In Virginia 
Traces Its Beginnings To 
Virginia Beach
Virginia Tech professor of landscape architecture Brian Katen, who has 
done an exhaustive study of the beginnings of racing in Virginia, reports 
that car racing in the Commonwealth got its start on the beach at Virginia 
Beach in 1904. That was the plan, at least. Alas, neither the weather nor 
the tides cooperated that day, and so the race was moved to the Norfolk 
fairgrounds. This started a trend of having races at fairgrounds.
“Since colonial times, race day – horse racing – was always a part of the 
fair. These horse tracks became car tracks,” Katen explained (Susan 
Trulove, “Life in the fast lane enriches Virginia’s landscape: Culture of 
racing a significant part of past and present,” Research Magazine, Virginia 
Tech, fall 2004). 
Katen’s research unearthed 110 car race tracks in Virginia, though not all 
were ever operational at the same time. From the fairgrounds to baseball 
fields to oval tracks in a farm field, car racing would become very popular 
and a part of life in many rural communities, especially in Southwest 
Virginia.  
Early race cars were open-wheeled vehicles. After World War II, there 
was a move to what became known as stock car racing – featuring cars 
that race around oval tracks at speeds up to and exceeding 200 mph. 
Southwest Virginia Speedway, built near Marion in 1947, was the first 
designed for stock cars. Currently, there are at least 11 hard-surface stock 
car tracks in Virginia plus a half-dozen dirt tracks.   
A dozen or more distinct classes of stock car racing exist (for example, 
“true” stock car racing, which is limited to street vehicles that can be 
purchased by the general public). For each class, rules exist that are 
designed to produce races between cars with near-identical specifications. 
Fudging the specification rules, of course, always has been a temptation for 
drivers and teams.
It’s not easy to assemble reliable information on car racing in Virginia 
because public records in the sport are limited and many of the 
participants come and go from year to year. NASCAR, for example, is a 
family-owned and operated firm. Thus, anecdotal information assumes 
larger than usual importance.
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The foremost historian of race cars and tracks in Virginia is Brian 
Katen, an associate professor in the School of Architecture + Design at 
Virginia Tech. His contributions include “Racing’s Roots in the Virginia 
Landscape,” in “Horsehide, Pigskin, Oval Tracks and Apple Pie: Essays on 
Sports and American Culture,” Dr. James A. Vlasich, ed., McFarland and 
Co., 2006; “The Roots of Oval Track Racing in Virginia,” in “Car Crazy: 
Racing and Rodding in Southwest Virginia,” Art Museum of Western 
Virginia, Roanoke, Va., in collaboration with the Blue Ridge Institute and 
Museum of Ferrum College, 2004, and “Richmond’s Oval Track History,” 
in “Capital Car Crazy; Racing and Rodding Around Richmond,” Exhibit 
Catalogue, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Va., Blue Ridge Institute 
and Museum of Ferrum College, 2005.
The story that stock car racing began in the era of Prohibition is a 
mixture of myth and truth. The legend is that young men, particularly 
in the South, used souped-up regular cars to ferry illegal moonshine and 
outrun federal revenuers. Undoubtedly this occurred during Prohibition 
and was the basis for movies such as “Thunder Road” (1958). The 
tradition was embellished (and satirized) subsequently by Burt Reynolds 
in movies such as “Smokey and the Bandit” (1977) and “The Cannonball 
Run” (1981). Even so, to the extent this occurred, it only supplemented the 
natural desire of many car owners to maximize the performance of their 
vehicles.  
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Race Car Tracks In Virginia
Table 1 lists the major stock car raceways with hard surfaces in Virginia. 
Dirt tracks and drag racing tracks are listed separately. Figure 1 locates 
the tracks within the Commonwealth. While concentrated in less 
urbanized areas, it is apparent that virtually every area of Virginia hosts a 
stock car race track.
TABLE 1
RACE CAR TRACKS IN VIRGINIA, 2015
Bristol Motor Speedway - Located on the Tennessee side of the city of Bristol, which straddles the Virginia and Tennessee border. Shape: High-banked oval. 
Surface: Concrete. Length: .533 miles. Called the “world’s fastest half mile.” It is counted as a Virginia track in Figure 1.
Dominion Raceway - Thornburg. Multipurpose race and entertainment facility. Shape: Oval. Road course and drag strip to open soon. Surface: Asphalt. 
Length: .4 mile. Seats: 3,500. New in 2016.
Langley Speedway - Hampton. Shape: Semi-banked oval. Surface: Asphalt. Length: .396 mile.
Lonesome Pine Raceway - Coeburn. Shape: Oval. Surface: Asphalt. Length: .375 mile.
Martinsville Speedway - Ridgeway. Shape: Paperclip. Surface: Asphalt. Length: .526 mile. Voted one of the most popular tracks by fans.
Motor Mile Speedway - Radford. Shape: High-banked oval. Surface: Asphalt. Length: .416 mile.
Richmond International Raceway - Shape: “D”-shaped oval. Surface: concrete. Length: .75 mile. Seats: 70,000.
Shenandoah Speedway - Shenandoah. Shape: Oval. Surface: Asphalt. Length: .375 mile.
South Boston Speedway - South Boston. Shape: Semi-banked oval. Surface: Asphalt. Length: .4 mile.
Southside Speedway - Midlothian. Shape: Oval. Surface: Asphalt. Length: .33 mile. Called “toughest short track in South.”
VIRginia International Raceway - Alton (near Danville). Shape: Road course, oval and drag strip. Surface: Asphalt. Length: 2.25 miles. Named one of the top 
six courses in North America by Car and Driver magazine.
Among the more active dirt oval tracks are Eastside Speedway, Waynesboro; Natural Bridge Speedway, Natural Bridge; Virginia Motor Speedway, Jamaica; 
Winchester Speedway, Winchester; and Wythe Raceway, Rural Retreat. 
Drag racing strips in Virginia include Colonial Beach Dragway, Colonial Beach; Eastside Speedway, Waynesboro; Elk Creek Dragway, Elk Creek; New London 
Dragway, Lynchburg; Newton Dragway, Newton; Richmond Dragway, Richmond; Sumerduck Dragway, Culpeper; and Virginia Motorsports Park, Petersburg.
Source: Virginia Delegate Kenneth Plum
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FIGURE 1
LOCATION OF STOCK CAR TRACKS IN VIRGINIA
RACE TRACKS
1. Bristol Motor Speedway – Bristol, VA/TN 
2. Dominion Raceway – Thornburg
3. Langley Speedway – Hampton 
4. Lonesome Pine Raceway – Coeburn  
5. Martinsville Speedway – Ridgeway 
6. Motor Mile Speedway – Radford 
7. Richmond International Raceway – Henrico County
8. Shenandoah Speedway – Shenandoah
9. South Boston Speedway – South Boston 
10. Southside Speedway – Midlothian 
11. Virginia International Raceway – Alton   
DIRT OVAL TRACKS
12. Eastside Speedway – Waynesboro
13. Natural Bridge Speedway – Natural Bridge
14. Virginia Motor Speedway – Jamaica 
15. Winchester Speedway – Winchester
16. Wythe Raceway – Rural Retreat
DRAG RACING STRIPS
17. Colonial Beach Dragway – Colonial Beach
18. Elk Creek Dragway – Elk Creek 
19. New London Dragway – Lynchburg
20. Newton Dragway – Newton 
21. Richmond Dragway – Richmond
22. Sumerduck Dragway – Culpeper
23. Virginia Motorsports Park – Petersburg
Source: Virginia Delegate Kenneth Plum
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Virginia Recognizes The 
Economic Potential Of Stock 
Car Racing 
In 2003, Gov. Mark R. Warner announced the Virginia Motorsports 
Initiative to “promote and support motorsports activities in Virginia as a 
means for economic development.” According to Warner, the purpose of 
the project was:
Virginia has a strong cluster of racing venues and motorsports 
businesses. Our new initiative will build on these exciting assets to 
promote the growth of the motorsports industry and racing venues. 
Our aim is to attract and grow in Virginia a dynamic motorsports 
industry that sees the Commonwealth as the preferred location 
for engine builders, component makers, race car teams, and other 
businesses in the fast growing motor sports world (press release from 
the Governor’s Office, Aug. 13, 2003).
Warner’s announcement also revealed that $250,000 would be made 
available in low-interest loans to help finance the move of new motorsports 
businesses to Virginia, $100,000 in workforce funds to train new workers 
and $250,000 in incentive funds from the Virginia Tobacco Commission to 
attract related new businesses. Educational and workforce programs in 
motorsports were to be developed. A private-sector Virginia Motorsports 
Coalition was organized.
A commending resolution passed by the House of Delegates and the 
Senate (HJR 451) in March 2004 was equally as optimistic in praising the 
motorsports industry in the Commonwealth “for its positive contributions 
to tourism and economic development.” The resolution noted that Virginia 
had 37 racetracks, from the best tracks in the competition to local dirt 
tracks and drag strips. It further noted that “attendance figures from 
Martinsville Speedway, Richmond International Raceway, South Boston 
Speedway, Virginia International Raceway and Virginia Motorsports Park 
show almost two million visitors in 2002 with an economic impact of 
$11.7 million in state and local sales taxes and other tax revenues.”
A posting on the internet blog Bacon’s Rebellion (June 19, 2005) 
proclaimed: “Virginia has what it takes to be a contender in motor sports. 
A little help from the state could jump-start local development of this 
fast-growing industry.” The column went on to explain that “several states 
are trying to position themselves as the location for more motorsport 
businesses. None of these efforts has taken a clear lead yet, and Virginia 
should work to position itself as the industrial capital of motor sports.” 
NASCAR And Other Stock 
Car Sanctioning Groups
Sanctioning bodies in stock car racing are organizations that establish 
uniform rules and safety standards for the races for which they coordinate 
the scheduling and promotion. Rules include detailed and elaborate 
specifications for the racing cars and trucks that are permitted to enter 
various kinds of races. Rules that drivers must follow are also specified. 
There are three major stock car-sanctioning bodies nationally and each 
sanctions some races in Virginia.
Virginia is home to two of the tracks where major NASCAR races are 
held: Richmond International Raceway and Martinsville Speedway. 
Another major NASCAR site, Bristol Motor Speedway, is located on the 
Tennessee side of the divided city of Bristol, Va./Tenn., but is counted as a 
Virginia track in Table 1 and in Figure 1.  
The National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) was 
founded in 1948 as a family-owned and operated business venture that 
sanctioned and governed multiple auto-racing sports events. There was no 
central organization or rules until Bill France Sr. of Daytona Beach, Fla., 
organized a meeting of racing team owners, which led to the formation of 
a sanctioning body that would become NASCAR.
As a family-controlled business, NASCAR is not publicly traded on 
the stock market. However, its major sanctioning body, International 
Speedway Corp. (ISC), is publicly traded on the NASDAQ. Declining 
attendance and revenues during the Great Recession of 2008 pushed down 
the price of ISC stock from a high of $53.20 per share on Feb. 1, 2007, to 
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less than $19 per share two years later. It currently trades at about $32 
per share and has paid dividends to its shareholders for 43 consecutive 
years (https://finance.yahoo.com).
ISC owns and operates 13 motor speedways, including Richmond 
International Raceway and Martinsville Speedway. Its total revenues for 
the first quarter of 2016 were approximately $142.6 million, up about 
5 percent compared to the previous year. Its market cap is approximately 
$1.5 billion.  
The second major owner of NASCAR tracks, Speedway Motorsports 
Inc., is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The company 
owns eight raceways including Bristol Motor Speedway. The price of 
a share of Speedway Motorsports fell from a high of approximately 
$40 in 2007 to only about $12 per share in 2009. It currently trades 
at approximately $17 per share, but recently has experienced falling 
revenues. Its market cap is about $700 million. (The third owner of large 
national race venues, Dover Motorsports, owns two raceways including 
the Indianapolis Motor Speedway, but none in Virginia.)
The aforementioned stock market data are relevant because they reflect 
a slowdown that has afflicted stock car racing nationally over the past 
decade. The Great Recession is partially, though not totally, responsible 
for this. In any case, as Graph 1 reports, attendance at NASCAR events 
has been declining. Rather than increasing their attendance capacities, 
several race tracks have reduced their size, including Martinsville and 
Richmond (see Table 2). Bristol, however, remains an immense facility 
that apparently will be the largest in the United States by year’s end.  
Richmond International Raceway boasted a 33-race sellout streak that 
lasted 16 years, from 1992 to 2008 – while its seating capacity rose from 
59,368 to 112,029 with a waiting list of thousands who wanted tickets. 
Since 2008, however, the raceway has not sold out and the seating capacity 
currently is being reduced to 60,000 (Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
Jan. 5, 2016).
The Great Recession of 2008 accelerated what had been a very gradual 
decline in interest in stock car racing. NASCAR’s average ticket price of 
$92, when combined with the associated costs of getting to the track and 
staying nearby for a couple of days, proved to be a major impediment to 
NASCAR attendance when the country’s unemployment rate peaked at 
10 percent.
 In addition, many prime NASCAR races were televised and some 
NASCAR fans simply decided to stay home.   
Underpinning these economic motives has been an erosion in fan interest. 
Graph 2 illustrates the gradual decline in interest in NASCAR nationally. 
This has been matched by declining television ratings as well. 
NASCAR Race Series
Sprint Cup Series* - Cars weigh 3,450 pounds, engines produce about 
850 horsepower and 9,000 RPM, and cars can reach speeds above 180 
mph at some tracks. Richmond International, Martinsville and Bristol hold 
races in this series.
Xfinity Series* - Cars weigh 3,400 pounds, engines produce about 650 
horsepower and 8,200 RPM, and cars can reach speeds around 175 mph 
at some tracks. Richmond International and Bristol host races in this 
series.
Camping World Truck Series* - Pickup trucks with high-performance 
engines that produce about 750 horsepower. Trucks may go as fast as 180 
mph on some tracks. Martinsville and Bristol have races in this series.
K&N Pro Series - Divided between east and west. Cars produce 625 
horsepower at 8,000 RPM. Considered developmental races before 
drivers progress to national races. Bristol, VIR and Dominion host these 
races.
Whelen All-American Series - Short-track races. More than 10,000 
drivers compete through a point system that results in track-, state- and 
national-level champions. Four tracks in Virginia host races in this series.
*NASCAR national races
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GRAPH 1
ATTENDANCE AT NASCAR EVENTS IN THE PRECEDING 12 MONTHS, 2008 TO 2015 (IN MILLIONS)
Source: Nielsen Scarborough, www.statista.com
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TABLE 2
NASCAR SPRINT CUP RACE TRACKS PERMANENT SEATING CAPACITY – 2015
Rank and Track Capacity Background*
1 – Daytona International Speedway 147,000 Seating being reduced to 101,000
2 – Bristol Motor Speedway 146,000 Will take over No. 1 spot in 2016
3 – Texas Motor Speedway 137,000 No change
4 – Las Vegas Motor Speedway 123,000 Previously was 131,000
5 – Kentucky Speedway 107,000 No change
6 – Dover International Speedway 96,000 Had been as high as 135,000
7 – Charlotte Motor Speedway 89,000 Had been as high as 156,000
8 – New Hampshire Motor Speedway 88,000 Previously was 96,000
9 – Talladega Superspeedway 78,000 Had been as high as 143,000
10 – Kansas Speedway 74,000 Previously was 80,000
11 – Atlanta Motor Speedway 71,000 Had been as high as 124,000
12 – Michigan International Speedway  71,000 Had been as high as 137,243
13 – Richmond International Raceway  71,000 Had been as high as 110,000. Is being reduced to 60,000.
14 – Auto Club Speedway 68,000 Had been as high as 92,000
15 – Darlington Raceway 58,000 Had been as high as 65,000
16 – Chicagoland Speedway 55,500 Had been as high as 73,000
17 – Martinsville Speedway 55,000 Previously was 63,000
18 – Phoenix International Raceway 51,000 Previously was 76,812
19 – Sonoma Raceway 47,000 No change
20 – Homestead-Miami Speedway 46,000 Had been as high as 63,000
21 – Watkins Glen International 33,000 Previously was 35,000
* “Had been as high as” indicates that seating capacity was reduced more than once.
Source: Adapted from NBC Report, March 10, 2015
NASCAR’s fan base is 63 percent male, 98 percent white, 91 percent ages 35 or older, and twice as likely as the typical American to live in rural areas of 
the South and Midwest. http://brandongaille.com/52-fantastic-nascar-demographics
2016 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
120 STOCK CAR RACING IN VIRGINIA: THE SPORT AND THE BUSINESS■
GRAPH 2
NUMBER OF PEOPLE INTERESTED IN NASCAR IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008-2015 (IN MILLIONS)
Source: Nielsen Scarborough, www.statista.com
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NASCAR Changes Its 
Business Model
NASCAR has not been sitting idly while these changes in its market 
position have been occurring. In February 2016, it announced a drastic 
overhaul of its business model. It is shifting from an independent-
contractor alliance of racing teams with sponsors to a franchise-like 
system that is intended to provide value and financial stability to team 
owners. Under the old system, car owners as independent contractors 
were responsible for all the financial obligations of each race, while 
depending on sponsorships to pay the bills. The Great Recession exposed 
the vulnerabilities of this business model, as several teams went broke 
because they could not obtain sufficient financial support, which in turn 
reflected flagging attendance.  
Under the new model, the franchises (or “charters,” as NASCAR now 
terms them) will have economic value that can be bought and sold within 
the rules of NASCAR. The new model is designed to smooth out team 
financial performance. A charter has a life of nine years and can be bought 
and sold, much like a taxicab medallion or liquor license. Economically 
speaking, this model may indeed moderate the ups and downs in racing 
team financial performance; however, it does not deal directly with the 
elephant in the room – the ebbing of attendance and interest in NASCAR.  
NASCAR also attempted to address the issue of flagging interest in 
its events by changing the manner in which it determined its season 
champion. In 2004, NASCAR erased the system whereby all races during 
a season counted the same in determining its champion and replaced it 
with a new structure whereby, with 10 races to go, all point advantages 
were erased for the top 10 drivers, who then would compete for the 
championship. The goal was, in the fashion of Major League Baseball and 
the National Basketball Association, to maintain fan interest by increasing 
the number of competitors who realistically could win its championship.  
In 2011, NASCAR tinkered with the system whereby it awarded points 
reflecting the finishes of its drivers in races. In 2014, it changed its 
championship format to a 16-driver field that would be whittled down 
through a set of races until there would be only four drivers remaining, 
who would compete in a final race. These changes ensure that long-term, 
steady racing performance over the length of the NASCAR season would 
not be the major determinant of NASCAR’s champion. A driver could 
endure a series of subpar finishes and still end up being crowned the 
champion if he/she performed well at the crucial times late in the racing 
season. This was viewed as a means to maintain the interest of a larger 
number of fans of specific NASCAR racing teams. Now, in 2016, it is not 
clear that it yet has had this effect.  
NASCAR Racing Teams
In 2016, in response to a variety of complaints from the owners of its 
racing teams, NASCAR issued 36 charters to 17 teams. Charter teams 
now are guaranteed entry into each of the season’s 36 NASCAR races 
that generate ranking points for drivers; the remaining four spots will 
be filled by noncharter teams that qualify. According to Forbes magazine 
(Feb. 17, 2016), the charters are worth $5 million to $10 million each. 
Forbes estimated in the same article that the top 10 teams were worth an 
average $148 million, up 6 percent from the previous year (see Graph 3). 
In aggregate, the teams generated nearly $1 billion in revenues in 2015.
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GRAPH 3
VALUE OF MAJOR NASCAR RACING TEAMS IN 2016 (IN MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
Source: Forbes, www.statista.com
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Joe Gibbs Racing is headed by former Washington Redskins football 
coach Joe Gibbs, who lived in Virginia while he was coaching the Redskins. 
His son J.D. Gibbs attended the College of William & Mary and played 
football there before going into racing. Their team, which includes four 
cars and drivers, is one of the most successful in the country today. The 
team is second only in value and revenue to Hendrick Motorsports and is 
celebrating its 25th anniversary this year. 
According to Forbes magazine, 13 NASCAR drivers made more than 
$10 million in 2015 from salaries, bonuses, personal endorsements and 
their share of winnings and licensing. Collectively, they made $198 million 
(Forbes, Feb. 17, 2016).
NASCAR’s latest television deal with Fox and NBC, which runs through 
2024, is worth a reported $8 billion, of which sum the tracks receive 
approximately 65 percent. The shift described earlier to a charter system 
among the teams will bring stability for the racing teams. Some analysts 
have concluded that the big companies that control NASCAR may see a 
reduction in revenue but an increase in profit. Clearly, experience across 
the industry varies.
NASCAR remains a popular, profitable sport even while it is in the 
midst of a disturbing period of declining interest in its product. One 
should not make too much of this because the value of most NASCAR 
racing teams has increased and NASCAR itself, while privately held, 
is widely viewed as a quite profitable firm with a “moat” (barrier to 
entry) of considerable magnitude. Thus, it would not be easy for any 
challenger to dent NASCAR’s carefully constructed market position.
Other Stock Car-Sanctioning 
Groups
There are two additional groups that sanction racing in Virginia, but 
they are birds of a different feather. The International Motor Contest 
Association (IMCA) is the oldest active car racing-sanctioning body, 
having organized in 1915. Its races primarily focus on modified cars with 
open wheels. The IMCA-sanctioned Virginia Sprint Series is held at 
Eastside, Natural Bridge and Shenandoah speedways. 
The other, INEX, is the third-largest short track-sanctioning body and 
holds races in Virginia at Southside Speedway and Dominion Raceway. 
Races for INEX, which stands for inexpensive racing, include legend cars, 
bandoleros, thunder roadsters and legends dirt-modified racing cars. 
INEX has sanctioned more than 30,000 races since its founding in 1995.
Beyond NASCAR races, there are dozens of other races that utilize local 
racing talent. For some people, the local tracks provide a way to break 
into the big business of racing or to pursue a hobby interest in rebuilding 
cars and engines. For others, limitations on funding keep them local. One 
of the enduring and endearing features of stock car racing on the local 
level, often on dirt tracks, is the manner in which “the boy next door” – 
and sometimes now “the girl next door” – attract followers who faithfully 
follow them, root for them and grant them mini-hero status, albeit 
sometimes within a fairly defined segment of society.  
Racing attendance figures are not available for local dirt tracks, many of 
which are highly informal in their organization, and there is no association 
that collects such numbers from them. We received not a single response 
to our written requests for attendance and other information, probably 
because many of these tracks operate on a cash basis and have tax 
reasons for not supplying such information. Our telephone interviews with 
personnel at these tracks revealed that many have only a single full-time 
staff member. However, there was general agreement among them that 
their race attendance has fallen. Half-filled seats have replaced full houses 
with people sitting on blankets because no seats were available.
Rick Hendrick, the owner of Hendrick Motorsports, grew up near South 
Hill, Va., and as a teenager built engines and drag raced in the area. 
After attending North Carolina State University, he settled in North 
Carolina, where he started Hendrick Motorsports. Headquartered in 
Concord, it has 600 employees. Since 1986, his teams have won at least 
one cup-level race each season. In addition, Hendrick is chairman of the 
board of Hendrick Automotive Group, which generated $7.55 billion in 
revenue in 2014 after selling 184,000 vehicles and servicing more than 
2.3 million cars and trucks at dealerships throughout the country.
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The Economic Impact Of 
Stock Car Racing   
Economic impact studies by and large tend to overestimate the actual 
economic impact of the enterprises and organizations they evaluate 
because they typically ignore the role of “displaced expenditures.” For 
example, when a resident of Fairfax County spends $250 at Fair Oaks 
Mall in Fairfax, if this reduces expenditures elsewhere in Fairfax County 
by $250, then the net economic impact of this expenditure is zero insofar 
as the county and the Commonwealth of Virginia are concerned. A 
practitioner may ignore the displaced expenditures and report a large 
economic impact in any given situation, but that does not mean such a 
report is valid.  
However, stock racing is a bird of a different color because it typically 
attracts people from other regions and other states who spend money 
that does not represent expenditures displaced from other jurisdictions 
immediately around the track. Further, racing fans who flock to venues 
such as Bristol, Martinsville and Richmond often spend several days and 
patronize hotels, restaurants, bars, stores of all kinds, gasoline stations, 
rental car agencies, airlines, etc. The point is simple – the economic 
impact of stock car racing is very different from the findings of the run-of-
the-mill studies that (inaccurately) attribute economic impact to actions 
that represent nothing more than displaced expenditures. 
An economic impact study conducted by Washington Economics Group 
of the Richmond International Raceway in 2009 found that the track 
generates over a half million dollars in economic activity each year, 
including $36 million in additional state tax revenues (see Table 3). A 
total of 6,102 jobs were directly attributed to the RIR, while another 
1,663 “induced and indirect” jobs were generated as well by the 
expenditures of the raceway’s employees and the expenditures of its 
suppliers.  
Each class of racing cars features rigid specifications imposed by the 
sanctioning body for the race or by the race track. All vehicles within a 
type must adhere to weight, horsepower, size, etc., in order to create a 
racing competition among vehicles that are otherwise equal. 
Bandolero - Miniature stock cars. Speeds about 50 mph. Drivers as young 
as 8.
Legends - Open-wheel, 5/8th scale replicas of automobile coupes from 
the 1930s style, enclosed racer. 140 horsepower motorcycle engine. For 
short, paved oval tracks. Dirt-modified model also available.
Thunder Roadster - Open cockpit, open wheel, purpose-built racers look 
like race cars from the 1950s. 122 horsepower. Race on road, asphalt or 
dirt.
Sprint car - Purpose-built, open-wheel race car with or without wings for 
short-oval dirt or paved tracks. V-8 engine with about 1,000 horsepower. 
Can reach speeds to 160 mph.
UCAR (U Can Afford Racing) - Features front-wheel drive cars that have 
been slightly modified and fitted with safety measures, such as a roll 
cage, racing seat, etc., and are run at short tracks. Cars such as Ford 
Escorts or Probes, Chevy Cavaliers, Dodge Daytonas, Honda Preludes, 
Toyota Tercels and even Geo Storms are often used.
Stock Car - Originally stock car meant automobiles that had not been 
modified from the factory. True stock car racing continues with a 
designation “street stock,” “pure stock” or “hobby stock.” Other stock 
cars, such as in NASCAR, are production-based automobiles that may 
superficially resemble production-based cars but are really purpose-built 
racing machines.
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TABLE 3
RECURRING ECONOMIC IMPACTS GENERATED BY RICHMOND 
INTERNATIONAL RACEWAY
Economic Impacts  Direct Indirect/Induced Total Impact 
Employment Jobs 6,102 1,663 7,765
Labor Income ($ Mil.) $126 $60 $186 
Gross State Product 
(Value-added $ Mil.)
$177 $109 $286 
Federal Tax Revenue 
($ Mil.)
$48.50 
State & Local Tax 
Revenues ($ Mil.)
$36.20 
Total Economic 
Impact ($ Mil.)
$303 $169 $557 
Source: Washington Economics Group Inc., November 2008 
A somewhat similar economic study by the Washington Economics 
Group of the Martinsville Speedway in 2009 found the total economic 
impact of the track to be $170 million a year statewide. The study 
attributed 3,000 full-time jobs in Virginia to the Martinsville Speedway 
(The New York Times, “A Longtime Racing Town Shifts Its Focus,” 
March 3, 2009). In a region that has seen more than its share of economic 
challenges, these are big numbers.  
To build on this development, Virginia issued more than $8 million in 
bonds to build a 30,000-square-foot instructional facility at Patrick Henry 
Community College for motorsports-related jobs. Further, a four-year 
bachelor’s degree program leading to a minor in motorsports engineering 
was established at New College Institute through a partnership with Old 
Dominion University.   
The lesson that we should take from these studies is that stock car racing, 
especially when connected to NASCAR, has a large economic impact 
because these races often attract attendees from other regions and states. 
In this regard, economic impact studies of stock racing differ significantly 
from the dozens of economic impact studies that report largely bogus 
economic impact numbers, which fail to take into account displaced 
expenditures that would have been made anyway.   
Competitors To The South
Reference has been made several times in this chapter to auto racing 
activity in North Carolina. The truth is that the Charlotte metropolitan 
region has become the unchallenged hub of stock car racing in the 
United States. The success in North Carolina has no doubt affected the 
possibilities for future growth in the industry in the Commonwealth. 
Within a hundred-mile radius of Charlotte, there are no fewer than 36 
significant motorsports industry-related activities that include a major 
race track, the base of operation of the most successful racing teams in 
the country, several engine and auto manufacturing facilities, two wind 
tunnels for race car testing, the nation’s only NASCAR-endorsed training 
program for race technicians, a Center for Motorsports Automotive 
Research, government incentives for racing teams and more. 
Motorsports tax incentives in North Carolina include a refund of half 
the sales tax paid in the state on tangible property that is part of a 
professional motorsport vehicle, a refund on aviation fuel taxes when 
airplanes are used to travel to motorsports events and a refund of sales 
tax paid on service contracts related to racing activities. For the three 
years – 2012, 2013 and 2014 – North Carolina paid out in tax refunds to 
motorsports teams or sanctioning bodies and professional motorsports 
teams nearly $8 million in refunds. Of that amount, 60 percent went to 
the five wealthiest racing teams with the highest levels of revenue in the 
United States. Refunds that were due to expire in 2016 have been extended 
for four more years despite the current challenges the state faces in trying 
to balance its budget. The state’s policy is clearly not simply to attract 
racing teams but to give them incentives to stay in North Carolina.
Despite North Carolina’s success in building a motorsports hub in the 
Charlotte area, there was one effort that has not paid off. A NASCAR 
Hall of Fame was built in Charlotte in 2009 with $137 million in municipal 
bonds. It was expected to attract 800,000 visitors in the first year and 
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400,000 each year thereafter. Thus far, the attendance has averaged 
175,000 per year and the facility has yet to break even.
Interesting Developments
None of Virginia’s major stock car race tracks has avoided the national 
trend of declining attendance. However, Bristol Motor Speedway neatly 
found another way to profit from its facilities by hosting “the biggest 
football game ever” on Sept. 10, 2016. The Hokies of Virginia Tech met 
the Tennessee Volunteers in a matchup of rivals on a football field marked 
off on the infield of the raceway oval. The raceway is about a two-hour 
drive from each campus. The “Battle at Bristol” set an NCAA football 
attendance record, as 156,990 fans watched the game in person. Each 
school potentially earned $4.5 million for the game. This example has 
inspired other race tracks, like Daytona, to consider doing the same thing.
Activity at VIRginia International Raceway (VIR) shows great promise 
for motorsport activities in the Commonwealth. VIR is located in Alton, 
12 miles east of Danville and just north of the North Carolina line. Since 
1957, there has been racing on the property that is now VIR, with the 
exception of 1974 to 2000. With the investment of Connie Nyholm and 
Harvey Siegel, the track was reopened in 2000 under a concept of a 
“Motorsport Resort” that features a unique combination of race track, 
luxury lodging, dining, spa, skeet shooting, pistol and rifle range, karting, 
hiking and mountain bike trails, and more. With the retirement of Siegel 
in 2013, Nyholm became one of the only female majority owners of a race 
track in the country.  
The raceway is considered a showplace for racing. It has five world-class 
road course configurations, ranging from 1.1 miles to 4.1 miles, with up 
to 130-foot elevation change. The late actor Paul Newman, who raced in 
amateur and professional competition from 1972 to 2007, was quoted as 
saying, “If there’s a heaven on earth, it’s VIR” (www.virnow.com). VIR’s 
annual Hyperfest claims to be the largest automotive event on the East 
Coast, with about a dozen different kinds of races in an “automotive 
amusement park of asphalt, dirt, mud, grass and air.” Car and Driver 
magazine recognizes its road courses as one of the six best in North 
America. It has a drivers’ club.
Also at VIR is the Virginia Motorsport Technology Park (VMTP) that 
on a greatly reduced scale attempts to replicate the supporting industries 
of racing one sees in the Charlotte region. “VMTP offers occupants a 
strategic advantage over their competitors – a premium location adjacent 
to Virginia International Raceway’s world-class road courses for on-
track testing and close proximity to other race support and research and 
development. VIR industrial park tenants lead the way in motorsports 
innovation, research, and development.” Already in the park, Virginia 
Tech Transportation Institute operates the Global Center for Automotive 
Performance Simulation and the National Tire Research Center. The 
National Tire Research Co. is an affiliated company of Virginia Tech that 
provides testing of race tires for Goodyear specific to a particular track. 
Other tenants offer vintage car preparation, driver training and race 
engineering. Old Dominion University has a drivetrain lab and chassis 
dynamometer in the park.
Dominion Raceway in Spotsylvania County, which opened in April 
2016, describes itself as “a new model for motorsports facilities and 
entertainment venues.” The complex that is nearing completion in 2016 
is located on I-95 between Washington, D.C., and Richmond. When 
completed, the complex will include a 2 mile road course, a 4/10th mile 
paved NASCAR oval, and a 1/8th mile drag strip. In addition to the race 
tracks, the complex includes a 36,600-square-foot building for meetings, 
entertainment and hospitality with a full-service kitchen and bar. Not 
only will fans be able to watch races, but also they will be able to join a 
Drivers Club to participate in races themselves. Space will be available 
for meetings and events. The goal clearly is to offer a range of experiences 
that build upon and augment stock car racing.
Racing College of Virginia, a partnership between Old Dominion 
University and Patrick Henry Community College, offers training to people 
who wish to enter the motorsports field. The program is a 2+1+2-year 
A.A.S. to B.S. program, where students can receive an Applied Associate 
of Science degree from PHCC followed by one-year leveling courses 
and two years to complete their B.S. degree in mechanical engineering 
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technology with a minor in motorsports. Students from the program do 
not necessarily become drivers of race cars, but instead the designers, 
engineers and technologists who build and enhance racing cars.  
Final Thoughts
Stock car racing is highly visible in some parts of the Commonwealth 
and virtually invisible in others. Despite the considerable economic 
impact of large NASCAR races that easily attract more than 100,000 
fans, there has been a tendency among some to pooh-pooh the sport 
as somehow not being in the same category as sports staples such as 
football and basketball. In fact, the economic impact of NASCAR 
races in Virginia (counting Bristol) appears to be larger than the 
economic impact of all intercollegiate athletic contests in the state 
combined. This is because the college contests typically involve 
significant displacement of expenditures that would have occurred in 
any case somewhere in Virginia.
This noted, attendance at most stock car racing events has been 
declining gradually in Virginia as well as nationally. Surveys suggest 
a decline in interest in the sport and this has been matched by declines 
in previously healthy television ratings. If this trend continues 
through the remainder of this decade, then it will have visibly negative 
economic effects on the communities that have relied upon stock car 
racing as an economic engine.   
■THE RISE OF SINGLE-
EARNER HOUSEHOLDS 
IN VIRGINIA:
WHY IT MATTERS
It is far better to be alone, than to be in bad 
company.
– George Washington
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W
hat once was typical – perhaps 
stereotypical – concerning 
American households no longer 
holds true. The family model epitomized by 
Ozzie and Harriet of television fame and their 
two children1 certainly hasn’t disappeared, 
but the two-parent family cum children has 
become less common. In 1940, 90 percent of 
U.S. households consisted of families that 
included two or more persons who were related 
to each other by virtue of birth, marriage or 
adoption. The vast majority of those families 
were married couples with children. However, 
by 2010, that household number had dropped to 
66 percent.    
In 2014, an estimated 117,707,000 households 
existed in the United States (Economagic, 
2016). Of these, 55 million were headed by 
unmarried adults, including more than 573,000 
headed by same-sex individuals. Thus, 47 
percent of all households now are headed 
by one or more single individuals and 27.41 
percent by only one individual. These numbers 
should not come as a surprise because at least 
107 million unmarried individuals now exist 
nationally. Single-person households have 
become the second-most common household 
type – behind married couples without 
children.2 Table 1 summarizes these and related 
household data for the United States and 
Virginia. 
1   For trivia buffs, “The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet” (starring the 
real-life Nelson family) aired on ABC-TV from 1952 to 1966. Ozzie 
and Harriet had two sons, David and Ricky. Ricky went on to achieve 
fame as a singer and actor. 
2   America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2014, Table A2. 
Source: https://www.census.gov/hhes/families/data/cps2014A.
html. See also Rani Mola, “One in Four American Households Is One 
Person Living Alone,” The Wall Street Journal (Aug. 12, 2014).  
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A Closer Look At Single-
Person Households
Single-person households can usefully be divided into three categories: 
(1) post-high school and post-college young people who are out on their 
own; (2) single-parent households, typically headed by women; and (3) 
older, unmarried individuals, who now constitute 36 percent of all single 
households.3  
We’ll begin our analysis with a look at the institution of marriage, whose 
decline is responsible for a considerable proportion of the increase in 
single households. We’ll see that significant differences exist in marriage 
rates across educational, racial, religious and economic lines. We’ll also 
focus on a rapidly growing segment of single-person households – often 
young, post-high school Americans, but increasingly including more people 
who simply have decided to live on their own – as well as older, more 
mature individuals who may once have been married, but now are living on 
their own.
Not surprisingly, social policies that are framed in the context of Ozzie 
and Harriet types of family structures tend to favor those who live in such 
circumstances. The federal and Virginia income tax systems both contain 
numerous preferences that assign benefits to conventional families. These 
include exemptions for family members, reduced tax rates, subsidized 
mortgages, deductions for expenditures on education and the like. 
TurboTax, the largest vendor of tax preparation software, puts it simply: 
“Families can frequently save more on their taxes than a single person.”4 
TurboTax’s advice may be wise, but the real world increasingly is not 
configured in the classic Ozzie and Harriet family fashion. Single women 
now outnumber married women in the United States and Great Britain. 
Households led by one or more single individuals have become much 
more common, and more than 40 percent of all new births in the United 
States now are associated with an unmarried mother. These changes have 
consequences, which we will explore.
3   Contrary to the expectations of some, this number actually has been declining because men are living longer 
and this has diminished the number of widows.  
4   https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tools/tax-tips/Family/Tax-Exemptions-and-Deductions-for-Families/
INF12053.html.
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TABLE 1 
UNITED STATES AND VIRGINIA HOUSEHOLDS, 2010-2014
HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE
UNITED STATES VIRGINIA
ESTIMATE PERCENT ESTIMATE PERCENT
Total households 116,211,092 - 3,041,710 -
Family households 76,958,064 66.2% 2,047,106 67.3%
    With own children under 18 years 33,917,911 29.2% 901,736 29.6%
    Married-couple family 56,270,862 48.4% 1,542,174 50.7%
    With own children under 18 years 22,823,632 19.6% 636,122 20.9%
    Male householder, no wife present, family 5,543,754 4.8% 129,210 4.2%
    With own children under 18 years 2,662,944 2.3% 60,515 2.0%
    Female householder, no husband present, family 15,143,448 13.0% 375,722 12.4%
    With own children under 18 years 8,431,335 7.3% 205,099 6.7%
Nonfamily households 39,253,028 33.8% 994,604 32.7%
    Householder living alone 32,036,772 27.6% 806,539 26.5%
    65 years and over 11,569,876 10.0% 277,453 9.1%
    Households with one or more people under 18 years 37,895,810 32.6% 1,002,599 33.0%
     Households with one or more people 
65 years and over
30,294,116 26.1% 753,703 24.8%
    Average household size 2.63 - 2.61 -
    Average family size 3.23 - 3.16 -
RELATIONSHIP
    Population in households 306,058,480 - 7,943,875 -
    Householder 116,211,092 38.0% 3,041,710 38.3%
    Spouse 56,242,970 18.4% 1,542,172 19.4%
    Child 93,459,419 30.5% 2,350,171 29.6%
    Other relatives 22,147,046 7.2% 539,092 6.8%
    Nonrelatives 17,997,953 5.9% 470,730 5.9%
    Unmarried partner 6,958,557 2.3% 155,680 2.0%
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TABLE 1 
UNITED STATES AND VIRGINIA HOUSEHOLDS, 2010-2014
HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE
UNITED STATES VIRGINIA
ESTIMATE PERCENT ESTIMATE PERCENT
MARITAL STATUS
  Males, 15 years and over 123,281,364 - 3,232,491 -
    Never married 44,100,702 35.8% 1,117,524 34.6%
    Now married, except separated 61,902,351 50.2% 1,690,501 52.3%
    Separated 2,254,810 1.8% 70,983 2.2%
    Widowed 3,166,898 2.6% 76,370 2.4%
    Divorced 11,856,603 9.6% 277,113 8.6%
  Females, 15 years and over 129,692,771 - 3,404,862 -
    Never married 38,239,034 29.5% 971,569 28.5%
    Now married, except separated 60,570,863 46.7% 1,654,929 48.6%
    Separated 3,231,201 2.5% 94,983 2.8%
    Widowed 11,878,014 9.2% 295,544 8.7%
    Divorced 15,773,659 12.2% 387,837 11.4%
Source: U.S. Census 2010-2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/S1101 
Marriage Trends 
Changing social attitudes, delayed marriage, elevated rates of cohabitation 
and widening marital divides between demographic groups have fueled a 
dramatic rise in the proportion of Americans who are single. According 
to the U.S. Census’ America’s Families and Living Arrangements survey, 
45 percent of U.S. residents 18 and older were unmarried in 2014 – 53 
percent of women and 47 percent of men. A 2014 Pew Research Center 
study noted that the number of American marriages fell from a high of 
72 percent of all adults age 18 or older in 1960 to 50.5 percent in 2012. 
Only 20 percent of Americans now get married before the age of 30.5
5   http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/06/new-census-data-show-more-americans-are-tying-the-
knot-but-mostly-its-the-college-educated.
Simone de Beauvoir, the French writer, activist and feminist, once 
bemoaned that all women either were “married, or have been, or plan to 
be, or suffer from not being.”6 Things have changed. Graph 1 illustrates 
the decline in marriage rates in the Commonwealth of Virginia between 
2001 and 2013. According to the 2014 America’s Families and Living 
Arrangements survey, unmarried women now outnumber married 
women in Virginia and the United States, and there are 88 unmarried 
men for every 100 unmarried women. The median age of women at their 
first marriage is 27, while it is 29 for men.   
6   The Second Sex, Vols. I and II (Paris: Gallimard, 1949).
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GRAPH 1
TOTAL NUMBER OF RECORDED MARRIAGES: VIRGINIA, 2001-2013
Source: Virginia Department of Health, www.vdh.virginia.gov/healthstats/stats.htm
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Couples in Virginia typically now wait longer to marry and are more likely 
to cohabit before they do marry. According to the Pew Research Center’s 
2010 report, “The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families,” 
15 times the number of couples today live together outside of marriage 
than in 1960 and almost half of today’s cohabiting households include 
children. In the first decade of this century, 88 percent of children 
fathered by men under age 20 were “nonmarital,” that is, outside 
of marriage. Fully 41 percent of all births in 2010 were nonmarital 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015). 
According to the National Center for Health Statistics (2013), nearly 
half of women ages 15-44 have cohabited with a partner before marriage 
in households without children. In 2014, 39 percent of opposite-sex, 
unmarried-partner couples lived at the time with at least one biological 
child of either partner. Why are we observing these changes?  
•  An expanding number of women no longer feel either that they must be 
married, or that they will miss their chance to do so if they don’t commit 
when young. Rebecca Traister’s “All the Single Ladies” (Simon and 
Schuster, 2009) dissected this environment and its consequences.  
•  Among people 25 years or older, 40.6 percent of women have earned 
a college degree, whereas only 36 percent of men have done so (U.S. 
Census, “Women in the Labor Force,” 2014). A large cadre of women 
now exists that is composed of women capable of forging independent 
economic paths in society.  
•  Elevated rates of unemployment among young men ages 16-24 
have increased the fear of some that making a long-term financial 
commitment via marriage is one they will not be able to keep. For 
example, in February 2016, when the overall rate of unemployment 
was 4.9 percent, it was 10.1 percent for all individuals ages 16-24 and 
13 percent for men in the same age group (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2016). 
•  Though bad economic times may discourage marriage, simultaneously 
they may encourage couples to cohabit in hopes of reducing their 
expenses. The notion that two together can live less expensively than two 
separately long has had legal acceptance and there is some empirical 
evidence in favor of it (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015).  
•  The increasing prevalence of divorce has elevated the concern of 
some about how potentially disruptive and expensive divorce can be. 
Approximately 40 percent of all first marriages end in divorce, 60 
percent of second marriages and 73 percent of third marriages. A 
divorce initially costs an average of $15,500, but subsequent costs over 
the years frequently dwarf this number.7 The solution to avoiding these 
expenses? Don’t get married.
•  There has been increased social acceptance of what was once regarded 
as “living in sin.” When a Vatican Council (this one in 2014) openly 
debates the theology and practicalities of this issue, it is a sign that times 
have changed, for better or worse. The social attitudes behind Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s “The Scarlet Letter” no longer guide substantial segments 
of American society. 
•  The feeling among some is that getting married in difficult economic 
times is irresponsible. The most persuasive evidence of this phenomenon 
is seen in countries after they have been defeated in a war and occupied 
(for example, Germany and Japan after World War II), but also is 
evident when countries dive into recession or economic depression.  
7   See www.divorcestatistics.org for information on divorce frequency and www.nolo.com for information on the 
cost of divorce.
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THE DISTINCTIVE SITUATIONS 
OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS
Despite an increase in cohabitation, many Virginians eventually marry. 
However, the rate at which they do so increasingly reflects factors of race, 
education, and religious and economic status. Low rates of marriage are a 
social consequence associated with low educational attainment. Marriage 
rates among the non-college-educated population have fallen sharply in 
the last few decades among all demographic groups, but most severely 
among African-Americans. There is general agreement that the reasons 
for this include imbalances of the number of men and women available for 
marriage, high rates of unemployment for both men and women that deter 
marriage, pain from less than successful past relationships, fears of being 
abandoned, high rates of imprisonment for African-American men, and 
concerns about readiness for marriage. Table 2 presents the U.S. Census 
2014 African-American demographic profile. One can see that large 
proportions of African-American men and women 15 years and older have 
never been married – 48 percent of women and 51.4 percent of men. 
It is not easy to disentangle the separate impacts of race, education and 
class on marriage because, for example, African-Americans tend not to 
be as well educated as the typical Asian or white individual of the same 
age and gender, and educational attainment clearly affects marriage rates. 
Graph 2 shows the high school graduation gaps in Virginia that exist 
between Asian, white, African-American and Hispanic students. 
TABLE 2 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN POPULATION PROFILE: 
UNITED STATES, 2014  
POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE 
Total population 40,379,066
    Male 47.7%
    Female 52.3%
Households 14,334,528
    Family households 61.6%
      With own children under 18 years 30.0%
    Married-couple family 27.0%
      With own children under 18 years 11.1%
     Female householder, no husband present, family 28.4%
      With own children under 18 years 16.0%
    Nonfamily households 38.4%
    Male householder 17.4%
      Living alone 14.6%
      Not living alone 2.8%
    Female householder 21.1%
      Living alone 18.9%
      Not living alone 2.2%
MARITAL STATUS
Population 15 years and over 31,735,327
    Now married, except separated 28.8%
    Widowed 5.7%
    Divorced 11.9%
    Separated 4.0%
    Never married 49.6%
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TABLE 2 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN POPULATION PROFILE: 
UNITED STATES, 2014  
POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE 
Male 15 years and over 14,880,533
    Now married, except separated 32.4%
    Widowed 2.6%
    Divorced 10.2%
    Separated 3.5%
    Never married 51.4%
Female 15 years and over 16,854,794
    Now married, except separated 25.7%
    Widowed 8.4%
    Divorced 13.4%
    Separated 4.5%
    Never married 48.0%
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
    Less than high school diploma 15.6%
     High school graduate (includes equivalency) 31.6%
    Some college or associate degree 33.1%
    Bachelor’s degree 12.4%
    Graduate or professional degree 7.3% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2014 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates  
*Respondents identified as black or African-American only
137
GRAPH 2
STATE GRADUATION RATES BY RACE/ETHNICITY: PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS IN VIRGINIA, 2011-2012
Source: National Center for Education Statistics
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THE EDUCATION/MARRIAGE LINK
The Pew Research Center reported in 2014 that 24 percent of men with 
a high school education had never married, as compared to 14 percent of 
men with advanced degrees. The National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES) 2015 report titled “Disparities in Educational Outcomes Among 
Male Youth” noted that the percentage of males ages 25-29 who had 
completed a bachelor’s or higher degree was significantly higher for Asians 
(55 percent) and for whites (37 percent) than for those of two or more 
races (29 percent), blacks (17 percent) or Hispanics (13 percent). One 
might be tempted to say, “Well, that’s none of our business,” but these 
disparities partially drive many different adverse phenomena that range 
from underweight babies and stunted preschool development to higher 
unemployment rates and elevated risks of imprisonment. Either society 
recognizes and deals with these challenges when they arise, or we pay for 
them later.  
Table 3 illustrates the differences in marriage demographics among 
women. Women with less than a high school education are not getting 
married. There also is a post-marriage effect. Regardless of race, women 
with lower levels of education are more likely to get divorced.8 Alas, 
divorce not only is an expensive proposition for those involved, but also 
frequently leads to one-parent homes, higher rates of unemployment, a 
much higher risk of living in poverty, lower educational attainment and a 
greater likelihood of both parents and children ending up in prison or the 
courts. It is an understandable, though unattractive, situation.
8   Jamie M. Lewis and Rose M. Kreider, Remarriage in the United States, Bureau of the Census, March 2015, 
www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/acs/acs-30.pdf.
TABLE 3
SELECTED UNITED STATES MARRIAGE DEMOGRAPHICS, 2011
Characteristics Percent of Married Couples
Age of Wife
    15 to 24 years 3%
    25 to 34 years 17%
    35 to 44 years 21%
    45 to 54 years 24%
    55 years and older 36%
Race/Ethnicity of Wife
    White alone, non-Hispanic 74%
    Black alone, non-Hispanic 7%
    Latina 12%
    Other 7%
Education Level of Wife
    Less than high school 10%
    High school graduate 29%
    Some college 27%
    Bachelor’s degree or more 34%
Source: Current Population Survey, U.S. Census Bureau
A 2013 brouhaha at Princeton University focused on the statistical circumstances that confront many women, especially those who have earned 
college degrees. One-third of never-married women 25 or older have earned either a bachelor’s or an advanced degree, compared with only one-
quarter of never-married men of the same age.  In what was to become a famous letter to The Daily Princetonian, alumna Susan Patton sparked 
controversy when she advised Princeton women who wanted to marry to “find a husband on campus before you graduate.” She asserted that it is 
only during college when unmarried females will be around a high concentration of educated single males. She maintained that after college, “you will 
meet men who are your intellectual equal — just not that many of them.”  Implicitly, she advised the women at Princeton to strike while the figurative 
iron was hot.
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THE PARADOX OF ASSORTATIVE MATING
Which brings us to a brief discussion of “assortative mating,” a term 
economists use to describe individuals who choose to marry someone who 
has achieved a level of educational attainment similar to their own. This 
phenomenon has important implications for social and economic mobility. 
Education is a strong predictor of future earnings. It also influences 
intergenerational mobility and usually opens paths to a wider set of 
alternatives and increased incomes. Nevertheless, if assortative mating 
results in college graduates marrying each other, then additional education 
likely will be an engine that causes income inequality to increase rather 
than decrease.  
There is little mystery attached to this relationship. Households supported 
by the earnings of two college-educated individuals are much more likely 
to be economically prosperous, avoid divorce and unemployment, and 
subsequently raise stable families that boast high-achieving children 
who follow in their footsteps. Paradoxically, though higher education 
traditionally has been viewed as a vehicle for diminishing economic 
inequality, assortative mating acts to diminish or even reverse this 
outcome. When Ivy League graduates marry each other, the financial 
results differ from those we typically observe when two community college 
graduates marry each other. Because an Ivy League education (or even 
an education at a flagship state university) increasingly is not within the 
financial capabilities of many families unless they incur substantial debt, 
the current higher education system in the United States no longer can 
be counted upon to diminish economic inequality. Paradoxically, it may 
contribute further to it, especially where single-parent families with 
modest incomes are concerned.
SINGLE-PARENT HOUSEHOLDS HAVE TRIPLED 
IN NUMBER SINCE 1960
Even though birth rates for women ages 18-24 have reached historic 
lows in the United States, single-parent families have more than 
tripled as a share of American households since 1960. However, 
there are distinct differences between racial groups when it comes to 
marriage. The share of never-married adults has gone up for all major 
racial and ethnic groups, including Hispanics and Asian-Americans 
in the United States, but as noted in Table 2, the number of never-
married African-Americans has increased dramatically. Among black 
adults ages 25 and older, the share of those who never have been 
married quadrupled over the past half century – rising from 9 percent 
in 1960 to 36 percent in 2012.   
Virginia as a state has the 10th-largest population of African-Americans 
in the United States – constituting 19.2 percent of the Commonwealth’s 
population. The median age at first marriage for black women Virginians 
is 30, the highest for all racial groups. According to the Pew Research 
Center’s Social & Demographic Trends project (2014), for every 51 
employed, never-married young black men between the ages of 25 and 34, 
there are 100 never-married black women. The marriage market is not 
flooded with younger black men.
African-Americans were significantly more likely than whites to “place 
a high priority on a spouse or partner with a steady job.”9 Age, education 
and income are major factors in the stability of all marriages, but the 
evidence suggests those factors affect African-American couples more 
than others.
A significant proportion of young African-American women appear 
to have decided either that they wish to remain single, or that they 
must remain single. Hence, they have increased their focus on their 
own professional lives by pursuing education and a subsequent career. 
Several single African-American women to whom we spoke echoed these 
sentiments. “I have spent many years working hard in my career to be 
successful. My profession is more important to me than marriage” (the 
words of a 28-year-old African-American single woman in Richmond). 
Helping and perhaps even living with multigenerational family members 
often is cited as being more important than marriage. “I know that my 
daughter needs me and I am willing to put her needs before my needs. I 
am not willing to sacrifice my time with her for any relationship right now,” 
observed a single mother from Newport News.  
9   Wendy Wang and Kim Parker, Record Share of Americans Have Never Married: As Values, Economics and 
Gender Patterns Change. Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center’s Social & Demographic Trends project, 
September 2014.
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Table 4 reveals which Virginia communities have the highest percentages 
of single-parent households. The communities with the highest single-
parent rates typically also exhibit among the lowest per capita and 
household incomes in the Commonwealth. The precursor to this status for 
a large proportion of single-parent households often was an unplanned, 
nonmarital birth. Marriage may be faltering in Virginia, but sex and 
procreation are not.  
Table 5 reports the number of nonmarital births by Virginia location in 
2014. There is an important and unavoidable connection between the data 
reported in Tables 4 and 5. For many Virginians, an unplanned, out-of-
wedlock birth either is the beginning of their descent into poverty, or it 
firmly places an exclamation point on their already perilous economic 
situation.  
Graph 3 provides further detail on the relationships among economic 
status, householder status and children. The median income of a woman 
householder without a spouse present was $36,151 in 2014. A typical single 
black woman with children under 18, however, had a median income of 
only $25,767. Being a single woman is not easy; being a single black woman 
with children dramatically raises the chance that such a household will 
live in poverty. Note that single-parent households headed by men have 
median incomes that are more than $17,000 higher than those headed by 
women.  
We cannot explore in detail the negative ramifications of these realities 
for the young people in those families and their future lives. It will suffice 
to note that such circumstances generate costs for society at large. These 
costs eventually come home to roost in the form of lower productivity, 
higher incidences of antisocial behavior, crime and substance abuse, and 
almost inevitably, the higher taxes that are required to deal with such. The 
proverbial free lunch does not exist in this environment.  
TABLE 4
VIRGINIA COMMUNITIES WITH THE HIGHEST  PERCENTAGES OF 
SINGLE-PARENT HOUSEHOLDS
Locality
Number of 
Single-Parent 
Households
Number of 
Households
Percent 
Single-Parent 
HouseholdS
Petersburg 4,630 6,619 70%
Hopewell 3,488 5,402 65%
Richmond 24,368 38,139 64%
Danville 5,567 9,176 61%
Emporia 758 1,246 61%
Martinsville 1,742 3,028 58%
Lancaster County 1,007 1,767 57%
Portsmouth 12,580 22,359 56%
Galax 844 1,546 55%
Roanoke 11,502 21,077 55%
Norfolk 25,821 49,788 52%
Franklin 1,053 2,090 50%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010-2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, http://factfinder.
census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml
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GRAPH 3
MEDIAN INCOMES FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF HOUSEHOLDS: UNITED STATES, 2014
Source: U.S. Census, Income and Poverty in the U.S., 2014, www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032015/hhinc/hinc04_000.htm
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TABLE 5 
NUMBER OF NONMARITAL LIVE BIRTHS IN VIRGINIA, 2014
PLANNING DISTRICT AND CITY 
OR COUNTY
TOTAL RESIDENT NONMARITAL LIVE BIRTHS
NUMBER OF NONMARITAL BIRTHS PERCENT
TOTAL WHITE BLACK OTHER TOTAL WHITE BLACK OTHER
Planning District 8 7,413 2,873 1,741 2,799 21.5 14.6 41.1 26.6
Arlington County 492 206 89 197 15.5 9.5 41.4 24.7
Fairfax County 3,013 946 568 1,499 20.5 12.2 37.3 27.8
Loudoun County 789 344 116 329 15.6 11.3 32.0 20.0
Prince William County 2,019 911 628 480 29.3 23.5 44.5 29.9
Alexandria 646 219 271 156 22.7 12.4 49.3 29.3
Fairfax 109 41 13 55 15.1 10.2 28.9 19.9
Falls Church 23 8 5 10 8.7 4.3 41.7 15.9
Manassas 316 194 51 71 41.5 40.5 46.8 40.8
Manassas Park 6 4 - 2 28.6 30.8 - 33.3
Planning District 20 6,069 2,000 3,528 541 38.0 22.3 66.7 31.4
Isle Of Wight County 139 75 61 3 37.4 27.0 74.4 25.0
Southampton County 57 23 32 2 40.1 24.5 74.4 40.0
Chesapeake 1,057 398 578 81 35.1 21.6 64.2 29.9
Franklin 100 16 83 1 63.3 30.8 83.0 16.7
Norfolk 1,657 349 1157 151 45.8 22.0 71.4 36.6
Portsmouth 822 171 624 27 55.7 29.5 75.7 37.0
Suffolk 401 109 286 6 36.7 18.0 64.9 12.5
Virginia Beach 1,836 859 707 270 30.2 22.0 55.2 30.2
Planning District 15 4,907 1,726 2,741 440 39.7 24.1 72.6 30.7
Charles City County 36 8 22 6 57.1 26.7 81.5 100.0
Chesterfield County 1,297 624 515 158 34.5 25.0 58.9 40.2
Goochland County 58 38 20 - 31.4 24.1 83.3 -
Hanover County 249 190 52 7 26.6 23.3 65.0 17.1
Henrico County 1,394 512 775 107 34.3 22.9 68.3 15.4
New Kent County 61 37 18 6 31.8 22.8 78.3 85.7
Powhatan County 61 50 9 2 25.8 22.8 75.0 40.0
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TABLE 5 
NUMBER OF NONMARITAL LIVE BIRTHS IN VIRGINIA, 2014
PLANNING DISTRICT AND CITY 
OR COUNTY
TOTAL RESIDENT NONMARITAL LIVE BIRTHS
NUMBER OF NONMARITAL BIRTHS PERCENT
TOTAL WHITE BLACK OTHER TOTAL WHITE BLACK OTHER
Richmond 1,751 267 1,330 154 60.0 25.8 83.2 54.6
Planning District 21 2,565 717 1,564 284 41.4 23.4 66.5 36.6
James City County 200 91 69 40 27.4 17.4 61.1 43.5
York County 151 80 55 16 21.4 15.4 54.5 18.4
Hampton 817 204 551 62 46.3 27.9 64.5 34.1
Newport News 1,339 306 872 161 47.7 26.3 69.4 41.5
Poquoson 24 23 1 - 24.7 25.8 100.0 -
Williamsburg 34 13 16 5 39.1 31.7 61.5 25.0
Source: Virginia Department of Health, Division of Health Statistics www.vdh.virginia.gov/healthstats/documents/2010/pdfs/NonMaritalBirths14.pdf
WHAT ABOUT CAMPAIGNS TO PROMOTE 
MARRIAGE?
Reality is that the current distribution of governmental tax incentives 
typically skews in favor of traditional Ozzie and Harriet types of families. 
For example, a husband and a wife who file a joint tax return usually pay 
lower taxes than if they each filed separate returns. Shouldn’t incentives 
such as this promote marriage? Perhaps they do, but they are costly and 
have not been sufficient to reverse the societal trend away from marriage.
With respect to the promotion of marriage, we face difficult (and 
expensive) choices. Should we increase marriage incentives significantly, 
hoping that this will cause more couples to choose marriage, or instead 
turn our attention to improving the lot of the burgeoning number of 
single-parent families? Where should we spend our dollars?
Economist Eduardo Porter and others have argued The (New York 
Times, March 22, 2016) that marriage per se isn’t the key to the economic 
progress of lower-income, single-adult families. Instead, what is important 
is to diminish or eliminate the impoverished state of such families. This 
involves improving their often-inadequate housing situations, enhancing 
their access to education and training, and supplying sex education and 
contraception options that will delay motherhood. The latter proposal 
recognizes that 6 out of 10 children born to single mothers under the age 
of 30 are unplanned (according to Brookings Institution economist Isabel 
Sawhill).10 
Porter and others argue that the federal Healthy Marriage Initiative 
begun in 2001 has expended $600 million on a variety of initiatives, but 
there is little to show for its efforts. While not quite ready to punt on 
the issue of increasing the rate of marriage, Porter, Sawhill and others 
believe that emphasis on increasing the rate of marriage actually does 
not really address the root causes of why single-parent families exist, or 
what we must do to improve their lot. Hence, they advocate programs 
that prospectively will improve the economic conditions of single-parent 
families rather than pro-marriage initiatives. This, they believe, is a cost-
effective approach because it avoids numerous costs that governments, 
organizations and individuals must bear when single-parent families live in 
or close to poverty. 
10   Isabel V. Sawhill, Generation Unbound (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2014).
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Young And Single 
The Pew Research Center, relying upon U.S. Census data, reports that 
millennials – those young adult Americans ages 18-34 – now constitute 
the largest age group in the American workforce. This group numbers 75.4 
million, surpassing the 74.9 million baby boomers ages 51-69. Millennials 
often are single and choose to delay marriage for a variety of reasons, 
including economics, education and personal preferences. 
Today’s younger generation exhibits much lower rates of marriage than 
their parents and grandparents. In 2013, only 1 in 10 young adult females 
(ages 18-34) lived with a spouse – down considerably from 1 in 4 in 1989. 
Economic times have been challenging for these individuals. Their labor 
force participation rates (the percentage of these individuals who 
either are employed, or actively seeking a job) declined to only 65 
percent in 2012. This means that an astonishing 35 percent of the 
individuals in this cohort neither were employed, nor looking for a 
job. Somehow, however, they have found a way to survive – variously 
cobbling together diverse combinations of living at home or with 
friends to reduce expenses; receiving unemployment compensation, 
disability and other entitlement payments; undertaking part-time and 
off-ledger employment; and getting involved with illegal activities.   
In 2013, 58 percent of young adult men and 51 percent of young 
adult women ages 18-24 were living with their parents. Scarce job 
opportunities and student educational debt have plagued this generation 
of single Americans. In 2012, 66 percent of all recent graduates of public 
colleges and 75 percent of all recent graduates of nonprofit independent 
colleges had student loan debt (Institute for College Access & Success, 
March 2014).      
Nearly all of the millennials in Virginia with whom we spoke commented 
on the adverse impact that difficult labor markets were having upon their 
lives and personal choices. Consider a 27-year-old white male who chose to 
live at home initially after college because of what he reported to be a lack 
of suitable employment opportunities. After graduating from a Virginia 
public university in 2011, he worked part time for four years before 
finally securing a full-time position with benefits in 2015. “After months 
and months of searching for a full-time job, I was depressed from being 
rejected over and over again. After graduating with a business degree and 
a concentration in finance, I would have never guessed that my national 
job market search would have been so grim. I was shocked by the number 
of mid-career and even senior-level people applying for the jobs that I 
was applying for. These positions advertised low salaries too. I was stuck 
in a part-time position for four years still searching all the while until it 
finally turned into a full-time job.” This young man continues to stay with 
his baby boomer dad and helps pay a share of the monthly mortgage in 
addition to saving money to purchase his own home one day.  
If you are a millennial who neither is employed, nor in education or 
training, then you are a “NEET.” NEETs constitute a major proportion of 
those who have dropped out of the labor force and in so doing reduced the 
labor force participation rate. There were 10.2 million NEETs ages 16-29 
in the United States in 2015. There are more female than male NEETS, 
and two-thirds of all NEETs have a high school education or less. African-
Americans and Hispanics comprise the largest share of this subgroup (see 
Table 6 for a complete breakdown), which has been increasing in relative 
size.  
Virginians have not been immune from the student debt crisis. More 
than 1 million borrowers in the Commonwealth were estimated to owe 
more than $30 billion in student loans in 2015. This has predictable 
consequences. They cannot afford to purchase automobiles, homes or 
major household items.
TABLE 6 
“NEETS” IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014
Characteristics
Number 
(in 1000s)
Percent of All 
NEETS
Percent of Total 
Subgroup
Male 4,300 42.6% 14.4%
Female 5,900 57.4% 19.5%
16-19 2,200 21.7% 13.3%
20-24 3,800 37.6% 17.5%
25-29 4,200 40.7% 19.1%
Race/Ethnicity
White 7,000 69.1% 15.8%
Black 2,000 19.7% 22.2%
Hispanic 2,500 24.5% 19.5%
Asian 500 5.0% 14.2%
Other 600 6.2% 20.9%
Education Level
Less than High 
School
2,700 26.7% -
High School 
Graduate
4,100 40.0% -
Some College 1,700 16.9% -
Associate Degree 500 5.1% -
Bachelor’s Degree or 
More
1,100 11.2% -
Source: Pew Research Center Analysis of the Bureau of Labor Statistics data, http://pewrsr.ch/1PUPwJ4
Aging Alone
Between 1915 and 2013, the proportion of single-person households 
in the United States jumped from 6 percent to 28 percent of all 
households. Women accounted for 54 percent of this group. The most 
rapidly growing segment of this population is individuals 65 or older, 
who now make up 36 percent of all single households. According to the 
Virginia Division for the Aging, the number of Virginians 85 and older 
will increase five times faster than the state’s total population growth 
between now and 2025. 
Interestingly, many of these more mature, unmarried Americans do not 
identify with the word “single” because they are widowed or have acquired 
partners. 
Uncertain future economic prospects have contributed to rising retirement 
ages. This has resulted in rising proportions of more mature individuals 
remaining in the labor force. Graph 4 tells us even though labor force 
participation rates generally have been gradually declining for age groups 
of both genders, people 65 and older form an exception. Increasingly, one 
sees some of them in action behind the counters at fast food restaurants 
and big-box chain stores. 
State and local governments that do not have mandatory retirement ages 
also are finding that their employees are delaying their retirements. Graph 
5 illustrates this trend within the Commonwealth.   
Why do seniors end up living alone? The reasons are wide-ranging and 
include increased rates of divorce, longer life spans and delayed marriages. 
Graphs 6 and 7 illustrate the marital status of American seniors (by 
gender) living alone in 2010. A century ago, more than 70 percent of the 
elderly lived with family members. Currently, fewer than 20 percent live 
with relatives. Improved health and financial status have made it feasible 
for older people without a spouse to live alone rather than with relatives 
or in assisted living. Almost three times as many women as men, however, 
now live alone because they are widowed. Quite simply, women live longer 
than men, making single men what one widow termed a “hot commodity” 
in many residences that cater to seniors.  
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One should not ignore the immense implications of these trends for 
Virginia. Increasing proportions of Virginians are becoming both old 
and single. One way or another, they must be cared for and supported 
by their families, charitable and religious organizations and the 
government. Almost inevitably, this implies that increasing proportions 
of Virginia state government expenditures are going to be expended 
on the (single) elderly. The nub of the economic challenges is this: 
A declining proportion of working-age Virginians will be asked to 
support their fellow retired citizens for increasingly long periods of 
time.    
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GRAPH 4
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES FOR INDIVIDUALS OF VARIOUS AGES, 1945-2015 (RECESSIONS IN GRAY)
Source: www.short.com. With permission.
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Labor Force Participation Rates for Individuals of Various Ages, 1945-2015 (Recessions in Gray) 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.short.com. With permission. 
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GRAPH 5
TOP 10 COMMUNITIES FOR VIRGINIA WORKERS WHO WERE 55 OR OLDER, 2014
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, OnTheMap Application and LEHD Origin-Destination Employment Statistics Beginning of Quarter Employment, 2nd Quarter of 2002-2014), http://onthemap.ces.census.gov
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, OnTheMap Application and LEHD Origin-Destination Employment Statistics Beginning of Quarter Employment, 2nd Quarter of 2002-2014), http://onthemap.ces.census.gov. 
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GRAPH 6 
NUMBER OF MALE SINGLES IN THE UNITED STATES OVER THE AGE OF 65 AND THEIR MARITAL STATUS, 2010 (IN MILLIONS)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, P23-212, 65+ in the United States: 2010, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., Report Issued June 2014, www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p23-212.pdf 
*Married, Spouse Absent indicates that the male was in the household but the spouse was not, likely due to prolonged hospitalization, living with relatives, etc.  
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Number of Male Singles in the United States Over the Age of 65 and Their Marital Status, 2010 (in millions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, P23-212, 65+ in the United States: 2010, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., Report Issued June 2014, 
www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p23-212.pdf  *Married, Spouse Absent indicat s that the male was in the household but the spouse was not, likely due 
to prolonged hospitalization, living with relatives, etc.   
 
2016 STATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT
150 THE RISE OF SINGLE-EARNER HOUSEHOLDS IN VIRGINIA: WHY IT MATTERS■
GRAPH 7
NUMBER OF FEMALE SINGLES IN THE UNITED STATES OVER THE AGE OF 65 AND THEIR MARITAL STATUS, 2010 (MILLIONS)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, P23-212, 65+ in the United States: 2010, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., Report Issued June 2014, www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p23-212.pdf 
*Married, Spouse Absent indicates that the female was in the household but the spouse was not, likely due to prolonged hospitalization, living with relatives, etc.  
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GRAPH 7 
 
Number of Female Singles in the United States Over the Age of 65 
and Their Marital Status, 2010 (millions) 
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Final Thoughts
Because of the politically charged nature of immigration, the changing 
ethnic and racial composition of the U.S. population has gained more 
attention than the changing marital status of the same population. 
Nevertheless, the rapid growth of the proportion of single-individual 
households (or single-family households) in our population literally is 
demanding attention. For young adults and single-parent households, 
delayed marriage (or no marriage at all) has been a fact of life for several 
decades. Divorce has become increasingly common. Policies designed to 
encourage the formation of two-parent households have been less than 
successful.  
At the other end of the spectrum, longer life spans have noticeably 
increased both the proportion of elderly people in our population and the 
proportion of single individuals as well.  
Hence, we now live in what might be termed the “Age of the Single.” Many 
of our taxation and social policies have been developed with a conventional 
model in mind – the “Ozzie and Harriet” model with two heterosexual 
parents and children. Reality is that this paradigm no longer accurately 
depicts the diversity of household styles we observe today. If there is 
a moral to our story, it almost surely is that this situation is going to 
require significant changes in the policies of both the federal and state 
governments, along with those of private-sector and nonprofit agencies.   
■LIBERTY UNIVERSITY: 
A HIGHER EDUCATION 
PHENOMENON
Liberty University is nothing less than a 
marvel. There are few stories like it in the 
entire history of higher education. They are 
teaching lessons to my institutions on a daily 
basis.
–  A senior higher education association 
official based in Washington, D.C.
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D
espite enrolling about three times 
as many headcount students as the 
next largest university in Virginia, 
Liberty University remains a mystery to many 
Virginians. Even those who know something of 
Liberty often think of it in terms of its genesis 
as Lynchburg Baptist College in 1971. They do 
not picture it as an institution that this year 
enrolled more than 100,000 students, or one 
that boasts an endowment of $1.093 billion. 
Nor do they visualize Liberty’s 7,000-acre 
campus, which features 357 buildings, $956 
million of ongoing or planned construction, 
and accredited law and osteopathic medicine 
schools.  
Liberty’s burst into prominence has many 
roots, but realistically can be dated to 
the appointment of Jerry Falwell Jr. as 
its president in 2007.1 Since then, its 
enrollment has grown 184 percent and 
includes approximately 95,000 online and 
almost 15,000 residential students (see 
Graph 1). Falwell’s vision for Liberty is 
surprising to those not familiar either 
with him or the university’s history. He 
forthrightly asserts that Liberty’s goal 
is to become the Evangelical Protestant 
equivalent of the University of Notre Dame 
for Roman Catholics and Brigham Young 
University for Mormons. This means having 
an academically selective student body; 
nationally ranked academic programs in 
virtually every major academic discipline; 
1   President Falwell earned a B.A. degree in religious studies from 
Liberty University in 1984 and a J.D. from the University of Virginia 
School of Law in 1987.
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Division I athletic teams, including a nationally prominent football 
team that competes successfully against some of the NCAA’s best; an 
inviting residential campus with state-of-the-art facilities; a campus 
atmosphere and ethic that promote high levels of student participation; 
and an endowment that rivals the best independent institutions and 
will buffer Liberty from future vicissitudes in the higher education 
marketplace.  
The university is planning for the day when its current prominence 
in online education will dissipate due to increased competition from 
other institutions and new technologies. If and when that day arrives, 
Falwell wants Liberty to fit securely into the niche of a medium-sized, 
selective, well-endowed, high-quality Christian academic community 
that graduates Christ-centered students and supports research, 
public service and exploration that support these students and others 
connected to the university.  
Even so, Falwell forthrightly states, “We’re not a church, we’re not a 
business, we’re a university.” He makes a firm distinction between Liberty 
and a class of institutions he refers to as Bible colleges. In this category, 
he includes schools such as Florida’s Pensacola Christian College, Ohio’s 
Cedarville University, Oklahoma’s Oral Roberts University and South 
Carolina’s Bob Jones University. He points out that these institutions 
have more limited missions than Liberty and impose much stricter belief 
and behavioral requirements on their students and faculty than does 
Liberty. Thus, he would position Liberty somewhere in the middle of a 
higher education religious/moral continuum that might have Cedarville, 
Oral Roberts and Bob Jones at one end and essentially secular public 
universities at the other end.  
As Graph 2 reveals, in terms of student curricular choices, Liberty is not 
just a Bible college. In 2014-15, almost one in every five students earned 
a degree in business, almost 14 percent in psychology and 11.3 percent in 
education. Philosophy and religious studies plus theology and religious 
education together accounted for only slightly less than one in five degrees 
granted by the university. Liberty also offers a small, but growing set of 
engineering programs that are accredited by the Accrediting Body for 
Engineering and Technology (ABET).
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Graph 1    
Liberty University Enrollment: 2007-08 to 2015-16 
 
Source: Liberty University 
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GRAPH 2
DEGREES GRANTED (ASSOCIATE, BACHELOR’S, MASTER’S, DOCTORAL) BY LIBERTY UNIVERSITY, 2014-15
Source: National Center for Education Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator
2	
	
Graph 2 
Degrees Granted (Associate, Bachelor’s, Master’s, Doctoral) by Liberty University, 2014-15 
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A Bit Of History
Lynchburg Baptist College opened its doors to 154 students in 1971 
after Rev. Jerry Falwell Sr. persuaded his Thomas Road Baptist Church 
congregation in Lynchburg to establish a college based on Christian values. 
This college would have the express purpose of educating students to “go 
out in all walks of life to impact this world for God.” 
From the very beginning, Falwell made it clear that the intention was 
not to be strictly a Bible college such as Pensacola Christian College, 
but rather a world-class institution with all of the amenities of a 
secular university. It is he who first enunciated the goal of developing an 
institution that would be the academic equivalent of Notre Dame and 
Brigham Young.
After Falwell’s death in 2007, his son Jerry Falwell Jr. was appointed 
by the university’s Board of Trustees to be president of the institution. 
Falwell is an impressive individual who clearly is passionate about Liberty 
and very knowledgeable about every aspect of its operations. Interestingly, 
while his administrative style sometimes involves going around the 
administrative hierarchy that he himself has carefully developed, he has 
not acquired the reputation of being a micromanager because he is results 
oriented and continues to focus on strategic issues.    
A friendly and charismatic individual, Falwell is refreshingly open and 
informative when answering questions about Liberty, and this attitude has 
carried over to those who report to him. Liberty is eager to tell its story, 
which it believes is a good one, yet one not necessarily well understood.  
In 1980, the university initially gained accreditation from the Southern 
Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS), widely reputed to be the 
most demanding of all the regional accrediting agencies. Currently, 
Liberty is classified as a Level I institution, acknowledging the breadth 
of its offerings from the associate degree level through the doctorate. 
The university endured a lengthy and sometimes frustrating process as 
it moved to satisfy SACS requirements. It would be fair to say that for 
some period of time, SACS apparently remained unconvinced that Liberty 
could offer its online programs at a level of quality that would merit 
accreditation. This process appears to have reflected SACS’ own leisurely, 
gradual evolution toward acceptance of the broader use of technology as a 
major supportive element in the teaching-learning process, concerns about 
faculty quality and library resources, and some doubts that Liberty had 
the financial resources to support a large online operation. It will suffice to 
observe that had Liberty sought accreditation for its online offerings from 
a different regional accrediting body, approval probably would have been 
forthcoming more rapidly.  
Initially, Liberty offered distance learning courses to students via 
videotapes that were sent to students. Between 2003 and 2005, the 
university changed its platform for delivery to Blackboard, a well-known 
learning management system (LMS), and began to use high-speed internet 
to deliver academic content completely online. Falwell candidly notes that 
Liberty’s faculty initially did not support online education proposals and 
programs – a circumstance common at other institutions. After receiving 
some resistance from faculty, several associate deans for online education 
were appointed to move the online projects forward despite faculty 
opposition.  
An important and not to be ignored key to gaining faculty cooperation 
and muting faculty disapproval was the nontenured status of all faculty 
at Liberty, excepting those in the law school. Faculty members at Liberty 
are appointed on one-year contracts. Tenure is not granted. Thus, at the 
end of the day, the choice for faculty was simple: either help the university 
move forward in the area of distance education, or find another job at 
a different institution. In 
discussing the absence of 
tenure at Liberty, Falwell 
opines that although there 
was a philosophical basis to 
the university’s decision not 
to grant tenure to faculty, 
“This also was a sound 
business decision.”  
Today, the National Center 
for Education Statistics 
Liberty University does grant tenure to 
faculty in its School of Law.  Without that 
provision, the American Bar Association 
likely would not have granted 
accreditation to the Liberty Law School.  
Liberty has successfully resisted the 
blandishments of accrediting agencies in 
all other disciplines.
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(NCES) reports that 85 percent of Liberty’s undergraduate students and 
97 percent of its graduate students take at least one course online. The 
average age of online students is 36.6 – making them older than is true for 
most other large online education providers.  
The university seems content to serve online students within the borders 
of the United States. When asked about expansion to other countries, 
senior Liberty staff said there were no plans to do so. They state that the 
university would find it difficult to deal with the financial, legal and lingual 
differences that would develop if students in other countries were served. 
Further, it would be difficult for faculty to serve and occasionally meet 
with online students in other countries. While this is not a completely 
persuasive explanation, it underlines the extent to which Liberty is a 
goal-oriented institution that focuses upon the pursuit of well-identified 
and widely accepted goals. Thus, when the university develops a new 
program (it currently offers more than 500 majors and options), or begins 
to address a new market, it is unified and confident that its current 
structure, resources and procedures augur for success. While Liberty has 
taken some huge risks over time (such as plunging into online learning), 
it is judicious about assuming unnecessary additional risks. The university 
believes it knows what works and proceeds along that path. It is difficult 
to quarrel with the results.  
The Liberty University 
Student Body
Liberty University’s leadership team is data oriented. They study the 
successes and failures of competitor institutions and use this knowledge 
to adjust and improve their own efforts. Who are Liberty’s competitors 
in terms of its residential student body? Not the institutions that some 
might guess. In 2015, the top three schools to which students who 
eventually enrolled at Liberty also sent their SAT and ACT scores were 
James Madison University, George Mason University and Virginia Tech. 
Interestingly, only two religious institutions were included among the top 
20 competitors, which essentially is a list of large state universities in 
Virginia and neighboring states such as North Carolina.    
Very few institutions of higher education simultaneously grow in size and 
quality. Liberty has found the way to do so. Even while it has burgeoned 
in size, the quality of students attending classes on its home campus in 
Lynchburg has increased. The mean high school grade point average of 
its entering freshman class in fall 2015 was 3.46, up from 3.25 in 2009. 
During the same period, the mean SAT score of the entering freshman 
class climbed from 1009 to 1063.  
Consistent with the goal of establishing Liberty as a selective, high-quality 
institution that will be mentioned in the same breath as Notre Dame or 
Brigham Young, the university is committed to continued increases in 
student quality. In fall 2015, it enrolled 35 National Merit Scholarship 
winners and has developed an active scholarship program designed to 
attract highly talented students.    
The university’s marketing efforts now focus primarily on the quality of 
incoming students rather than the quantity of students. Liberty, after all, 
does not lack for headcount students.  
The University’s Pricing And 
Financial Aid Model
Based upon survey responses, Liberty believes that the two most 
significant factors in students choosing the university as their online 
education provider are its competitive prices and its Christian orientation. 
A survey revealed that 83 percent of the university’s online students 
have a faith-based, religious connection to the university and chose 
Liberty because it is faith-based. Most often these faith-based students 
come from an Evangelical Protestant background, but they also include 
both individuals from other Protestant denominations and Roman 
Catholics for whom God is an important part of their lives. This spurs 
them to choose an education provider that, among other things, they feel 
will treat them equitably in an online educational universe where promises 
sometimes are made to be broken.  
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Liberty’s strategy with respect to the cost of attending the university is 
simple – it seeks to be much less expensive than the typical independent 
institution and within striking distance of its major state university 
competitors. Table 1 reveals that this has resulted in a parsimonious 
0.7 percent total increase in undergraduate tuition and fees between 
2012-13 and 2015-16 and only an 11.5 percent total increase in the annual 
cost of undergraduate residential attendance over the same time period.  
TABLE 1
UNDERGRADUATE TUITION AND FEES AND NET PRICE AT 
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY, 2012-13 TO 2015-16
2012-13  2013-14  2014-15 2015-16
Undergraduate 
Tuition and Fees
$19,968 $18,274 $21,000 $20,109
Total On-Campus 
Expenses
$32,018 $33,238 $34,000 $35,809
Undergraduate 
Net Price After 
Financial Aid
$23,191 $23,367 N.A. N.A.
Source: National Center for Education Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/
collegenavigator/?q=Liberty+University&s=VA&id=232557
Over time, Liberty has become more cost competitive with institutions 
both in the public and independent sectors of higher education. What 
counts in this regard is the net price that students pay after their receipt 
of financial aid. Graph 3 illustrates that where in-state residential 
students are concerned, Liberty remains more expensive in net terms than 
its major public-sector competitors, but compares favorably with regard 
to out-of-state students. Within the realm of independent institutions, 
Liberty is highly competitive in terms of its net price.  
Liberty’s online courses are considerably less expensive – typically $1,365 
per three-hour course for a part-time student. Hence, one could take 10 
online courses (a full year’s load for an undergraduate student that usually 
would lead to graduation in four years) for a total price of $13,650, well 
below the approximate $20,000 sticker price that full-time residential 
students pay for tuition.
An important key to Liberty’s facility for attracting tens of thousands 
of students is the ability of those students to receive federal student 
financial aid. The Washington Post (July 15, 2015) reported that in the 
late 1990s, Liberty students received less than $20 million in total federal 
student financial aid, but by 2015, this had grown to $800 million. This aid 
included both grants and loans and was awarded to needy students who 
qualified under federal financial 
aid standards.  
Much of the federal financial aid 
goes to graduate students. The 
same Washington Post article 
also revealed that such graduate 
aid amounted to more than $351 
million in the 2013-14 academic 
year.   
Federal financial aid to Liberty students accelerated after 2009, when the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act increased Pell Grant funding 
by $15 billion nationally. National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) 
data reveal that in 2013-14, 23,465 undergraduate students at Liberty 
received $85.59 million in Pell Grant assistance – an average of $3,648 per 
student recipient – very similar to the average grant received by recipients 
at other institutions. Federal student loans to 31,298 undergraduate 
students added $8,030 per student to this total. Approximately 50 percent 
of the university’s undergraduate students received a Pell Grant and 
almost two-thirds received a federal student loan.  
Liberty University’s price for online instruction is $390 per credit hour or 
$1,170 per typical three-hour course for full-time students and $455 per 
credit hour, or $1,365 per course, for part-time students. Old Dominion 
University, the largest four-year public provider of distance learning in 
Virginia, charges $325 per credit hour, or $975 per online course ($1,065 
for out-of-state students). Southern New Hampshire University, one of the 
largest national online providers, charges $960 per undergraduate course 
and $1,881 per graduate course.
An important reason why such a 
high percentage (96 percent) of 
Liberty students receive financial 
aid is that the university itself 
provides substantial financial 
support to its students. In 2015-16, 
this amounted to $235 million.
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These data underline that the Liberty student body by and large is not one 
composed of individuals who are well heeled financially. Measured student 
financial need is great. NCES reports that in 2014-15, 96 percent of 
Liberty’s first-time freshmen received some sort of institutional financial 
aid. This means that access to federal student aid is absolutely essential 
– both to the students (and their families) and to the university. It is 
accurate to say that the U.S. government has financed a non-negligible 
portion of Liberty’s expansion. Though indirect, there has been a rich flow 
of funds from American taxpayers to the university’s financial bottom line. 
We hasten to note that Liberty is hardly the Lone Ranger in this 
regard; similar circumstances exist for many other institutions of higher 
education. Federal student financial aid is a vitally important indirect 
source of institutional financial sustenance at virtually all levels of higher 
education.    
Even though Liberty students typically incur substantial federal loan debt 
during their time at the university, their default rate on federal loans 
(8.5 percent for the most recent student cohort) was well below the 
national average (11.8 percent), as well as less than that for student 
borrowers from public institutions (11.7 percent) and the Virginia average 
(8.7 percent).2    
Discussions with Liberty personnel revealed that they believe they face 
what economists term a “price elastic” demand for the university’s 
educational services. This means that Liberty’s students are rather price 
sensitive. What is important in this regard is the university’s relative 
price – how this price compares to those at other institutions. In this 
regard, Liberty’s modest recent price increases have improved its cost 
competitiveness. 
In the final analysis, four major factors underpin the university’s 
skyrocketing enrollment: (1) its cost competitiveness; (2) the ability of 
its student body to receive federal financial aid support; (3) its religious 
and moral attractiveness to many students; and (4) the quality of its 
educational product. These factors work together and are mutually 
reinforcing.    
2  http://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator
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GRAPH 3
NET FIRST-TIME UNDERGRADUATE COST OF ATTENDANCE AFTER FINANCIAL AID: SELECTED INSTITUTIONS, 2013-14
Source: College Navigator, National Center for Education Statistics
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Academic Programs
Liberty University offers a somewhat astonishing 547 programs of study 
that range from undergraduate and graduate certificate programs to the 
doctoral level. Included among these are 355 residential and 267 online 
programs, with some programs available both on campus and online. In 
addition to typical degree programs, Liberty offers a variety of vocationally 
oriented associate degrees, including those that prepare students to be 
airline flight attendants and aviation maintenance technicians. In 2013, 
the university opened a College of Osteopathic Medicine.  
Liberty’s offerings also include some Spanish language degree programs 
via online classes, an online program via homeschooling, an Online 
Academy, a dual-enrollment program for high school students wanting to 
earn college credit while still in high school, and a free American History 
Orientation course on the massive open online course (MOOC) platform. 
Liberty frequently has allowed innovative faculty and staff to “try 
things out” (the words of a staff member) to see what works. The 
university’s organizational structure and traditions have proven to be 
more conducive to rapid deployment of innovations than typically has 
been the case at older, more traditional institutions.  
Faculty, Students And 
Expectations
FACULTY
Liberty University employs more than 2,500 faculty members, of whom 
more than 1,700 are full time. This results in a combined residential 
undergraduate, graduate and online student/faculty ratio of 18:1. Eighty 
percent of the faculty members (including those who teach online) hold 
a terminal degree in their discipline. The quality of the credentials of 
Liberty’s faculty was an important factor in SACS’ decision to extend 
accreditation to the university, including its extensive online programs. 
Many online institutions struggle to appoint credentialed faculty who truly 
are committed to their online teaching activities. This is an area where 
Liberty appears to excel, not the least because its faculty subscribe to a 
common vision and set of Christian beliefs. These serve as mortar that 
binds together the institution and its faculty. 
At this point in its history, Liberty is not a research-intensive institution. 
Teaching and counseling students is considered to be the most important 
activity of faculty members. Some professors do generate significant 
scholarly productivity, but this is not their primary task. As a 
consequence, it remains to be seen if Liberty will be able to crack 
the upper reaches of national university rankings (and those within 
individual academic disciplines). For better or worse, the coin of 
the realm in academic rankings is a considerable cohort of faculty 
members who consistently publish in top-flight refereed outlets, garner 
externally funded research grants and obtain external consultancies. 
The waves generated by the scholarship of faculty remain far more 
important in prestige contests than their teaching abilities.  
A primary reason that current academic ranking systems typically assign 
little or no importance to the quality of teaching and learning is because 
that quality would be difficult to measure, even if there were agreement 
on how to define it. Instead, the ranking systems that identify the Notre 
Dames and Brigham Youngs of the world focus on institutional financial 
characteristics, the quality of facilities, the measured quality of the student 
body, faculty salaries, subsequent student employment and incomes, and 
faculty scholarly accomplishments. Liberty’s current institutional model 
enables it to address most of these criteria, but would appear to fall short 
where faculty scholarly productivity, funded research and faculty external 
reputation are concerned. Many (perhaps most) citizens would applaud 
Liberty for its emphasis on teaching and serving students rather than 
on research, some of which might be considered to have marginal value 
to society. Nonetheless, that is not how the ranking and prestige game is 
played.  
All those who accept a faculty position at Liberty must sign a doctrinal 
statement that affirms both their belief in God and in Jesus Christ as their 
savior. This may deter some people from competing for faculty positions at 
the university, but does lend cohesion and principle to the faculty members 
who ultimately are appointed. Faculty members are not required to attend 
worship services or to do anything visibly religious beyond professing their 
beliefs via the doctrinal statement.  
163
Liberty does not report its faculty salaries to the American Association of 
University Professors (AAUP). Graph 4 lists the average faculty salaries 
by rank as reported by American School Search for 2015-16. It should be 
noted that American School Search, an online resource for prospective 
students and their parents, reports faculty salaries generally ranging 
higher than those transmitted to the AAUP. Thus, more attention should 
be given to Liberty’s relative positioning with respect to other institutions 
than to the absolute salary levels. Graph 5 provides data for specific 
institutions. Except for James Madison University, Liberty is not paying its 
full professors as much as its large state university competitors.      
Are these faculty salary deficits problematic for Liberty? Not necessarily. 
The institution does not appear to have difficulty attracting and retaining 
qualified faculty and nearly all of its academic programs have attained 
the highest possible disciplinary accreditations. However, should Liberty 
decide to invest more heavily in doctoral programs and research, then the 
differentials identified in Graphs 2 and 3 would become highly relevant, 
as would the absence of longer-term faculty contracts or tenure, and the 
university’s strong institutional commitment to teaching.  
Since February 2016, Liberty has been designated a Carnegie Doctoral 
University R3, which is indicative of “modest research activity.” Previously, 
it was considered to be a master’s degree-level institution. Ours is not to 
advocate changes in the university’s mission, but rather to point out that 
further evolution in the area of doctoral programs will bring with it a set 
of challenges that presumptively might alter the nature of the institution 
as it currently stands.  
STUDENTS
Liberty University’s student body is racially and ethnically less diverse 
than the overall roster of college students in the United States. Fifteen 
percent of Liberty undergraduates are African-Americans, 2 percent 
Hispanic and 1 percent Asian. Fifty-nine percent are women. Residential 
or online, students are not required to sign a doctrinal statement similar 
to faculty, but instead must acknowledge and follow the behavioral 
precepts outlined in the university’s codes of conduct. These include 
adherence to ethical academic principles and standards of personal 
behavior. For residential students, there is a dress code and more specific 
rules that ban certain media, such as X-rated movies. All students “are 
asked to display mature Christian behavior in social interaction,” including 
at athletic events. When students conspicuously fail to meet the standards 
found in the “Liberty Way,” they are not automatically expelled, but 
instead are taken under counseling. President Falwell believes that peer 
pressure often turns out to be the most effective way to inspire desired 
changes in behavior.    
All unmarried Liberty students who attend classes on the Lynchburg 
campus and are under age 21 are required to live on campus. There 
are spiritual coaches and prayer groups within the residence halls. All 
residential students and students who commute to the home campus are 
required to attend convocations on Monday, Wednesday and Friday during 
the academic year. The subject matter often is religious, but convocations 
also include addresses on a wide variety of economic, social and political 
topics by an absolutely impressive list of elected officials, candidates 
for office and people successful in their fields. Virtually every major 
presidential candidate comes to Lynchburg to be seen and heard, including 
Sen. Bernie Sanders in September 2015 and Donald Trump in January 
2016. Sanders’ appearance was notable because Liberty traditionally 
has tipped strongly in the direction of the Republican Party. Indeed, 
Falwell endorsed Trump for president. (The university does not endorse 
candidates.)
Student behavioral requirements are less stringent in the case of online 
students (who in any case typically are much older than on-campus 
students) and the university makes no attempt to monitor the personal 
behavior of its off-the-main-campus students. Nevertheless, the Liberty 
University Online codes of honor leave no doubt what the purpose of the 
institution is: “… man’s ultimate purpose is to glorify God” and, “The 
Academy exists to help each student realize his full potential by guiding 
him in developing spiritually and morally.”  
Available evidence suggests that student satisfaction with Liberty is 
rather high. The retention rate for resident undergraduate students from 
year to year hit 85.3 percent in 2015-16, a number that most colleges and 
universities would covet. Fall to spring undergraduate retention in spring 
2016 was 94.2 percent, a historical high for the university.
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GRAPH 4
AVERAGE FACULTY SALARIES BY RANK, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY AND VIRGINIA AVERAGE, 2015-16
Source: American School Search, www.american-school-search.com
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GRAPH 5
AVERAGE FULL PROFESSOR SALARIES AT SELECTED VIRGINIA INSTITUTIONS, 2015-16
Source: American School Search, www.american-school-search.com
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Graph 5 
Average Full Professor Salaries at Selected Virginia Institutions, 2015-16 
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Intercollegiate Athletics
An important part of the Liberty University dream is that the institution 
will field nationally successful Division I intercollegiate athletic teams 
in every major sport. This vision certainly includes football, where the 
Flames anticipate being invited to join the NCAA’s Division I Football 
Bowl Series (FBS) Division. This would involve Liberty leaving the Big 
South Conference and likely competing as an independent for some period 
of time. It also implies expansion of the university’s Williams Stadium, 
which though renovated in 2010, has a seating capacity of only 19,200. 
Already under construction is an indoor football practice facility that will 
have a major positive impact on the university’s ability to recruit quality 
football players.  
Liberty opened its 2016 football season with a game at Virginia Tech and 
also played on the road at Southern Methodist University. This was not 
accidental scheduling – a big-time, highly visible, successful football team 
is an important part of Liberty’s self-image for its future. Notably, in the 
university’s boardroom, one can find on a wall a copy of a 2012 letter to 
Falwell from Father Theodore M. Hesburgh, the well-known president 
emeritus of the University of Notre Dame. Hesburgh, who knows more 
than a little bit about playing top-flight football outside a major conference 
as well as using football success to promote a university, commented that 
Liberty was on “the trajectory to success.” 
Measures Of Financial 
Success
It is one thing to increase enrollment via expansive new programs; it is 
quite another to do so in a financially sound, profitable manner. Graph 6 
reveals that Liberty University’s revenues in 2016 were 15 times as high as 
they were in 2000.  
One of the most remarkable aspects of Liberty’s ascent has been its 
simultaneous ability to grow its revenues and to control its costs. Graph 7, 
which reports the university’s net financial assets, demonstrates that its 
business model has been implemented in a very successful fashion. Since 
2007, when Falwell assumed leadership, the university’s net financial 
assets (endowment plus retained earnings) have increased in value 
from $150,756,140 to $1,811,000,000 – a 1,101 percent increase. 
Liberty’s net asset growth primarily reflects retained earnings 
generated by its productive business model.  
The 2016 value of the university’s endowment is a healthy $1.093 
billion. While Liberty has received some gifts that have added to its 
endowment, the predominant source of endowment growth has been the 
institution’s positive annual cash flows. The two primary purposes of the 
endowment are to sustain the university into perpetuity and to provide 
scholarship aid to students.
The salient point, however, is this: In addition to attractive, well-regarded, 
accredited academic programs, Liberty has developed a very successful 
business model that generates impressively large cash flows. These cash 
flows emanate primarily from the institution’s online offerings. As such, 
they are subject to the vagaries of a rapidly evolving higher education 
marketplace.    
New online competitors have been appearing across the spectrum – some 
that undercut Liberty in price, others that cream skim the upper portions 
of the market and still others that roughly imitate many of the things 
Liberty is doing. The online education market space is becoming crowded 
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and beckoning constantly are new technologies, innovative methods of 
delivery and new software packages that purport to enhance learning.  
All of this makes Liberty’s future in the online education arena 
somewhat uncertain, a reality that occupies an important part of 
Falwell’s thinking as he contemplates the university’s future. He 
believes that Liberty’s online enrollments, which declined a bit 
in 2015-16, gradually will recede to much lower levels. Hence, 
he seeks to prepare Liberty for the day when it will be a well-
endowed, high-quality institution with 15,000 residential students 
and considerably fewer online offerings. And, yes, spoken about in the 
same breath as Notre Dame and Brigham Young.  
Falwell wants to have an endowment of $3 billion or more when that day 
arrives. If the university can maintain its current annual cash flows, it 
could achieve this goal by 2022. This prognosis, however, presumes a great 
degree of stability in the online education marketplace that may not be 
merited. Hence, 2025 or later may be a less risky projection.  
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GRAPH 6
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY’S ANNUAL REVENUES, 2000-2016
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Graph 6 
Liberty University’s Annual Revenues, 2000-2016 
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GRAPH 7
THE VALUE OF LIBERTY UNIVERSITY’S NET FINANCIAL ASSETS, 2000-2016
Source: Liberty University
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The Lynchburg Connection
The Lynchburg metro area boasts more than 250,000 residents. Liberty 
University, with approximately 8,800 employees, is the largest employer in 
the region, followed by Centra Health with approximately 6,500 employees. 
Liberty has become Lynchburg’s most important economic engine. A 2014 
economic impact study of the university performed by Mangum Economics 
asserted that one of every five jobs in the city of Lynchburg is due to 
Liberty, which generated $1.1 billion in local economic activity and $9.2 
million in additional tax revenues for the city.3  
The university’s relationships with the city of Lynchburg are friendly and 
cooperative, but perhaps this was not always so. In recent years, it has 
been virtually impossible for anyone in Lynchburg not to understand that 
Liberty has been providing badly needed economic energy to an otherwise 
somewhat torpid local economy. This has encouraged elected officials 
and government employees to treat the university’s requests with greater 
dispatch and concern. This is a story common to many cities that host a 
rapidly growing college or university.   
Liberty recently found an additional way to stimulate the local economy 
when it purchased 75 percent of the nearby River Ridge Mall. New 
restaurants, retail stores and entertainment venues are planned, with 
some possibly incorporated in an open-air concept. The mall represents 
part of a deliberate diversification of Liberty’s investment portfolio and 
represents its third investment in a local shopping center.    
 
3   www.newsadvance.com/news/local/study-lu-has-billion-in-local-economy-impact/article_eb414992-8fbd-
11e4-b121-176903d07d6e
Final Thoughts
The analysis in this chapter has not touched on the Moral Majority, 
conservative politics, lawsuits against the Affordable Care Act, guns 
on campus or any of the other hot-button issues that some people 
associate with Liberty University. Instead, the focus has been upon the 
institution as an academic and economic phenomenon. One should not 
allow what one observer termed “the issues” to divert one’s attention from 
the amazing transformation that has occurred at Liberty in recent years.
President Falwell clearly notes, “From the beginning, our goal was not to 
create another Bible college. Our vision is to create academic excellence, 
world-class facilities, NCAA Division I athletics and abundant student 
activities, and to provide all of this within a distinctively Christian 
environment.” A fair reading of the evidence leads one to observe that 
Liberty is well along the path to achieving those goals.  
There is more work to be done before the university can reach its 
goals, and no doubt it will be challenged significantly by the rapidly 
changing higher education environment. Nevertheless, few institutions 
have demonstrated more ability to assess higher education trends and 
the emerging needs of students. Thus far, and without question, it has 
been an impressive ride.  
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